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Summary 
This dissertation reflects critically on the calls for the decolonisation of South Africa’s 
higher education sector by studying the historical development of legal pedagogy in 
South African law faculties. It focuses in particular on the intellectual property law 
curriculum broadly, and more specifically on the copyright law module. Africa’s 
colonisation by Western powers ravaged it in various ways. This is starkly illustrated 
in the areas of knowledge production and research. Against this background the 
dissertation teases out the prevailing extent, depth, and reach of colonialism in the 
copyright law curriculum with the aim of identifying possible ways to give practical 
effect to the calls for the curriculum to be decolonised.  
To achieve this, the dissertation examines leading South African intellectual 
property law textbooks through an African lens in an express attempt to assert the 
pluriversal, epistemicological traditions of the global South. In each chapter and with 
each theme the dissertation proposes how an envisaged decolonised copyright 
curriculum could look.  
The dissertation grapples with the various theories underpinning the decolonial 
discourse, laying groundwork for an academically sound basis on which to 
decolonise the copyright law curriculum. It provides an African critique of the 
Eurocentric intellectual property law ‘justifications debate’ and posits communal 
modes of property ownership in Africa to counter Western individualistic notions of 
property ownership which lend credence to the current justification debate. The 
dissertation analyses the nature of copyright in a work using the philosophy of 
Ubuntu as an alternative in teaching this theme within the curriculum. A decolonial 
analysis of the requirements for copyright is offered, and it is argued that the current 
sta-ndards and threshold used for the subsistence of copyright is colonial and 
furthers the onslaught on the Black Body, both in its practical application and in how 
it is taught. The dissertation concludes by studying copyright exceptions, critically 
urging the academy to apply a differentiated model of exceptions to different 
jurisdictions in light of their colonial history (and present).  
Key words: Decolonisation, Africanisation, Epistemology, Mohlomism, Copyright 
law curriculum, Critical Pedagogy, Ubuntu, Transmodernity. 
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Isirhunyezo 
Lomtlolo utjheja ihlangothi lokufuna bona kutjhugululwe iimfundo zemkhakheni 
wezefundo ephakamileko yangeSewula Afrika ngokufunda ngetuthuko yokufunda 
kanye nokufundisa ngemNyangweni wabajameli. Utjheja khulu umthetho wepahla 
wezefundo khudlwana kanye nomthetho welungelo lokukhuphela. Ukuthunjwa 
kweAfrika ngabamhlophe kone ngeendlela ezinengi. Lokhu kutjengiswa kumbi 
mikhakha ekhiqiza ilwazi kanye nerhubhululako. Ngalesi isendlalelo lomtlolo utjheja 
ngokudephileko ukobana ukuthunjwa kweAfrika ngabamhlophe kulethe muphi 
umuthelela ngehlangothini lomthetho welungelo lokukhuphela lezefundo 
ngomqopho wokufumana iindlela nofana iinzathu zokobana kutjhugululwe ifundo 
yangeemfundweni eziphakamileko. Ukuphumelelisa lokhu, lomtlolo uhlahluba 
iincwadi zobuhlakaniphi bomthetho wepahla ngokutjheja indlela yokwenza izinto 
ngeSewula. Isahluko esinye nesinye kanye nommongo omunye nomunye utjheja 
bona ifundo etjhugululweko ingaba njani.  
Lomtlolo utjheja amathiyori atlolweko kanye nekukhulunywa ngawo lawo akhe 
umkhanyo wokutjhugulula zefundo. Utjheja isiphoqo seAfrika ngobuhlakaniphi 
babamhlophe ngomthetho wepahla ‘ikulumopikiswano yesizathu sokwenza 
okuthileko’ begodu ibeka ngaphambili indlela yokwabelana ipahlo eAfrika 
ukulwisana nendlela yabamhlophe yokungabelani ipahlo ekubange 
ikulumopikiswano yesizathu sokwenza okuthileko. Lomtlolo uhlaziya isisusa 
sokukhuphela ngokutjheja ikolelo yegama elithi ‘Ubuntu’ njengegama elisetjenziswa 
lokha nakufundiswa lommongo eemfundweni. Indlela etjhugululweko yokuhlaziya 
iimfuneko sokukhuphela yindlela yabamhlophe begodu igandelela indlu enzima, 
ngendlela yokwenza kanye nangendlela efundiswa ngayo. 
Lomtlolo uphetha ngokufunda isiphambuki sokukhuphela, ngokubawa isikolo 
ukobana sisebenzise indlela ehlukileko kunaleyo ebegade isetjenziswa 
ngabamhlophe ekadeni kanye nesikhathini sanje. 
Amagama aqakathekileko: 
Ukutjhugulula umbuso ukobana uzijamele, ukwenza izinto ngendlela ye-Afrika, 
ikolelo epilweni ehlahla indlela yokuziphatha neyokwenza izinto, uMohlomi, 
umthetho wokukhuphela wezefundo, indlela yokufunda nokufundisa 
eqakathekileko, ubuntu, iTransmodernithi. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The chaotic student protests that engulfed South Africa between 2015 and 2016 
under the banner of #FeesMustFall were a clarion call for the academy to engage 
in the continuing process of intellectual introspection.1 This is in light of the calls by 
students for fee-free, quality, and decolonised education.2 The dialogue is nuanced 
by demands of university and TVET students in 2015/2016, protesting for free 
education – free not only as regards access, but also free from capitalist, 
Eurocentric, and colonial demands.3 Admittedly, the calls for decolonisation pre-
date the #FeesMustFall protests,4 however, where the Bachelor of Laws (LLB) is 
concerned, these events brought two vital questions to the fore: (1) What is the 
content taught to students? and (2) How is it taught?5  
This chapter provides a background to the calls for the decolonisation of higher 
education, linking these calls to the LLB curriculum as taught in South African 
universities. The background sets the basis for the chapters that follow by providing 
context to the research undertaken in this dissertation.  
After setting out the aims of the research, preliminary assumptions are identified and 
the methodology applied to come to the research findings is explained. This chapter 
also briefly narrates extant theorising on the challenges facing legal education in 
South Africa, pointing to those aspects which are the focus of the dissertation. The 
                                                             
1  Mabasa K ‘The rebellion of the Born Un-frees: Fallism and the Neo-Colonial Corporate 
University’ (2017) 39/2 Strategic Review for Southern Africa 95. 
2  Ibid 101. 
3  Le Grange L ‘Decolonising the university curriculum’ (2016) 30/2 South African Journal of 
Higher Education 2. The author quotes one of the leading figures of the #FeesMustFall 
movement and now EFF member of parliament, Vuyani Pambo, verbatim: ‘We don’t want to 
treat the symptoms, we want to decolonise the university – that is at the heart of the cause.’ 
Pambo’s statement comports with that of his comrade, Alex Hotz: ‘As a law student, I believe 
decolonising the law faculty goes beyond the faculty and the institution. It speaks to what the 
law is and how it is used within society.’ See Himonga C & Diallo F ‘Decolonisation and 
teaching law in Africa with special reference to living customary law’ (2017) 20/1 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2. 
4  Manzini NZ ‘Reflections on the presence of police and private security at the University of 
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg’ (2017) 33/3-4 Agenda 78. 
5  Himonga C & Diallo F ‘Decolonisation and teaching law in Africa with special reference to 
living customary law’ 4–5. 
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chapter lays ground for deepened analysis of the meaning of decoloniality which is 
done in the second chapter. 
1.2 Background  
The recent decade sounds in various debates about the quality of LLB graduates 
produced by the seventeen law faculties in South Africa. The debate initially 
stemmed from judges who complained that most LLB graduates could neither read 
nor write6 and lacked basic numeracy skills.7 This brought legal education under 
scrutiny and prompted diverse concerned groups to probe the potential causes. This 
reality laid bare the truth that there were challenges facing the LLB curriculum which 
were in urgent need of attention.8 In 2017, the Council on Higher Education (CHE) 
set ball rolling to review the LLB curriculum, culminating in a comprehensive report 
titled: The State of the provision of the Bachelor of Laws (LLB) qualification in South 
Africa.9 Broadly, the report shows that all South African law faculties face different 
challenges and all have weaknesses in their delivery of the LLB degree. The 
weaknesses vary from the number of modules in the programme, the type of 
modules taught, the different pedagogical ideologies, the programme’s ability to 
train critical thinking skills, reading and writing skills, and other graduate-related 
attributes. The report, inter alia, finds that the purpose of the LLB programme is to 
prepare its graduates adequately for legal practice, for the world of work, and for 
postgraduate studies (academe).10 However, while all the institutions were engaging 
with these aspects, an imbalance in the focus areas of the LLB programme was 
                                                             
6  Bauling A ‘Towards a Sound Pedagogy in Law: A Constitutionally Informed Dissertation as 
Capstone Course in the LLB Degree Programme’ (2017) 20/1 Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 3. The author argues that most existing skills courses in South African law faculties 
is inadequate as regards remedying the skills crisis, and as a result many graduates enter 
legal practice without mastering basic skills required for legal practice.  
7  Modiri J ‘The Crises in legal education’ (2014) 46/3 Acta Academica 8-9. The author 
responds to this complaint by judges saying that it is facile merely to complain about skills of 
law graduates, without interrogating deeper issues about the foundations of post-apartheid 
South African law, the substantive content of the courses taught in law schools, and the 
political/ideological perspective that informs them. He posits that the genesis should be 
critical theory, thus calling for a thorough reconceptualization of the content, culture and 
practices in legal education.  
8  Sedutla M ‘Time to change the LLB degree?’ (2019) July De Rebus 3. 
9  Council on Higher Education The State of the provision of the Bachelor of Laws (LLB) 
qualification in South Africa https://www.che.ac.za/media_and_publications/accreditation-
and-national-reviews/state-provision-bachelor-laws-llb   (date of use: 10/08/2019). 
10  These three purposes are the abridged version of the purpose of the LLB qualification as 
provided in the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) framework. See generally, 
SAQA Online Portal http://regqs.saqa.org.za/viewQualification.php?id=22993  
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identified. Certain law faculties were found to be stuck in ‘old habits’ of focusing on 
preparing students for practice, but neglected the other two focus areas.11  
The report calls for an extensive transformation of legal education in South Africa. 
In its recommendations as regards curriculum reform, it states: 
Decolonisation speaks to the need to transform the LLB curriculum and the 
teaching and learning content of applicable modules in a manner that, while 
mindful of constitutional norms and principles, steers a clear path between the 
need to ‘Africanise’ the curriculum and the need to educate students on the 
globalised environment within which law is practised. African-based themes and 
an African context must permeate law teaching far more than is currently the 
case – but in a way that does not neglect the importance of maintaining a global 
perspective on national and international law.12 
On decolonisation of the LLB curriculum, the report further finds that: 
SALDA currently plays a facilitative role in discussions on and designs of 
decolonised LLB curricula within the respective law faculties/schools. SALDA 
should continue to play this role, and faculties/schools should be encouraged to 
pay dedicated attention to this important component of LLB re-curriculation.13 
The report’s findings point to a new way of thinking about how the law is taught, 
insisting on transformative constitutionalism14 as a bedrock of a transformed LLB 
curriculum while also expressly paving the way for decolonised articulations of legal 
pedagogy. 
Discussions problematising South Africa’s legal education predate the CHE LLB 
report, and various scholars have grappled with this topic since the dawn of 
democracy in South Africa.15  
                                                             
11  Council on Higher Education The State of the provision of the Bachelor of Laws (LLB) 
qualification in South Africa 21-22. 
12  Ibid Section D-1.9, 54. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid 18. The report sets out, in its terms of reference, to use four standards to measure the 
suitability of the various LLB programs: Transformative constitutionalism; Responsiveness 
to social justice; Responsiveness to globalisation; and Responsiveness to ever-evolving 
information technology. The standards of globalisation as well as social justice expressly 
justify the decolonial project where the LLB curriculum is concerned. 
15  See generally, Greenbaum L ‘Current issues in legal education: A comparative review’ 
(2012) 23/1 Stellenbosch Law Review 16-39. See also, Field T ‘Demystifying and 
problematising the paradigm shift affecting legal education’ (2005) 16/2 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 324-348, and Dlamini C ‘The law teacher, the law student and legal education in 
South Africa’ (1992) 109/4 South African Law Journal 595-610. See further Klare K ‘Legal 
Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14/1 South African Journal of Human 
Rights 146-188, and Modiri J ‘Transformation, tension and transgression: Reflections on the 
culture and ideology of South African legal education’ (2013) 24/3 Stellenbosch Law Review 
455-479. 
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Dlamini acknowledges that the fundamental question in the LLB curriculum lies in 
honestly grappling with the purpose of legal education. He, insists that law teachers 
should always look to the end-goal.16 Beyond the expectation that law graduates 
should be able to think logically and critically,17 legal education should engender a 
strong sense of social justice in a student.18 Dlamini argues that colonial and 
apartheid legal education is not in a position to realise this ideal, especially for black 
students.19  
Instead of producing graduates who think and reason critically, law faculties are 
producing graduates who are dogmatic – albeit with knowledge of black letter law.20 
This reality is born of positivist21 and formalist legal traditions which continue to 
define South African law faculties; an ingrained belief in two ideologies – (1) that law 
is immune to politics and questions of morality; and (2) that one legal rule results in 
one legal answer, so insisting that the law is value-neutral.22  
Quinot proposes transformative legal education as an alternative to the current 
situation:  
In my view transformative legal education can help us to realize that the 
changes facing legal education in South Africa do not result in relativism, but 
rather in the recognition of, and the subsequent identification of, ways to cope 
with the complexity inherent in the endeavor of legal education.23 
                                                             
16  Dlamini ibid 596. 
17  South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) Online Portal PURPOSE AND RATIONALE 
OF THE QUALIFICATION  1 http://regqs.saqa.org.za/viewQualification.php?id=22993 (date 
of use: 06/06/2018). 
18  Dlamini ‘The law teacher, the law student and legal education in South Africa’ 595. This  view 
is echoed by Modiri that in the discussion about South African legal education the stakes are 
the ideal of justice itself. See Modiri J ‘The crises in legal education’ 3. 
19  Dlamini ibid 597. The author specifically retells of the story of former apartheid student 
leader, Onkgopotse Tiro’s iconic speech at the University of the North’s graduation ceremony 
on 29 April 1972. For the full speech see Azanian Peoples Organization ‘Graduation Speech 
by Onkgopotse Tiro at the University of the North, 29 April 1972’ 
http://azapo.org.za/graduation-speech-by-onkgopotse-tiro-at-the-university-of-the-north-29-
april-1972/ (Accessed on 06/11/2019). Dlamini (at 606), argues that Tiro’s speech was 
indicative of the reality that the education that black people were receiving at universities 
was not ‘real education’. From this argument it can be drawn that an LLB curriculum that 
follows apartheid patterns can be likened to the education bemoaned by Tiro.  
20  Modiri J ‘The crises in legal education’ 4 where he argues that the cognitive poverty of legal 
theory resulted in the study of law as an entomolgy of rules and a science of what legally 
exists.  
21  Modiri ibid defines positivism as the epistemological recasting of law as a science or as a 
pure discipline as well as the construction of a discursive opposition between the legal and 
the non-legal. 
22 Zitzke E ‘Stop the illusory nonsense! Teaching transformative delict’ (2014) 46/3 Acta 
Academica 61.  
23  Quinot G ‘Transformative Legal Education’ (2012) 129/3 South African Law Journal 431. 
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Transformative legal education is drawn from existing theorising on the concept of 
transformative constitutionalism,24 and means that new areas of law must be 
accommodated in the curriculum, and that the curriculum should shift paradigms to 
become Constitution based.25 This type of legal education represents a move from 
positivism and formalism in that it transcends merely teaching the substance of the 
law to inculcate newer methods of reasoning which include morality, policy, and 
politics.26  
Quinot summarises transformative legal education as an action of moving from 
transmission to construction – the former being the pedagogy of the teacher who 
transmits knowledge to an empty student; the latter being teaching through 
constructing new knowledge with both the teacher and the student acting as 
knowledge creators27 and partners in knowledge production.28 
Zitzke opines that legal education in South Africa has reached a ‘code-red’ status,29 
problematising conservative legal traditions in terms of which teachers train students 
to become docile bodies fit to serve at the behest of capitalist interests.30 Most 
crucially, this type of legal education embraces positivist ideals and urges students 
to be indifferent towards South Africa’s apartheid and colonial reality.31   
Modiri intervenes that the crisis is not merely with the law curriculum, but also with 
the law itself; like Zitzke, he posits that legal education is linked to profit and the 
marketability of law graduates.32 Modiri insists that the response to the challenges 
                                                             
24  Ibid 422. 
25  Ibid 414. This is an opinion that Modiri is diametrically opposed to, insisting that critical legal 
theory should be a solution to the challenges facing the LLB curriculum, and that this is more 
expansive than simply affirming the supremacy of the Constitution. See Modiri J ‘The crises 
in legal education’ 10. 
26  Quinot ibid 415 
27  Modiri J ‘The crises in legal education’ 14, where he opines that critical legal education, 
which combines both critical legal theory and critical pedagogy, accords the relationship 
between the teacher and a student a degree of integrity and sacredness which affirms 
students, insisting that students should be allowed to bring their experiences and thoughtful 
reflections in the classroom, and that this would enrich the teaching and learning experience.  
28  Quinot G ‘Transformative Legal Education’ 419, 421 and 423. 
29  Zitzke E ‘Stop the illusory nonsense! Teaching transformative delict’ 53. 
30  Ibid 64. 
31  Ibid. The author uses the law of delict as an example of the prevalence of capitalist interests 
in the LLB curriculum. He argues that the delict module expressly assumes free market 
system ideology actively excluding alternative views such as Marxism or Socialism. This is 
an argument made by Modiri who insists that many South African law teachers, especially 
from private and mercantile law departments, tend to teach students that law is value-neutral 
and ignore the historical racist, colonial, and apartheid contexts. See Modiri J ‘The crises in 
legal education’ 6. 
32  Modiri ‘The crises in legal education’ 2. 
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faced by the LLB curriculum should go beyond superficial changes and adopt an 
alternative and more critical approach to legal education.33 This proposes a law 
curriculum geared towards the pedagogy of the humanities and aims to infuse a 
more expansive and imaginative conception of certain concepts currently taught in 
law – a curriculum which turns its back on the annexation of the law by capitalist 
ideals and interests.34 
Bauling contributes to the discourse by proposing that a capstone dissertation 
module be introduced in the LLB curriculum. She opines that such a module can 
resolve many of the challenges identified in the CHE report, including critical 
thinking, research skills, and reading and writing skills.35 She proposes that, 
[t]he capstone course should aim to assess both theoretical and practical 
knowledge, help students to identify valid and important issues in a particular 
field, provide them with the opportunity to evaluate the interaction and 
interrelatedness of the subcategories of a field, and open their minds to the fact 
that there may be more than one approach to every problem.36 
Bauling agrees with the views of both Quinot and the CHE report that transformative 
constitutionalism should be central in reshaping the LLB curriculum.37  
Zitzke is at odds with the proposal that transformative legal education is the solution 
for the LLB curriculum, and instead argues that the constitutional approach enjoys 
support from some lawyers because it carries legal weight, however it also 
entrenches neo-colonialism. This he bases on three factors: (1) the ideas that 
underpin human rights and private law are born from the intellectual work of Hugo 
de Groot and the subjective-rights tradition which represent an outdated 
understanding of individualistic natural law; (2) South African human rights, common 
law, and the supremacy of the Constitution subordinate customary law; and (3) the 
                                                             
33  Ibid 7. 
34  Ibid 17. 
35  Bauling A ‘Towards a Sound Pedagogy in Law: A Constitutionally Informed Dissertation as 
Capstone Course in the LLB Degree Programme’ 4. 
36  Ibid 6. 
37  Ibid 9, 13 where she argues that, ‘[b]y aligning the proposed dissertation module with the 
requirements inherent in TLE (transformative legal education) approach to teaching and 
learning, the student will have a more enriching learning experience which is better suited to 
instil the required graduateness attributes in the student.’ 
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constitutional order is subjected to Western paradigms and the epistemic traditions 
of the global North.38  
Heyns does not reject transformative constitutionalism and transformative legal 
education. However, she notes the paradox between change and stability, arguing 
that transformation requires change whereas constitutionalism assumes stability – 
ideologically contradictory ideals which may lead to varying outcomes.39  
Zitzke proposes a decolonial turn in the LLB curriculum, defining decolonisation as, 
‘[a] commitment to Africanization through conceptual decolonization.’40 He explains 
that Africanisation means centering African thought in the study of each discipline 
to make it contextually sensitive to Africa’s epistemological traditions and related 
ontologies.41 In the same breath, Zitzke defines conceptual decolonisation as the 
effort to ensure that there is no blanket acceptance of any concept, regardless of its 
point of origin.42  
This dissertation notes all these arguments, and specifically investigates the calls 
for higher education to be decolonised with the focus falling on the copyright law 
curriculum in the LLB degree. The dissertation describes the concerns that plague 
copyright law and offers ways in which copyright can be presented. 
1.3 Research aims 
The aim is, inter alia, to offer an African perspective (an African voice) on the various 
aspects of the copyright law curriculum. African solutions, deduced by applying an 
African lens to copyright law concepts, may contribute to the task of decolonising 
university curricula.43 Conversations about decolonising legal education are 
                                                             
38  Zitzke E ‘A decolonial critique of private law and human rights’ (2018) 34/3 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 502, 504, 506.  
39   Heyns A ‘The inoperative Community of Law Students: Rethinking foundations of legal 
culture’ (2014) 46/3 Acta Academica 85. 
40  Zitzke E ‘A decolonial critique of private law and human rights’ 494. 
41  Ibid 509. 
42  Ibid 512. 
43  Nabudere D ‘Towards the Establishment of a Pan-African University: A Strategic Concept 
Paper’ (2003) 8/1 African Journal of Political Sciences 1-3. Nabudere grapples with the idea 
of establishing a Pan-African university as a response to the need to decolonise higher 
education in Africa, he opines: ‘The challenge is that such a university must be a new 
university, not only in the approach to teaching and research, but more fundamentally, in its 
strategic conception and its placement at the base of African and human emancipation and 
liberation. In being a new university, it has to play the vital role of freeing knowledge 
production from narrow class, technical, and instrumentalist dominance by a few specialists 
to a broader theatre of recognition of other producers of knowledge, which matters in their 
lives and has validity in their cultural contexts. This is what has made the creation of such a 
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centered on two probes, and these are (1) What is the content taught to students? 
and (2) How is it taught?44 This dissertation focuses only on the former, and not the 
latter. A curriculum is inclusive of more than just a student textbook, and entails 
teaching methods, sciences and other varied pedagogical frameworks,45 however 
this dissertation limits itself to the two student textbooks that are meant for 
undergraduate students in South African law faculties. These two textbooks are 
Dean, Owen & Dyer, Alison. (2014). Introduction to intellectual property law Oxford 
University Press and Van der Merwe, A. (2016). Law of intellectual property in South 
Africa (2nd ed.) Lexis Nexis. The two textbooks are entry-level 
introductory/foundational books that are meant for students, lawyers, academics 
and anyone who wishes to understand the basics of Intellectual Property Law.  
The reliance on the two textbooks comports with the dissertation’s aim to focus 
solely on the content that is taught to students. This does not mean that these two 
textbooks are the embodiment of the copyright law curriculum in its entirety but is 
rather a representation of the content taught to students. 
This research aims to persuade law teachers to adopt an African lens when teaching 
copyright law.46 The dissertation preliminarily assumes that the curriculum follows 
                                                             
university more difficult because its creation would not only undermine existing dominant 
interests, but also challenge the citadel of Eurocentric paradigms and western “scientistic” 
epistemologies of knowledge.’ Nabudere’s conception suggests that a completely new 
university should be established and while this dissertation does not apply Nabudere’s 
conceptualization, it notes that the approach is legitimately one of the various approach 
through which decolonisation of higher education can be achieved. 
44  Himonga & Diallo (2017) 20/1 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 4–5. 
45  Indeed, a curriculum means more than merely the two textbooks that are used in this 
dissertation. Moreover, the dissertation appreciates that the structure of higher education in 
South Africa suggests that each university enjoys institutional autonomy and that each law 
faculty designs its own LLB programme. As a result, there is no uniformity/universality in how 
the law is taught in South African universities or even the content taught. The two textbooks 
give a good synopsis of the general content taught to students, but does not give the full 
picture of the curriculum because respective law faculties may also have study guides 
usually designed by the lecturers responsible for the module concerned. This is crucial to 
note because in certain parts of the dissertation (such as chapter 5 where material form and 
originality are discussed) law concepts are criticized for being Eurocentric, and thus colonial, 
as they appear in the textbooks, but such a shortcoming might reasonably be cured in lecture 
rooms by the lecturer’s additional material.  
46  Higgs P ‘The African Renaissance and the Decolonisation of the Curriculum’ 7-8 in Msila V. 
& Gumbo M. (eds) Africanising the Curriculum: Indigenous Perspectives and Theories. The 
author frames an African lens in the decolonial project as the need to reconstruct the 
curriculum in an African context. He argues that the context of Africa is attentive to the legacy 
of colonial period and seeks to assert both the teacher and the student as active role players 
in knowledge production, thus empowering them to gain confidence in their own capabilities. 
See further Kamwendo G ‘Unpacking Africanisation of higher education curricula: Towards 
a framework’ 18 in Msila V & Gumbo M. ibid 18. The author sets out a few meanings of 
Africanisation, arguing that its objective is, inter alia, to intergrate issues of concern to 
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on from the colonial history and present of South Africa’s copyright law regime. The 
most notable feature of a colonial copyright law is its lack a receptiveness to 
alternative ways of knowing,47 and its rejection of the pluriversal epistemic traditions 
of the global South. The aim of the dissertation is thus to dismantle and deconstruct 
the colonial lack of receptiveness to alternative epistemologies.48 The dissertation 
aims to investigate the prevailing extent, depth, and reach of colonialism in the 
copyright law curriculum and identifies possible ways to give practical effect to the 
calls for the curriculum to be decolonised.  
The end product of this dissertation seeks to challenge law teachers to consider 
fresh ways of teaching the law which will lead to the gradual transformation of the 
LLB curriculum. The calls to decolonise higher education in South Africa require a 
substantive response from the academy in general, and from law academics in 
particular.  
1.4  Methodology 
Trite academic strictures compartmentalize research methodology into either 
qualitative or quantitative research methodology. In limited instances, research may 
take a hybrid approach that infuses both methodologies. This dissertation 
deliberately breaks free from these trite strictures, preferring instead to give practical 
application to the ‘critical approach’ methodology that is proposed by Modiri.49 This 
methodology allows law researchers to cast critical theory as an alternative 
normative teaching methodology and includes subjects such as resistance 
                                                             
Africans into the curricula, Africanise the student body by actively recruiting black student, 
changing institutional culture by amending existing institutional instruments such as its 
mission statement and Africanising an institution’s research agenda.  
47  Santos B de S Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers 2014 196, ‘Be that as it may, epistemological diversity is not the simple reflection 
or epiphenomenon of ontological diversity or heterogeneity. There is no essential or definitive 
way of describing, ordering, and classifying processes, entities, and relationships in the 
world. The very action of knowing, as pragmatist philosophers have repeatedly reminded us, 
is an intervention in the world, which places us within it as active contributors to its making. 
Different modes of knowing, being irremediably partial and situated, will have different 
consequences and effects on the world.’ 
48  Modiri J ‘The time and space for Critical Legal Pedagogy’ (2016) 27/3 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 507-508 where the author argues that in transforming legal pedagogy there is a need 
to break free from the monochromatic logic of accepting a singular epistemology. He 
therefore, ‘call[s] for a new imagination: new definitions, new categories, new lines of 
enquiry, new practices and new mindsets’. 
49  Modiri J ‘The crises in legal education’ 9. 
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pedagogy, feminism, critical race theory, queer theory, postmodern criticism, and 
Marxism.50  
This methodology applies a critical approach in a textual analysis of various texts 
which include legislation, textbooks, journal articles, case law, internet sources, and 
reports. For each of these aspects, the following list of sources is engaged. (The 
chronology is not of particular significance.) 
> Human rights instruments (both local and international). 
> The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
> International intellectual property (IP) instruments. 
> The law of other (African) countries – when undertaking a comparative 
 analysis. 
> South African (SA) Acts, Bills, and Regulations. 
> SA case law. 
> Traditional law. 
> Textbooks.  
The dissertation tests current concepts against their historical counterparts with a 
view to merging the two to find a new product. The totality of the information 
gathered is viewed through the lens of decoloniality and the expected outcome will 
be to bring both Africanised and novel ideas to the copyright curriculum.  
To give practical application to this critical methodology, the dissertation uses 
concepts such as ‘heterarchical thinking’ and relational theory to study and analyse 
the various texts referenced above.  
Kelbrick calls for deeper thinking in embracing new ways of teaching intellectual 
property law – what decolonial scholarship terms ‘heterarchical thinking’, which is 
the idea that there is neither an autonomous nor a single logic, but multiple and 
complex ways of thinking within a single historical reality.51 Whereas Kelbrick 
speaks of the developed and developing nations dichotomy, decolonial scholars 
                                                             
50  Ibid 13.  
51  Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’ 217. 
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refer to the developing countries as colonised nations, and to developed countries 
as colonisers.  
This dissertation uses relational theory to provide a detailed analysis of some 
copyright law topics; the theory expressly sets out to critically posit copyright law as 
an instrument to serve humanity and not to regulate the individual rights of private 
owners of property.52  This reasoning does not suggest that the protection of 
individual rights to property is inimical to the communal normative commitments of 
humanity, but rather that a greater good arises from a system of law which views 
any right in relation to and in concert with other rights. In so doing, relational theory 
asserts communitarian values over individualistic values, and in its most radical 
formulation proposes a shift away from individualised, rights-based thinking towards 
a focus on the resultant social relations.53 This discourse invites us to rethink the 
content of copyright law that is taught in South African law faculties and to break 
with its Eurocentric conceptualisation and the epistemic foregrounding it entails.54  
Relational theory contributes towards decolonising the pedagogy as it relates to 
copyright law. The basic tension in copyright emerges when individual rights are 
posited as competing with the rights of the community (generally termed ‘public 
interest’).  
1.5  Scope  
Decoloniality and decolonisation predate both the #FeesMustFall protests and the 
CHE report on the LLB. It is a discourse that has long been advanced globally. Most 
                                                             
52  Serving humanity and sane humanity is a theme that emerges prominently in this 
dissertation. See Chapter 3 on the proposed philosophy of Mohlomism, where it is argued 
that a decolonised copyright law curriculum is one that teaches of intellectual property rights 
that advance love, compassion, respect, recognition of the other, and sane humanism.  
53  This must not be confused with communist values – although the two are related, they mean 
two different things. Communist values are ideological ideas that include the left-leaning 
approaches towards how society should be organized. This school of thought that stems 
from the communist literature of the late 1800s. It was posed to the world to act as an anti-
thesis to capitalism, opposing global capital, private property, and the free market system. 
In its place, communist values proposed for a shared wealth model wherein any country’s 
means of production would be owned by the state on the behalf of the people. In turn, the 
state would use its ownership of the means of production to distribute wealth evenly and lead 
to the eradication of poverty, inequalities, and all other forms of class oppression. 
Communitarian values are more universal and slightly liberal. In the context of Africa, 
communitarian values are those that signify the value systems of the community as 
superseding the values of the individual.  
54  Craig C Copyright, Communication and Culture: Towards a relational theory of copyright law 
70: ‘Author-based reasoning, compounded by theories of private entitlements, gives rise to 
a rights-based vision of copyright, which affects both our basic characterization of the 
copyright regime and the extent of the rights that we expect it to accord.’ 
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notably, it has been canvassed more rampantly in fields of the humanities such as 
political sciences, sociology, development studies, and anthropology. As a result, 
there are varying meanings of the concept of decolonisation, and debates around 
how it can be practically implemented in the context of curriculum reform and 
transformation. This dissertation limits itself to the sphere of epistemic and 
conceptual decolonisation in that it advances research specifically on the law 
curriculum55 and not the law.  
Academic literature on the justificatory theories of intellectual property law is vast. 
However, this dissertation limits itself to the incentive theory (also known as 
incentive-to-innovate) and the labour theory to provide an African critique of 
Eurocentrism which continues to dominate this area of legal theory.56 
This dissertation is written at a time when the legislature, lawyers, academics, and 
concerned stakeholders are debating the controversial Copyright Amendment Bill. 
Although the Bill is referenced in some chapters, the dissertation deliberately does 
not study it in detail for the obvious reason of the uncertainty and contestation 
surrounding it eventually becoming law. This slight omission is more glaring in 
Chapter 6 when studying copyright limitations and especially in contrasting fair 
dealing and fair use because of the Bill’s introduction of fair use to South African 
jurisprudence. This omission is, however, justified by the dissertation’s approach of 
studying concepts at their abstract intellectual level instead of doctrinally, meaning 
that it is possible to study fair use for purposes of decolonising the copyright law 
curriculum without interpreting it as articulated in the Copyright Amendment Bill.  
The dissertation explores the various themes, topics, subjects, and concepts 
currently taught in the copyright law curriculum. These include, but are not limited 
to, authorship, copyright infringement, copyright duration, indigenous knowledge 
systems, traditional cultural expressions, and moral rights. The study provides a 
detailed analysis of these copyright law topics, using the tools of decoloniality, multi-
                                                             
55  The curriculum is represented by the two textbooks that are meant for undergraduate LLB 
students. This is sufficient to represent the curriculum because the dissertation limits itself 
to, and focuses on, the content taught students, and not how it is taught.  
56  See generally, Du Bois M ‘Justificatory Theories for Intellectual Property Viewed through the 
Constitutional Prism’ (2018) 21/1 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 8-30. Other 
justificatory theories include: revised labour theory, reward theory, spiritual theories, 
economic theory, and theory of natural monopoly. 
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culturism, Transmodernity, Africanisation, Afrocentricity, centricity, hetararchical 
thinking, and curriculum transformation.57  
1.6 Overview of chapters 
The dissertation begins, in Chapter 1 (the current chapter), by setting out current 
theorising on the concepts of decolonization, transformative legal education and 
decoloniality. Chapter 2 distinguishes between colonialism and coloniality, 
examines the essence of the calls for South African higher education to be 
decolonised, and links these calls to the LLB curriculum in general, and the copyright 
law module in particular. It further provides a theoretical framework on which 
subsequent chapters will rely.  
Chapter 3 approaches two intellectual property law justificatory theories by way of 
an African critique, using Africanisation to insert decolonial articulations into the 
incentive theory and the labour theory. It provides a brief historical background to 
the intellectual property law justificatory debates and shows that the discourse has 
been narrated only through a Eurocentric lens. The chapter further uses an African 
lens to reconstruct copyright authorship, arguing that African modes of communal 
ownership necessitate a renewal in teaching authorship in the copyright context.  
Chapter 4 addresses the idea of copyright in a work using the framework of the 
philosophy of Ubuntu. It defines copyright and explains the exclusive rights of a 
copyright owner. The chapter studies Ubuntu and argues that this philosophy has 
been vulgarised in South African jurisprudence, and needs to be restored to its true 
meaning. The chapter further studies moral rights in copyright, insisting that they 
can be taught using Ubuntu to link them with the cultural-appropriation discourse. It 
argues further that a decolonised copyright law curriculum has the potential to guide 
society in responding to the anomaly of cultural appropriation. The chapter 
concludes by advancing three indigenous knowledge expression scenarios, to show 
that there is an intersection between copyright law and cultural appropriation, and 
                                                             
57  Mamdani M ‘Between the public intellectual and the scholar: Decolonization and some post-
independence initiatives in African higher education’ (2016) 17/1 Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 
74-75. The author samples how African universities, in the quest to transform and decolonise 
curricula, relied on inter-disciplinary methodologies, further lending credence to the approach 
that this dissertation seeks to employ. 
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that the complexity in these expressions may provide nuanced dialogues in a 
decolonised copyright law curriculum. 
Chapter 5 analyses selected aspects of the extant requirements for copyright 
protection. It locates both the originality and material-embodiment requirements 
within Eurocentric epistemic traditions, and argues that they could be understood 
differently to be inclusive of expressions that do not meet the copyright threshold. It 
concludes by studying the Swakopmund Protocol and the South African Intellectual 
Property Laws Amendment Act 28 of 2013 (the IPLAA), to assert decolonial 
articulations into the originality and material-embodiment requirements. The 
statutory requirements for copyright are divided into two categories: inherent 
features; and external circumstance. Chapter 5 considers requirements for 
copyright protection but limits the study to originality and material embodiment. The 
other requirements not covered in this dissertation are that the author must be a 
qualified person, and the first publication or manufacture of the work must have 
taken place in South Africa.  
Chapter 6 investigates the fair-dealing exceptions, the limitation on moral rights, and 
the limited duration of copyright, and contrasts these with the social, economic, 
political, and historical realities of the coloniser and the colonised. The chapter 
points out that current intellectual property law pedagogy assumes a uniformity in 
the varying jurisdictions, which is indicative of the fact that the curriculum neglects 
the apartheid and colonial context of South Africa as well as other countries from 
the global South.  
Chapter 7, which concludes this dissertation, narrates how the research question 
and hypothesis have been addressed in the preceding chapters. It reviews and 
summarises how various copyright law concepts could be approached in a 
decolonised copyright law curriculum and identifies potential areas of further 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2  
THE CASE FOR DECOLONISATION 
2.1 Introduction 
The goal [of decolonising] is to better understand the nexus of knowledge, 
power, and being that sustains an endless war on specific bodies, cultures, 
knowledge(s), nature, and peoples, as well as to help evade and oppose 
multiple forms of decadent responses,58 including narrow views within 
decolonial movements themselves.59  
This research seeks to inform the inclusion of newer ideas60 in the LLB curriculum 
and ensure the gradual transformation of the qualification.61 The end product will be 
                                                             
58  On this subject, see broadly, Gordon L ‘Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonisation of 
Knowledge’ (2014) 39/1 Africa Development 81-92. By decadent responses, Maldonado-
Torres may be construed to mean a strictly discipline-centred approach to societal issues. 
In other quarters it is called disciplinary decadence. In essence it is the urge to wish to 
respond to law conundrums using only the law, while deliberately avoiding other helpful 
disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, sociology, sciences and others.  
59  Maldonado-Torres N ‘Outline of ten theses on coloniality and decoloniality’ 2 retrieved from 
the Frantz Fanon Foundation 2016 www.frantzfanonfoundation.com (date of use: 
28/07/2017) 
60  Fagbayibo B ‘Critical pedagogy of international legal education in Africa: An exploration of 
Fela Anikulapo-Kuti’s music in  Adeola R, Nyarko M, Okeowo A & Viljoen F (eds) The Art of 
Human Rights –  Human Rights and The Law in Africa 1-22.  The author explores new ideas 
in teaching international law in the LLB curriculum, arguing that the music of iconic Nigerian 
musician, Fela Anikulapo Kuti, can be used to assert a Pan-Africanist approach to 
international law pedagogy. He insists that: ‘Fela was able to position both his personal 
conduct and music, which were in most cases intertwined, as a better, counterculture 
alternative to settled societal normative values. As far as Fela was concerned, laws must be 
subjected to the rigorous test of the principles of Africanism, and if they fail, there must be a 
resistance.’ This, therefore, makes Fela’s music applicable to the demand to introduce new 
ideas to the LLB curriculum.  
61  Quinot G ‘Transformative Legal Education’ (2012) 415. The discussion on transformed legal 
pedagogy is not new, it is one that South African law academics have sought to grapple with 
since the dawn of democracy.  Quinot, for example, argues that, ‘[s]tudents should be 
educated not only in the new substance of the law but also in the new legal method or 
reasoning mode… [t]he new constitutional dispensation calls for a substantive mode of legal 
reasoning. Matters of morality and policy, even politics, can no longer be excluded from legal 
analysis. This means that such matters should also enter the law lecture hall.’ Modiri makes 
a similar assertion. See Modiri J ‘The crises in legal education’ 2, ‘[t]hese crises are manifest 
in the political implications of law’s separation from morality, and hence from justice, and its 
own participation in the construction, perpetuation and legitimation of hierarchy and 
inequality as well as its complicit affiliation to injurious social powers’. Among others, Quinot 
calls for a new approach to law as a subject of education. He opines that there ought to be 
marked difference in pre-constitutional and post-constitutional pedagogy. The constitutional 
era, presents a shift from a culture of authority to a culture of justification (borrowed from 
Etienne Mureinik). See Mureinik E ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ 
(1994) 10/1 South African Journal of Human Rights 31-48. Other scholars, such as Klare, 
argue that a transformed legal pedagogy means that there should not be discord between 
legal culture and the Constitution’s demand for social change. See Klare K ‘Legal Culture 
and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14/1 South African Journal of Human Rights. 
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seen in the increase62 of ‘graduate-ness’ of LLB graduates.63 The object is not the 
law but the curriculum, it is not to point out the inadequacies of the law, but rather 
the ineptitude in the current curricula used in teaching copyright law.64 
In its quest to decolonise the curriculum, the dissertation revisits the question of 
epistemicide65 in terms of which – metaphorically speaking – the coloniser killed the 
knowledge(s)66 of Black Bodies.67 Santos accordingly defines epistemicide by 
describing the condition of the knowledge(s) of Black bodies: 
Our knowledge flies at low altitude because it is stuck to the body. We feelthink 
and feelact. To think without passion is to make coffins for ideas; to act without 
passion is to fill the coffins. We are voracious in getting the diversity of the 
knowledges we are interested in. There are many knowledges looking for 
people eager to know them.68 
Santos’ description of the knowledge systems of the colonised helps us comprehend 
that the knowledge(s) of colonised people and those of the coloniser are positioned 
                                                             
62  Shako F ‘Decolonizing the Classroom: Towards Dismantling the Legacies of Colonialism & 
Incorporating TWAIL into the Teaching of International Law in Kenya’ (2019) 3/1 Journal of 
Conflict Management and Sustainable Development 28. The author argues that the 
international law module shows signs of being incomplete, opining that, ‘[t]he pedagogy used 
therefore remains rife with exclusions and distortions of indigenous knowledge, voices, 
critiques and scholars’. She further insists that a law curriculum should be inclusive of 
alternative epistemologies and that this will increase the graduate-ness of the graduates. 
63  Van Marle K ‘Reflections on legacy, complicity, and legal education’ (2014) 46/3 Acta 
Academica 197 where the author argues that in transforming how we think about the law 
and legal pedagogy, students and academics alike should reflect on legal education’s 
complicity in upholding the racist and segregationist ideas that ensured the survival of an 
evil apartheid regime.  
64  It is crucial to distinguish conceptually between the law and the law curriculum in order to be 
able to arrive at an intra-specific inquiry as opposed to a blanket approach.  
65  On epistemicide, see generally, Santos B de S Epistemologies of the South: Justice against 
epistemicide 1-236. ‘Unequal exchanges among cultures have always implied the death of 
the knowledge of the subordinated culture, hence the death of the social groups that 
possessed it. In most extreme cases, such as that of European expansion, epistemicide was 
one of the conditions of genocide. The loss of epistemological confidence that currently 
afflicts modern science has facilitated the identification of the scope and gravity of the 
epistemicides perpetrated by hegemonic Eurocentric modernity’ The author defines 
epistemicide as a genocide of knowledge(s). This definition understands that the impact of 
coloniality means the continued othering, and dismembering of the knowledge systems of 
the colonised.   
66  Decoloniality embraces different ways of knowing, doing, and teaching. This culminates in 
the plurality of knowledge into knowledge(s). On plurality of knowledge see, Whitt L Science, 
Colonialism and Indigenous People: The Cultural Politics of Law and Knowledge 32: ‘The 
dominant knowledge system tends to embrace anti-pluralism, a lack of receptiveness to 
alternative epistemologies, to other ways of knowing the world. Other knowledge systems 
are usually reduced to “superstition”, the very anti-thesis of knowledge.’  
67  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order’ 
(2015) 36/2 Australasian Review of African Studies 32. 
68  Santos B de S Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide 12. 
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differently in the global knowledge economy. The ‘Othering’ of the knowledge(s) of 
the colonised, is the essence of epistemicide, that Santos defines as: 
The energy that propels diatopical hermeneutics comes from a destabilizing 
image that I designate epistemicide, the murder of knowledge. Unequal 
exchanges among cultures have always implied the death of the knowledge of 
the subordinated culture, hence the death of the social groups that possessed 
it. In the most extreme cases, such as that of European expansion, epistemicide 
was one of the conditions of genocide. The loss of epistemological confidence 
that currently afflicts modern science has facilitated the identification of the 
scope and gravity of the epistemicides perpetrated by hegemonic Eurocentric 
modernity.69 
To reverse the epistemicidal legacy is to go to the graves where African 
knowledge(s) have been interred, open them up, and resuscitate this African 
knowledge(s).70 This methodology, although submitted in the metaphorical sense, 
is one response to the fundamental decolonial questions that Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
raises: ‘How can the “dismembered” people be “remembered”? How can they 
relaunch themselves from the world of “non-Being” into the world of language and 
knowledge?’71  
The reversal of epistemicide and subsequent re-membering of the dismembered, 
involves a restorative recovery project in which Black Bodies are given the power to 
own and name their own realities using their own epistemic perspectives.72 This 
                                                             
69  Ibid 92. See also at 152-153 where Santos argues that the knowledge(s) of the coloniser are 
embodied in ‘modern science’, and the knowledge(s) of the colonised are dismissed as myth 
or ignorance. Such a colonial setting privileges the former over the latter, he further argues 
that this privilege is definitive of epistemicide: ‘The epistemological privilege that modern 
science grants to itself is thus the result of the destruction of all alternative knowledges that 
could eventually question such privilege. It is, in other words, a product of what I called in a 
previous chapter epistemicide. The destruction of knowledge is not an epistemological 
artifact without consequences. It involves the destruction of the social practices and the 
disqualification of the social agents that operate according to such knowledges.’ 
70  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order’ 23, 
‘as one of the undying liberation discourses, decoloniality is concerned with how a 
“dismembered” people should relaunch themselves into the world.’ Here the author posits 
decolonisation as a liberational agenda, arguing that the ethics of liberation engender justice 
instead of retribution, revenge, or vengeance. Note further that at 24 he paraphrases Ngugi 
Wa Thiongo, saying that ‘decoloniality [should be understood] to be a search for a liberating 
perspective aimed at facilitating self-understanding (seeing ourselves clearly) after centuries 
of suffering dismemberment and alienation.’ 
71  Ibid 23. 
72  Ibid 32. 
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research sets out possible ways in which the Black Body may be re-membered as 
a Being worthy of producing knowledge. 
The chapter provides clarity on the concepts colonialism, coloniality, decolonisation, 
and decoloniality. The aim is further to clarify and correct some of the 
misconceptions regarding the legacy of colonialism in education. 
The chapter begins by distinguishing between colonialism and coloniality. 
Understanding the difference between these two concepts is crucial as it lends 
credence to the assumption that the project of decolonisation is a response to 
coloniality and not to colonialism. The three localities of coloniality and how they 
manifest in the copyright law curriculum are discussed. A deepened engagement 
with these three localities provides a synopsis of the anomalies in the copyright law 
curriculum to which this dissertation seeks to respond. The localities are the 
colonaility of Being, of Knowledge, and of Power. The chapter considers calls for a 
decolonised higher education in South Africa, which includes reading dominant 
themes that tend to emerge in the decolonisation discourse together with political, 
historical, and racial questions. 
In closing, a brief history of South African copyright law is presented and linked to 
the copyright law curriculum’s colonial make-up. These discussions provide a 
theoretical framework on which the dissertation relies to examine the calls for the 
decolonisation of the copyright law curriculum through an African lens. 
2.2  Distinguishing between history and present (colonialism v coloniality) 
Colonialism refers to the subjugation of one society by another. The conquered 
society is known as a colonial subject, whereas the conquering country is termed 
the colonial master. The aim of colonisation is for the colonial master to plunder the 
colonial subject’s mineral, cultural, human resources, and any other material wealth 
on which it can lay its hands, so to expand its economy.73 The colonised society 
loses its sovereignty and its right to self-determination. The capital city of the 
coloniser becomes the de facto and de jure capital of the colony.  
                                                             
73  For further reading on colonialism, see Cesaire A Discourse on Colonialism 1-31. This work 
was originally published as Discours sur le colonialisme by Editions Presence Africaine, 
1955. 
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South Africa’s first interaction with colonial modes of governance dates as far back 
as 1652.The Dutch annexation of the Cape by Dutch-East India Company (VOC) 
lasted from 1653 to 1822. The VOC initially aimed to use the Cape as a refreshment 
station for its ships travelling around the Cape en route to the East. The Cape 
became a hub of the slave trade, and annexation of black people’s land, resources, 
and livestock signalled the beginning of the end for the Black Body in South Africa.  
When the British took over from the Dutch, they abolished some of the laws the 
Dutch had put in place and replaced them with laws of their own. Among the 
changes that came with British colonisation was the introduction of the Abolition of 
Slavery Act of 1833.74  This Act of the British Parliament applied to all its colonies 
and was consequently law in South Africa, with all subsequent legislation applying 
automatically in all British colonies. Heleta argues that:  
Eurocentrism, racism, segregation and epistemic violence at South African 
universities were not products of the apartheid state. Rather, these problems 
began with the establishment of the universities by the British colonialists and 
further evolved after 1948.75 
Although colonialism is at the root of the calls for decolonisation, the response is not 
to colonialism but rather coloniality. Decolonisation seeks to act as an antithesis to 
coloniality, not colonialism. The concept of coloniality is the emphasis of this 
research.  
Maldonado-Torres qualifies the distinction between colonialism and coloniality as 
follows: 
Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and 
economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the 
power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire. Coloniality, 
instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of 
colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and 
knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. 
Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the 
criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the 
self-image of people, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our 
modern experience.76 
                                                             
74  Long title: An Act for the Abolition of Slavery throughout the British Colonies; for promoting 
the Industry of the manumitted Slaves. 
75  Heleta S ‘Decolonisation of higher education: Dismantling epistemic violence and 
Eurocentrism in South Africa’ (2016) 1/1 Transformation in Higher Education 2. 
76  Maldonado-Torres N ‘On the Coloniality of Being’ (2007) 21/2-3 Cultural Studies 4. 
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The appreciation of this distinction is critical as it acknowledges the reality that 
although colonialism has been defeated in Africa, its effects, legacy, and remnants 
remain deeply entrenched in all aspects of our present experience.77 Colonialism 
presents the past; coloniality remains the present.78 Coloniality is thus known as ‘the 
end of colonialism without an end.’79 
Even though coloniality can be practically located, it is a shade more subtle than 
actual colonialism. This subtlety is reason enough for some wrongly to assume that 
the end of colonialism immediately marked the end of its patterns of oppression.80  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni identifies four levers of colonaility: (1) control of the economy; (2) 
control of authority; (3) control of gender and sexuality; and lastly, (4) control of 
knowledge and subjectivity.81 Grosfoguel elaborates that coloniality involves 
entangled hetahierarchies, complex class formations, and core periphery 
divisions.82 Coloniality is realised in the continued patterns of subjugation of the 
colonised through extant institutionalised racism and the sustained hegemony of 
Eurocentric epistemologies.83  
Maldonado-Torres likens coloniality to the radicalisation and naturalisation of the 
non-ethics of war.84 The image of the ‘non-ethics of war’ relates to those atrocities 
committed by the army that has won a battle and then proceeds to enslave, kill, 
rape, and maim the people of the conquered territory. He suggests that once the 
colonial war is over, it is the race of the colonised people which will justify85 their 
continued serfdom, slavery, and rape.86 Coloniality is thus a vestigial force of 
                                                             
77  Ncube CB ‘Decolonising Intellectual Property Law in Pursuit of Africa’s Development’ (2016) 
8/1 WIPO Journal 36. 
78  Ramose M ‘The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose Debate on Ubuntu’ (2003) 22/4 South 
African Journal of Philosophy 407 who argues that there are two points of critique that 
necessitate decolonisation; the first is that the injustice of colonialism makes decolonisation 
an ethical and political imperative, the second is that decolonisation seeks to facilitate the 
restoration and modification of consensus politics.  
79  Santos B de S Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide 26. 
80  Grosfoguel R ‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: 
Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality’ (2011) 1/1 Journal of 
Peripheral Cultural Production of Luso-Hispanic World 12. 
81  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality as the Future of Africa’ (2015) 13/10 History Compass 485-
496. 
82  Ibid. 
83  Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’ (2002) 25/3 Review Fernand Braudel Center 205. 
84  Maldonado-Torres N ‘On the Coloniality of Being’ 247. 
85  This means that race became a qualifier for subjugation, persons are therefore oppressed 
on the basis of the [black] colour of their skin. 
86   Maldonado-Torres ‘On the Coloniality of Being’ 248-249. 
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colonialism which continues to enslave, kill, displace, rape, maim, and 
disenfranchise the colony long after the war (or rather, the direct colonial period) is 
over.87  
Coloniality and modernity are two sides of the same coin.88 Eurocentric colonial 
culture is an ideology that is not limited to Europe which means that modernity is 
always constituted by coloniality.89 Modernity has crucial implications for how the 
world conceives of social change, struggles against inequality, for democracy, and 
scientific disciplines; whereas coloniality is a lived experience of subaltern groups 
to conceive of these realities.90 However, with coloniality, white racism and the 
subjugation of the Black Body contends that colonised groups are of inferior 
intelligence and culture and have barbaric cultural habits.91 
Universities continue to teach the Eurocentric education imposed by the coloniser; 
the curriculum, research practices, and anything related to knowledge production 
remains Eurocentric long after the colony has gained independence.92 
Asante defines Eurocentric education as a superstructure that seeks to impose 
European consciousness and ideas on other people’s consciousness.93 Mulder 
agrees with this definition of Eurocentrism and adds that it is a pervasive ideology 
that sneaks into every aspect of life and attempts to erase the diverse history of 
                                                             
87  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order’ 31. 
88  Grosfoguel R ‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: 
Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality’ 11. 
89  Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’ 213. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Ibid. 
92  Mbembe A ‘Decolonizing the University: New directions’ (2016) 15/1 Arts & Humanities in 
Higher Education 32 states: ‘We all seem to agree that there is something anachronistic, 
something entirely is wrong with a number of institutions of higher learning in South Africa. 
There is something profoundly wrong when, for instance, syllabuses designed to meet the 
needs of colonialism and Apartheid should continue well into the liberation era.’ 
93  Asante M ‘Reconstituting curricula in African universities: In search of an Afrocentric design’ 
in C Alvares & SS Faruqi (eds) Decolonising the university: The emerging quest for non-
European paradigms 33-47. See further, Mbembe A ‘Decolonizing the University: New 
directions’ 32: ‘So, today the consensus is that part of what is wrong with our institutions of 
higher learning is that they are ‘Westernized’. What does it mean “they are Westernized”? 
They are “Westernized” in the sense that they are local instantiations of a dominant academic 
model based on a Eurocentric epistemic canon. A Eurocentric canon is a canon that 
attributes truth only to the Western way of knowledge production. It is a canon that disregards 
other epistemic traditions. It is a canon that tries to portray colonialism as a normal form of 
social relations between human beings rather than a system of exploitation and oppression.’ 
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peoples and supplant their outlook on life and understanding of the world.94 She 
posits: 
[Colonised education] reproduces the racist status quo,95 by institutionalizing 
the premises on which enslavement and colonialism were built for hundreds of 
years. Furthermore it reinforces the racist belief that people of colour [blacks in 
particular] have less or no right to agency and self-determination, because the 
colonizing country supposedly knows what’s best for them.96 
Eurocentric ideas about education and the curriculum are the only recognised forms 
of knowledge(s) in South African universities;97 everything else is relegated to the 
status of sub-knowledge or non-knowledge. Mulder emphasises that this reality 
indicates that the coloniser suffers from an ‘epidermisation’ of superiority which is 
an ingrained belief that, consciously or unconsciously, whiteness entails superiority 
over all those who are not white.98 Mulder explains that this unfounded sense of 
superiority does not arise through natural forces but rather is a consequence of daily 
exposure to institutionalised racism upheld by colonised education.99 
To persist in the current colonised methods of teaching and learning is to entrench 
coloniality. The locality and reality of coloniality in South African higher education 
generally, and the LLB curriculum in particular, gives rise to the calls for 
decolonisation.100  
                                                             
94  Mulder L ‘Frantz Fanon, Internalized Oppression and the Decolonization of Education’ 1 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308773706_Frantz_Fanon_Internalized_Oppress
ion_and_the_Decolonization_of_Education (date of use: 07/04/2018).  
95  Biko S ‘Black Souls in White Skins’ 24 in I write what I like – Selected Writings where the 
author makes the point that the racist status quo in colonial territories in South Africa is that 
the education system follows a pattern of superior-inferior white-black stratification wherein 
the white person is the perpetual teacher and the Black Body is a perpetual student. The 
author further bemoans white arrogance, suggesting that white people should desist from 
the false thinking that they should always lead in innovation, research and knowledge 
production, but rather be attentive of alternative epistemologies.  
96  Mulder L ‘Frantz Fanon, Internalized Oppression and the Decolonization of Education’ 1.  
97  Modiri J ‘Transformation, Tension and Transgression: Reflections on the Culture and 
Ideology of South African Legal Education’ (2013) 456. The author argues that legal 
pedagogy embraces a colonial logic of wanting to divorce the law from its socio-political 
context, further insisting that ‘teaching law is a performative and political act that has 
implications for transformation and democracy within the South African legal culture’.  
98  Mulder L ‘Frantz Fanon, Internalized Oppression and the Decolonization of Education’ 6. 
99  Ibid.  
100   Yousuf I ‘Burdened by a Beast: A brief consideration of social death in South African 
universities’  (2019) 1/1 Journal of Decolonising Disciplines 84 where the author links the 
call to decolonise the university to the tragedy of social death, explaining that coloniality has 
the effect ‘whereby a person [or university student] believes that they are as good as dead’. 
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Bhambra argues that both post-colonialism and decoloniality101 are necessary 
because of the depredations of colonialism – both offer the possibility of a new 
geopolitics of knowledge.102  
Decolonising is an imperative antithesis to the locality and reality of coloniality. 
Fanon characterises decolonisation as an inevitably violent phenomenon in that it 
entails the de-centering of long-standing hegemonic orders103 and the dismantling 
Eurocentrism within higher education and the curriculum,104 and presents a violence 
to both the colonised and the coloniser.  
2.3  Localities of coloniality 
2.3.1  Coloniality of Being 
In conversations on the impact of colonial relations of power, it is necessary to revisit 
the standard understanding of Being.105 Maldonado-Torres uses Descartes’s 
                                                             
101  On the difference between decoloniality and post-colonialism see generally, Grosfoguel R 
‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, 
Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality’ 18-19. He states: ‘Post-colonial criticism 
characterizes the capitalist system as a cultural system. They believe that culture is the 
constitutive element that determines economic and political relations in global capitalism… 
[w]e have yet to develop a new decolonial language to account for the complex processes 
of the modern/colonial world-system without relying on the old liberal language of the three 
arenas.’ 
102  Bhambra G ‘Post-Colonial and Decolonial dialogues’ (2014) 17/2 Postcolonial Studies 
Journal 120. 
103  Santos B de S Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide 120, wherein the 
author gives an example of one hegemonic order as it appears in the legal system of the 
colony, he argues that coloniality is evidenced through ‘abyssal thinking’ which creates a 
visible line between what is legal and what is not legal, whence the latter usually means the 
knowledge(s) of the colonised. He argues that ‘[i]n the field of modern law, this side of the 
line is determined by what counts as legal or illegal according to the official state or 
international law. The legal and the illegal are the only two relevant forms of existing before 
the law; for that reason, the distinction between the two is a universal distinction. This central 
dichotomy leaves out a whole social territory where the dichotomy would be unthinkable as 
an organizing principle, that is, the territory of the lawless, the a-legal, the nonlegal, and even 
the legal or illegal according to nonofficially recognized law. Thus, the invisible abyssal line 
that separates the realm of law from the realm of nonlaw grounds the visible dichotomy 
between the legal and the illegal that organizes, on this side of the line, the realm of law’ 
104  Eybers O ‘A social realist ontology for developing Afrocentric curricula in Africa’ (2019) 1/1 
Journal of Decolonising Disciplines 49. The author argues that universities require an 
Afrocentric curriculum which reflects the social ontologies of its students. He points out that 
one of the leading cause of the #RhodesMustFall protests at the University of Cape Town 
was that the colonial images of architects of apartheid colonialism, such as Cecil John 
Rhodes, continue to alienate and ontologically exclude Black Bodies. Although the student 
protests were focused on statues, the decolonial project goes beyond the statues, to critically 
grapple with the very same images in the content of the curriculum that is taught in these 
universities.   
105  Bewaji J ‘The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose Debate on Ubuntu’ 393. As will be shown 
in greater detail in Chapter 4, Being in Africa is evidenced through the philosophy of Ubuntu, 
which represents the essence of Africa. Bewaji argues that without Being there would be no 
language, culture, religion, philosophy, medicine, law, politics but only a vacuum. See further 
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formulation of the existential statement, cogito, ergo sum – I think, and therefore I 
am. The question of Being arises from the latter part of this ontological axiom. 
Descartes means that before a person can be, that person needs to think. To think 
is cast as a prerequisite to Being. The essence of Being is embedded in a person’s 
ability to think or to possess mental faculties. Animals, plants, and other living and 
non-living things are not Being precisely because they cannot think. They cannot 
think and so they are not Being.106 
Descartes’s formulation on what Being is and what should define it, when inverted, 
is used to exclude Black Bodies from Being. Maldonado-Torres insists that the 
coloniser was able to exclude its colonial subjects from Being. The colonial project 
included the rejection of the ‘Beinghood’ of Black Bodies, insisting that they have a 
different make-up to that of white people.107 It is consequently not possible to divorce 
the colonial aspect of Being from colour.108 For Fanon racism is the very object of 
colonial conquest. He argues that the Black Body is subjugated specifically because 
it is not white, and this a precondition for it to be colonised.109 
The most crucial aspect of Being is that it emerges as subjective consciousness of 
the self, that is the Being of self. The next step is for the Being to be conscious of 
other Beings,110 the consciousness of others as Beings must be reciprocated by 
others accepting one’s Beinghood. The Being of an individual’s self is validated by 
the Being of others.  
The coloniser was conscious of itself as Being and was aware that this 
consciousness included the deliberate dismembering of the Being of the Black 
                                                             
Taylor D ‘Defining Ubuntu for Business Ethics – A deontological approach’ (2014) 33/3 South 
African Journal of Philosophy 333 who argues that Ubuntu is at the centre of the ontological 
question of Being, meaning that people only exist in relation to others. 
106  Maldonado-Torres N ‘On the Coloniality of Being’ 252. 
107  Ibid 251.  
108  Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’ 213. As long as 150 years before Descartes’ 
ontological formulation, European thinking was in the maxim Ego conquistus which means, 
‘I conquer, therefore I am’. This reading suggests that Europe had assumed a God-like 
status, placing itself at the foundation of knowledge, acting as an imperial-being at the centre 
of the world because it had already conquered the world. 
109  Fanon F Black Skin, White Masks 73. 
110  On the concept of Being, see further Martin Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ and ‘Introduction 
to Metaphysics’ in Macquarrie J. & Robinson E. Martin Heidegger Being and Time Blackwell 
Publishers 1962. 
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Body.111 In this way the Black Body was reduced to a non-thinking species; it is not 
a Being, it is simply nothingness.112 The misconception of self as non-Being serves 
as a starting point when thinking about the coloniality of Being, which proves 
enigmatic for the Black Body.113 Fanon explains this using the lexicon of the ‘Zone-
of-Being’ and the ‘Zone-of-non-Being’.114 These concepts bear testimony to the 
dismemberment of a Black Body’s Being by the coloniser. This anomaly must be 
addressed by engaging in the decolonisation project.  
Just as genocide is the deliberate killing of a large group of people, especially of a 
nation or ethnic group, epistemicide is the deliberate killing of those people’s 
knowledge systems.115 The non-being of the Black Body allows the coloniser to 
dispense with the knowledge(s) of local communities. The term ‘epistemicide’ in 
decoloniality derives from the word ‘epistemology’ or the theory of knowledge. 
Epistemological enquiries are encapsulated in the questions: What is knowledge? 
How do we know? How do we know that we know the things that we know?  
The responses to these questions contribute to the theory of knowledge. 
Epistemicide means that the coloniser never asked these questions about the 
knowledge(s) of the colonised, nor indeed did it conceive of the Black Body’s ability 
to engage.116  
In similar vein, Wa Thiongo recounts of the violence of the classroom in which, in 
an epistemic inquiry, the Black Body was met with the violence of having to be taught 
in a foreign language and be tacitly conditioned to accept that their own language 
                                                             
111  Biko S ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity’ in I write what I like – 
Selected Writings 88. ‘White people [the colonizers] now despise black people, not because 
they need to re-inforce their attitude and so justify their position of privilege but simply 
because they actually believe that black [knowledge(s)] is inferior and bad.’ 
112  Fanon F Black Skin, White Masks 73 states ‘[t]he white man imposes discrimination on me, 
makes me a colonized slave, robs me of all worth, all individuality, tells me that I am a 
parasite on the world and that I must bring myself as quickly as possible into step with the 
white world.’ 
113  Maldonado-Torres N ‘On the Coloniality of Being’ 253. 
114   Fanon F Black Skin, White Masks 143. The author makes specific reference to the non-
Being of the Bantu people of South Africa.  
115  Zitzke E ‘The history and politics of contemporary common-law purism’ (2017) 23/1 
Fundamina UKZN Journal for Legal History 191: ‘But the process of colonisation did not only 
involve the displacement of African political and economic power. It also involved 
epistemicide - the killing of existing forms of knowledge and the subsequent prevention of 
the development of that knowledge.’ 
116  Lembede A ‘Freedom in our lifetime’ 43 in R Edgar & L Ka Msumza (eds) Freedom in our 
lifetime who argues that the cure for the colonial epistemic juniorization of the Black Body is 
poltical freedom, prescribing several intermediate steps which Africans could take to reassert 
an identity free from colonial domination.  
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does not matter or is not good enough for higher education or literature.117 The 
epistemic concerns of the Black Body would have been anomalous given the 
colonial assumptions that Black Bodies are incapable of thought – they are not 
Beings.118 
To reverse the epistemicidal legacy, law teachers, researchers, and historians need 
to return to pre-colonial119 Africa and uncover the knowledge(s) used by African 
societies120 pre-epistemicide.121 The task of researching pre-colonial Africa is 
important as the colonial disruption is understood as one that not only killed African 
knowledge(s), but also stifled its natural growth and development.122 Zitzke 
suggests that, ‘[p]art of the epistemicidal effects of colonization certainly related to 
the death of culture and language123 – it must be emphasised that a crucial effect 
                                                             
117  Wa Thiongo N Decolonizing the Mind: The politics of language in African literature 9. 
118  Biko S ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity’ 96 in I write what I like – 
Selected Writings who argues that the epistemic concerns of the Black Body are 
encapsulated in a black culture that implies a freedom for Black Bodies to innovate without 
recourse to Western hegemonic values.  
119  It is important to stress that the objective of decolonisation is not to move Africa back into 
the Stone Age. The move to pre-colonial Africa is rather an effort to undo and reverse the 
legacy of epistemicide, it is not to assume that pre-colonial Africa holds grand ideas or 
solutions to all of society’s challenges, but rather to find those knowledge(s) that were 
deliberately killed in order to deepen the dismembering of a Black Body’s Being.  
120  Chikaonda G ‘To decolonise our LLB degrees, we have to understand and incorporate the 
roots of African law’ Daily Maverick Opionista 2019 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ 
opinionista/2019-07-09-to-decolonise-our-llb-degrees-we-have-to-understand-and-
incorporate-the-roots-of-african-law/amp/?__twitter_impression=true (date of use: 
10/08/2019), she argues that the LLB curriculum would attain a semblance of decoloniality 
if it were to be attentive of the epistemologies of African scholars prior to colonial disturbance, 
she asserts that going back to pre-colonial Africa is one of the immediate tasks of any 
decolonial legal research, further arguing that, ‘[m]aking the links between how those 
perceptions have developed from pre-colonial times until this very moment is necessary for 
students to understand their legal history more comprehensively and to see the role of factors 
outside of black letter law on its trajectory in South Africa and on the continent — factors 
such as socio-economics, politics, globalisation and technological advancement.’ 
121  On Pre-Colonial Africa, see generally, Anta-Diop C Pre-Colonial Black Africa. The author 
makes an incisive analysis of pre-colonial Africa, detailing the social and political systems of 
Africa from antiquity to modern states. This work is crucial because it exemplifies Africa’s 
epistemic and ontological identities prior to colonial disturbance. 
122  Biko S ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity’ 95: ‘We accept that when 
colonisation sets in it devours the indigenous culture and leaves behind a bastard culture 
that may thrive at the pace allowed it by the dominant culture.’ 
123  Fatemi R, Ghajar SR & Bhaktiari S ‘De-colonizing English Language Education in Iran: The 
need for Islamic educational heritage’ (2018) 21/1 Journal of English Language Teaching 
and Learning 88, the authors point out that language forms an essential part of the Being of 
the Muslim body, and that through globalization, westernization and Eurocentric modernity, 
sacred Islamic texts have been translated into various other languages. This has contributed 
to the effective dismembering of the Being of Islam. The authors therefore call for 
decolonised teaching of the English language in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the 
intention to re-member the dismembered Being of the Muslim body.  
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was the discarding of African law and its replacement with a Dutch-inspired legal 
system’.124 
The essence of decolonisation becomes to re-member the Black Body as a Being 
by engaging in practical action that affirms it as a thinker capable of producing 
knowledge.125  
2.3.2   Coloniality of knowledge 
An inquiry into power relations between the coloniser and the colonised includes 
establishing the patterns of knowledge production. Ndlovu-Gatsheni asserts that 
decoloniality requires critical thinking about who generates knowledge, how it is 
generated, and what purpose it serves.126 The study must take account of how 
knowledge(s) have been used in the past to disempower communities and 
peoples.127 He elaborates that, ‘[the] concept of coloniality of knowledge, which 
focuses on teasing out epistemological issues, the politics of knowledge generation, 
as well as questions of who generates which knowledge, and for what purpose’.128 
New thinking on how the law is taught in South African universities is imperative for 
the decolonisation project.129 Decoloniality suggests heterarchical thinking as an 
endeavor to conceptualise social structures with a new vocabulary that breaks ranks 
with the prevailing definitional paradigm.130 Heterarchical thinking insists that extant 
                                                             
124  Zitkze E ‘The history and politics of contemporary common-law purism’ 191. 
125  Focault teaches that the voice that speaks is important because it presents the perspective 
of subaltern groups. See Focault M What is an Author? 101 in The Focault Reader.  
126  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Perhaps Decoloniality is the Answer? Critical Reflections on 
Development from Decolonial Epistemic Perspective’ (2013) 43/2 Africanus: Journal of 
Development Studies 5. 
127  Ibid. See further Mbembe A ‘Decolonizing the University: New directions’ 33:  ‘For these 
reasons, the emerging consensus is that our institutions must undergo a process of 
decolonization both of knowledge and of the university as an institution.’ 
128  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Perhaps Decoloniality is the Answer? Critical Reflections on 
Development from Decolonial Epistemic Perspective’ 5. 
129  Mgqwashu E ‘Education for public good in the age of coloniality: Implications for pedagogy’ 
(2019) 1 Journal of Decolonising Disciplines 66 where the author argues that part of 
cultivating a new thinking on legal pedagogy is to deeply understand that ‘[e]ducation, at 
least within the human rights discourse, cannot be seen as a commodity whose provision is 
determined by market forces and dependent on demand’. 
130  Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’ 217. 
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law and social sciences follow a colonial logic of assuming a single overarching 
hierarchy131 in knowledge production.132  
Decoloniality utilises critical concepts such as core-periphery divisions, male-female 
hierarchies, heterosexual-homosexual hierarchies, religious-spiritual divisions, and 
epistemic and linguistic hierarchies to denote the nature of coloniality and its 
manifestations.133  
The needs of the colonised and the coloniser differ vastly, and clearly these needs 
demand differentiation in the protection provided by intellectual property law. The 
effect of differentiated protection for the developed and developing will equally 
require differentiation in the teaching methods and curricula in the two respective 
groups. Although developing countries may attempt to exploit intellectual property 
in their own right, they find themselves faced with the inherited protectionist laws of 
a colonial past.134  
The liberation-centered aspect of differentiation is that hetararchical thinking 
proposes the reintroduction of previously silenced forms of knowledge.135 
Differentiation is a methodology that allows African ways of protecting creative 
works that currently fall under the scope of copyright law, to be uncovered.  
Grosfoguel advocates differentiation as expressed in the concept of 
Transmodernity, arguing that ‘trans’ represents an invitation to move beyond 
Eurocentric modernity.136 Transmodernity asserts the decolonial demand for the 
                                                             
131  Biko S ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity’ 89 who argues that the 
colonizer (whites) inherently believes that the Black Body cannot formulate their thoughts 
without white guidance and trusteeship thus insisting on a single hierarchy in knowledge 
production, and entrenching systems that catapult the epistemologies of white people, and 
negating the epistemic traditions of the Black Body.  
132  Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’ 217. 
133  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality as the Future of Africa’ 487. 
134  Cornish WR Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights 13-14. 
This comports with Kelbrick’s opinion, see Kelbrick R ‘The need for different perspectives’. 
(2008) 39/8 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 883-884.  
135  Grosfoguel draws from feminist scholarship to emphasize the need for scholars to recognize 
that they speak from a specific location in gender, class, racial, and sexual hierarchies of a 
particular region in the modern colonial world. See Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, 
Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-
System’ 208. 
136  Grosfoguel R ‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: 
Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality’ 29. 
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academy expressly to move beyond Eurocentric canons of thought and allow 
subaltern voices a space in the curriculum. 
The objective of moving beyond European modernity requires decolonisation of 
power relations.137 Transmodernity calls for epistemic diversity as a precursor to 
critical thinking about the epistemic traditions of the global South.138 Transmodernity 
does not assume a value-neutral posture towards the curriculum, it expressly sets 
out to transcend European Modernity.139 Grosfoguel insists that Eurocentric 
Modernity monopolised the definitions of democracy, human rights, economy, and 
others, and that Transmodernity seeks to provide a space for these definitions to be 
recast in accordance with pluriversal epistemic traditions.140  
2.3.3   Coloniality of power 
The coloniality of power is illustrated by Quijano’s explanation of patterns of control; 
it invites a study of how the world is divided into the Zone-of-Being and the Zone-of-
non-Being.141 Decolonial scholars use this concept to analyse the modern 
operations of power and how the world works. Coloniality of power is used as a 
reference point in assessing how the global political setting is constructed along 
sexist, patriarchal, capitalist, and/or hegemonic lines to create a hetero-normative, 
imperial power structure.142  
Grosfoguel insists that the masculine Western myth that knowledge production is 
neutral, universal, and un-positioned has been discredited by decolonial scholarship 
which shows that the production of knowledge is inextricably intertwined with global 
politics and Eurocentric hierarchies.143  
                                                             
137  Grosfoguel ibid 24. 
138  Grosfoguel R. The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities: Epistemic 
Racism/Sexism and the Four Genocides/Epistemicides of the Long 16th Century. 88 
139   Grosfoguel ibid. 
140   Ibid. 
141  Madlingozi T ‘Social Justice in a Time of Neo-Apartheid Constitutionalism: Critiquing the 
Anti-Black Economy of Recognition, Incorporation and Distribution’ (2017) 28/1 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 124-125.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni differentiates the two in that the zone of Being 
indicates the world of those who benefitted from colonialism and Western modernity, 
whereas the zone of non-Being denotes the world of slaves, victims of imperialism, 
colonialism, and apartheid. See Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality as the Future of Africa’ 
489. 
142  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order’ 32. 
143  Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’ 208. 
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The coloniality of power situates the production of knowledge within the network of 
the global power struggles which define curriculum development and 
transformation. According to Grosfoguel, coloniality of power posits the culture 
versus economy dilemma which emerges when economic relations in social 
processes are privileged over cultural and ideological aspirations.144 Coloniality of 
power integrates the multiplicity of cultural, political, and economic relations that are 
mediated in a neo-liberal capitalist dispensation.145  
2.4  Calls for decolonised higher education in South Africa  
The dissertation establishes an academic response to the calls for decolonised 
higher education in South Africa.146 Decoloniality is largely unknown in law and 
consequently this research borrows from sociology and the political sciences.147 It 
is important to craft a lexicon to articulate decolonial questions as they relate to 
intellectual property and copyright law curricula.  
Three points148 in history are relevant to this study: the 1803 copyright of the then 
law of the Batavian Republic;149 the 1842 British Copyright Act;150 and 1978 South 
African Copyright Act.151  
Terreblanche’s152 three-fold explanation of apartheid colonialism is instructive in its 
ability to create a basis for the law curriculum to be decolonised. Zitzke153 
paraphrases Terreblanche in saying that apartheid and colonialism are grounded 
                                                             
144   Ibid 218. 
145  Ibid 219. 
146  Mamdani M ‘Between the public intellectual and the scholar: decolonization and some post-
independence initiatives in African higher education’ 69 where the author argues that 
epistemic decolonisation begins with investigating the relation between the university and 
the national state, this comports with the calls for a deepened analysis of coloniality of power 
as a locality of coloniality.  
147  This is true notwithstanding recent contributions by the likes of Motshabi, Himonga, and 
Diallo. See Himonga C & Diallo F ‘Decolonisation and teaching law in Africa with special 
reference to living customary law’. See further, Motshabi B ‘Decolonising the University: A 
Law Perspective’ (2018) 40/1 Strategic Review for Southern Africa. See further, Le Grange 
L ‘Decolonising the university curriculum’ 
148  This is not to suggest that the history of copyright begins and ends with these three points. 
149  Die Wet van de Bataafasche Republiek van Juni 1803.  
150  The Copyright Act 1842 was an Act of Parliament in the United Kingdom, which received the 
Royal Assent on 1 July 1842 and was repealed in 1911. It revised and consolidated the 
copyright law of the United Kingdom. It was one of the Copyright Acts 1734 to 1888. 
151  Copyright Act 98 of 1978. This includes subsequent bills, drafts, amendments and laws 
connected with the subject. For instance, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 28 of 
2013 (IPLAA), Draft Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa Phase 1, and 
others. 
152  Terreblanche S A History of Inequality in South Africa 1652-2002. 
153  Zitzke E ‘The history and politics of contemporary common-law purism’ 202. 
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on the common theme of triadic oppression: (1) both the colonial and apartheid 
powers claimed political powers over black South Africans; (2) economic forces 
disempowered black South Africans by taking away their land; and (3) black South 
Africans were locked into in various forms of cheap and free labour for white 
masters. However, both Terreblanche and Zitzke are referring to colonialism, not 
coloniality.154 
Intellectual supremacy lies at the heart of the coloniality of knowledge and this 
results in a systematic dismembering of a Black Body’s intellect. Zitzke discusses 
how intellectual supremacy manifested and notes that colonisers subjugated African 
forms of law-making so relegating African law to a position where it remained largely 
underdeveloped and disrespected.155 The point of entry for decoloniality is that 
colonialism dismembered the Black Body and rendered it a non-Being lacking 
adequate mental faculties to produce knowledge.156 It follows that ‘African law’157 is 
not actual law as non-Beings are incapable of producing any credible product 
requiring intellectual thought.158 
Decolonial scholarship impels law teachers to encourage students to think deeply, 
broadly, and more critically about the law and how it is taught. The essence of 
decolonisation is to promote epistemic pluriversality159 within the academy. This 
                                                             
154  This distinction is ideologically and theoretically crucial because, as has been said 
previously, the decolonising discourse is an anti-thesis, in the main, not to colonialism but 
rather to coloniality. These two concepts, although largely related and historically 
chronological, must never be confused. 
155  Zitzke E ‘The history and politics of contemporary common-law purism’ 202. 
156  Yousuf I ‘Burdened by a Beast: A brief consideration of social death in South African 
universities’ 86, argues that universities continue to exclude the voices of black students in 
curriculum development, further deepening the social death of the Black Body. He further 
opines that, ‘[b]y excluding their narratives and encouraging them to cherish and exhibit 
gratitude for the privilege of being allowed in, students are coerced into dislodging from their 
memory the insufferable realities of the past. Subconsciously, and reinforced through 
institutional cultures and mores, students are sternly reminded that being allowed in means 
they must quietly submit and glorify colonial and “apartheid architecture”’. 
157  Zitzke E ‘The history and politics of contemporary common-law purism’ 202. 
158  Ramose uses this argument about African philosophy but in a different context. He 
problematizes how Africa is politically defined and the historicity of the claims of homogeneity 
in the epistemic traditions of Africa. He further argues that coloniality denied Africa its 
humanity, and this ontological denial of being an African means that Africans are not humans 
and therefore they cannot have a philosophy. See Ramose M ‘I doubt, therefore African 
philosophy exists’ (2003) 22/3 South African Journal of Philosophy 11. 
159  Santos B de S Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide 199, ‘Intercultural 
and postcolonial approaches have allowed for the recognition of the existence of plural 
systems of knowledge that are alternative to modern science or that engage with it in new 
knowledge configurations. Accessibility to a plurality of ways of knowing and to new kinds of 
relations among them has been going on for some time with fertile results, especially in the 
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counters colonial thinking about the law as something that is either purely English 
law or merely Roman-Dutch law.160 Indeed, decoloniality accepts ontological 
pluralism as a reality that requires ‘ecologies of knowledge’ to be understood.161  
According to Venter, the reconstruction of African culture will enable Africans better 
to respond to politics, economics, art, and/or education. The image reconstruction 
could be understood in line with the metaphor of raising the corpses of African 
knowledge(s) and cultures from their graves in order to re-member them in the body 
of existing knowledge(s).162  
Dismemberment follows the logic that states that colonial conquest removed (read 
dis-membered) the Black Body from the family of human beings. The totality of dis-
memberment is the dehumanising and ‘Thingifying’ of the Black Body so 
condemning it to the Zone of non-Being.163 Displacing one epistemology by the 
other and replacing one legal system with another is a brazen enactment of colonial 
ethics; its antithesis is decolonisation.  
2.5  Political, historical, and racial questions 
Does decolonising the curriculum in South Africa, mean that students will be taught 
a different type of copyright law to the rest of the world?164 This is a question not to 
be dismissed as frivolous. Although decolonisation presents a radical shift in how 
the law is taught, it does not in any way mean that the graduate of a decolonised 
curriculum will be of an inferior standard.165 If anything, in embracing epistemic 
                                                             
global South, where the encounter between hegemonic and nonhegemonic knowledges is 
more unequal and the limits of each are more obvious.’ 
160  See generally, Zitkze E ‘The history and politics of contemporary common-law purism’ 185-
230 where the author generally argues that the colonial wars between the British and the 
Afrikaner community tended to impact on how jurists interpret the law. He contended that 
these jurists were factional in their approach because in formulating South African judicial 
precedence those jurists with British background tended to rely heavily on English law, while 
tacitly avoiding Roman-Dutch law, while their Afrikaner counterparts tended to use Roman-
Dutch law and avoid English law.  
161  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order’ 43. 
162  Venter E ‘The notion of Ubuntu and Communalism in African educational discourse’ (2004) 
23/2-3 Studies in Philosophy and Education 156. 
163  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order’ 25: 
‘It captures not only physical fragmentation but also epistemological colonisation of the mind, 
as well the cultural decapitation that resulted in deep forms of alienation among Africans.’ 
164  Mbembe A ‘Decolonizing the University: New directions’ 31. The author addresses the limits 
of the decolonial project, arguing that some of these are set by neo-liberals, whilst the true 
intention of decolonisation is to reverse the tide of bureaucratization in universities, therefore 
a question of international standards does not arise.  
165  Kamwendo G Unpacking Africanisation of higher education curricula: Towards a framework 
24, 27 in Msila V & Gumbo M (eds) Africanising the Curriculum: Indigenous Perspectives 
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perspectives from the global South the envisaged pluriversality will establish 
localised intellectual traditions and so increase the graduate-ness of students.166 
The reductionist themes on race in the decolonisation discourse have made the 
historical blunder of blurring the lines.167 Mulder reiterates Fanon’s warning that 
decolonisation can never succeed if the only visible change is the replacement of 
white people with black people. She argues that before coloniality, actual 
colonialism created local elites, mostly educated, upper middle-class black people 
who had been compelled to assimilate European etiquette, and who thought and 
acted like Europeans.168  
Varma agrees with Mulder that the cultural and intellectual consequences of 
colonialism do not end with the achievement of political freedom.169 The mere 
replacement of the white man by the black man is therefore not decolonisation. 
                                                             
and Theories, addresses this political question by assessing prospects of graduate 
employability in an Africanised curriculum. He posits that Africanisation increases the 
graduate-ness of students because it empowers them by making them more knowledgeable 
about their immediate environment. He further warns that there should not be a perception 
that Africanisation means a rejection of anything that is not African; it is instead an attempt 
to assert Africa’s place in the development and internationalization of the knowledge 
economy. He responds to this political question by asking two further questions: (1) is 
Africanisation a passing fad? and (2) is Africanisation sustainable, and if so, how? To the 
former he responds that Africanisation is a fair attempt by African academic institutions to 
give their curricula local relevance and identity. To the latter, he responds by saying that 
there need to be resources put in place to ensure that the Africanisation dialogue is 
sustainable. 
166  Mbembe A ‘Decolonizing the University: New directions’ 32. ‘The harder I tried to make 
sense of the idea of “decolonization” that has become the rallying cry for those trying to undo 
the racist legacies of the past, the more I kept asking myself to what extent we might be 
fighting a complexly mutating entity with concepts inherited from an entirely different age and 
epoch. Is today’s Beast the same as yesterday’s or are we confronting an entirely different 
apparatus, an entirely different rationality – both of which require us to produce radically new 
concepts?' 
167  Pailey R ‘How to truly decolonise the study of Africa’ ALJAZEERA online News portal. 2019 
https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/indepth/opinion/decolonise-african-education-
190610111758402.html (date of use: 28/11/2019). The author finds that one of the 
reductionist themes in the decolonial discourse includes misguided narratives that seek to 
exclude white people from the discourse. She further argues that the mere action of removing 
white authors from reference lists in academic student textbooks does not achieve any of 
the goals set out in the decolonial project. ‘Still others erroneously contend that "decolonial" 
street credibility can be acquired by simply adding non-whites to their reading lists, journal 
editorial boards, speaking panels, research collaborations, book contracts, etc.’ 
168  Mulder L ‘Frantz Fanon, Internalized Oppression and the Decolonization of Education’ 2.  
169  Varma P Decolonising the University: The Emerging Quest for Non-Eurocentric Paradigms 
21-30. 
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Mphahlele bemoans how Africans insist on using Eurocentric tools to decolonise 
their situation.170 These tools include the exclusion of others and an obsession with 
‘whiteness’, which lead to radical projects that re-centre what they claim to 
challenge.171  An example of colonial re-centering is the use of the coloniser’s ideas 
as regards the inherent differences between blacks and whites and the uniqueness 
of black culture.172 
The reality of coloniality presents an epistemic, ontological, and physical violence 
on Black Bodies and their knowledge(s). It may be a phenomenon adversely 
affecting all of society, but its effects are felt more keenly by what Fanon refers to 
as ‘racialised subjects’.173 The discursive decolonial project should re-centre Black 
Bodies as agents of knowledge production, and foster an inclusive dialogue that 
elicits robust debate among all communities within the academic space.  
2.6  History of copyright law 
The Greeks and Romans are said to have been among the first to want their 
authorship to be recognised and attributed to them. Cornish locates the origin of 
copyright not in the author’s desire to hold an exclusive right over his or her work, 
but rather with the stationers at whose behest the first policies on copyright law 
emerged.174 The concern of the stationers was to have rules that regulated the 
number of reprints and reproductions that could be made of their work. The basis of 
modern copyright law can be attributed to the development of the printing press 
between the 1440s and late 1500s.  
In the Cape of Good Hope, copyright was governed by the common law – ie, by 
Roman-Dutch law. It is only after the arrival of the British and the introduction of their 
colonial order by way of the Copyright Act175 – a law of the colonial master applied 
automatically to the territory of the colonised – that statutory control entered the 
                                                             
170  Madlingozi T  ‘Decolonising “decolonisation” with Mphahlele’ New Frame.  1 November 
2018. https://www.newframe.com/decolonising-decolonisation-mphahlele (date of use: 
29/11/2018). 
171   Ibid. 
172  Ibid.  
173  Fanon F Black Skin, White Masks 41 
174  Cornish WR Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights 245. 
The author explains that “stationers” was the name used to refer to what is currently known 
as publishers. Cornish uses the phrase “forefathers of the modern publishers”. 
175  Copyright Act 2 of 1873 
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picture. At that time South Africa was divided into four self-governing republics176 
and whenever the British introduced a law in the Cape Colony, it would take 
approximately five years for the other three republics to adopt the same provisions.  
In 1910177 the four republics united to form the Union of South Africa which 
eventually became the Republic of South Africa.178 Even during the period after the 
Union of South Africa, copyright law continued to take its cue from British law.179 
Examples include The Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act 9 of 
1916180 which was annexed to the British Copyright Act of 1911.181 In 1965 South 
Africa promulgated the Copyright Act, 1965,182 which deviated from the 1916 Act183 
but still evidences British influence in that one may argue that it was adopted in light 
of the British Copyright Act of 1956184 and was subsequently modelled around it.185 
The law of copyright has followed this pattern of colonial domination, alternating 
between English and Dutch masters. Contemporary case law indicates that the legal 
system continues to rely on Commonwealth precedent when interpreting domestic 
legislation.186  
Additionally, international treaties play a definitive role in the historical trajectory of 
copyright law. The biggest influencer must be the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886.187 The French Copyright Decree 
                                                             
176  The Cape of Good Hope, the Orange Free State, Natal, and the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek, 
which was later known as the Transvaal.  
177  For further reading on some of the pivotal moments in the history of the Union of South Africa 
see Fisher J The Afrikaners.  
178  See Packenham T The Boer War.  
179  Pistorius T Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2 ed) Part 4 ‘Copyright Law’ 182-
185.  
180  Wet op Patenten, Modellen, Andelsmerken en Auteursrecht wet nommer 9 van 1916. See 
WIPO online for original text of the Act http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
lexdocs/laws/en/na/na014en.pdf. (Accessed on 06/11/2017) 
181  Also known as the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911, is an Act of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom (UK) which received Royal Assent on 16 December 1911. The Act established 
copyright law in the UK and the territories colonized or under the political control of the British 
state. 
182  Copyright Amendment Act 63 of 1965. 
183  The Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act 9 of 1916.  
184  The Copyright Act 1956 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom which received 
its Royal Assent on 5 November 1956.  
185  Pistorius T Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 183. 
186  For instance, the court held in Waylite Diary CC v National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA 645 (A) 
653F-G that English case law wields considerable persuasive force in the absence of local 
authority, and is construed as properly enacted legislation. 
187  Visser C (Gen ed) South African Mercantile and Company Law (8 ed) 704. 
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issued in 1852188 is also an era of copyright history which deserves a firm mention 
as it was pioneering in shaping some of the current widely-accepted definitions of 
copyright concepts such as works eligible for copyright protection, the primary 
sources of copyright, and many other copyright concepts.  
2.7  Copyright law curriculum’s colonial make-up 
South African higher education is colonial in its totality, and this includes the LLB 
curriculum.189 Wa Thiongo counsels that the language question is vital to the 
decolonial project.190 Copyright law is not immune to the politics of language as Wa 
Thiongo posits that ‘the choice of language and the use to which language is put is 
central to a people’s definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social 
environment, indeed in relation to the entire universe.’191 His assertions validate 
what scholarship around the coloniality of Being and of knowledge embodies in its 
calls for the re-membering of Black Bodies. Coloniality marks the continued patterns 
of the subjugation of the colonised through the enactment of a global racial hierarchy 
and the hegemonic Eurocentric epistemologies in the present-day world system.192 
To break these patterns, re-members the Being and de-centres the knowledge(s) of 
the colonisers by paying serious attention to the politics of language. 
2.8  Conclusion 
This chapter set out to establish a basis for decolonising higher education in South 
Africa by explaining the essence of the calls to decolonise the curriculum. It studied 
the difference between colonialism and coloniality, clarifying the misconceptions 
that tend to surround the decolonial discourse. The chapter digs deep in locating the 
                                                             
188  For further reading on this bit of history see Seville C The internationalization of Copyright 
law: Books, Buccaneers and the black flag in the Nineteenth century.  
189  Gumbo M ‘A model for indigenising the university curriculum: A quest for educational 
relevance’ 45 in Msila V & Gumbo M (eds) Africanising the Curriculum: Indigenous 
Perspectives and Theories, who uses former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere’s 
philosophical model on indigenization of the curriculum to explain the depth of colonial legacy 
in higher education. He observes that colonial education is based on the assumptions of 
colonialist and capitalist society, designed to transmit the values of the colonizing power to 
the colonized state. Julius Nyerere’s solution to this anomaly was to turn education around 
completely, by ensuring that it addresses the reality of the poor and underdeveloped and 
seeks a socialist transformation. 
190  Wa Thiongo N Decolonizing the Mind: The politics of language in African literature 4. 
191  Ibid. 
192  Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’ 205. 
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three sites of coloniality so as further to grapple with its manifestation in the copyright 
law curriculum.  
Coloniality manifests, in the main, in three forms: the coloniality of knowledge; the 
coloniality of power; and the coloniality of Being. These three manifestations provide 
a guide to investigating the colonial nature of the copyright law curriculum. This 
chapter has shown that there are racial, political, and historical questions that 
always need to be carefully negotiated in any project that seeks to bring about a 
transformed legal pedagogical framework. It concludes by setting out the history of 
copyright law and linking this to colonial aspirations which continue to be entrenched 
in the curriculum. The decolonised copyright law curriculum incorporates teachings 
of respecting traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, intangible 
traditional expressions, indigenous knowledge, folklore, and/or any similar form of 
intellectual property. These must be respected as an embodiment of the culture and 
heritage of the Black Body.  
The chapter lays a basis for the work in the chapters that follow as it firmly construes 
coloniality as a dis-membering experience for the colonised. This is a theoretical 
framework that which this dissertation is based – it establishes decoloniality and 
decolonisation as an intellectual foundation to critically study copyright law concepts 
as taught by the two student textbooks. In the next chapter the dissertation studies 
two intellectual property law justificatory theories and uses this theoretical 
framework to present Afrocentric alternatives.    
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CHAPTER 3 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JUSTIFICATORY THEORIES: AN AFRICAN 
CRITIQUE 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter briefly engages two justificatory debates and brings an African lens193 
to these discussions. It shows that current justificatory debates are Eurocentric and 
neglect other forms of thinking and knowledge(s) while specifically excluding African 
philosophies. This leaves no space for African thinkers. The chapter also relies on 
Sunder,194 Craig,195 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, and Sesanti, to give a brief critical analysis of 
central themes in current Eurocentric justifications.   
This research does not make a philosophical argument but rather advances the 
basic contention that renewed philosophical debate which actualises an Afrocentric 
approach by embracing localised epistemic traditions, is essential in rethinking the 
foundations of intellectual property law. This culminates in an African critique of 
these colonial philosophies and how they shape the philosophy underlying 
intellectual property. This, in turn, re-members the dismembered Black Body.196  
For purposes of this research it is sufficient to examine the two most prominent 
justifications – the labour theory of property; and the incentive theory.  
The chapter concludes by consulting African modes of communal ownership and 
considers the need to define authorship in terms that are applicable to Africa's 
reality.  This consultation decisively posits African ways of knowing as an endeavour 
to achieve the decolonial desire for pluriversal epistemic traditions in in higher 
education generally, and the copyright law curriculum specifically.  
                                                             
193  Msila V ‘Africanisation of education and the search for relevance and context’ 63 in Msila V. 
& Gumbo M Africanising the Curriculum: Indigenous Perspectives and Theories. African 
lens, as applied in this chapter, refers to what the author defines as Africanisation as 
emancipatory education, in terms of which the curriculum seeks to use African philosophies 
alongside Western forms.  
194  See generally, Sunder M From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global 
Justice.  
195  See generally, Craig C Copyright, Communication and Culture: Towards a relational theory 
of copyright law.  
196  See Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order’ 
(2015) 36/2 December Australasian Review of African Studies 25 who states: ‘It 
[dismemberment] captures not only physical fragmentation but also epistemological 
colonization of the mind, as well the cultural decapitation that resulted in deep forms of 
alienation among Africans.’ 
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3.2  Historical background 
African societies traditionally derive their societal value systems, which also 
influenced pre-modern African legal philosophies, from practices of cultural 
production imbued with the principles of custodianship which render culture 
inalienable. 
The property law module, which is a prerequisite for intellectual property law 
modules (copyright law included), teaches students that property can either be 
corporeal or incorporeal, the former denoting tangible and the latter intangible.197 
Intellectual property is classified as incorporeal due to the nature of property of 
objects.198 The current South African LLB curriculum begins the discussion of 
property in ancient Rome.199  
Du Bois explains the theory of natural law200 and labour theory by invoking the 
Roman-law concept pictura, which applies when a painter, and not the owner of the 
canvass upon which the painting was done, becomes owner of the finished work.201 
Pictura is a suitable Roman-law example, derived from the Roman-law tradition of 
thought as an expression of the heritage and culture of the Romans at a specific 
point in history. Romans are regarded as civilised beings202 who were capable of 
developing theories and philosophies which came together in the outward 
expression of Roman Beinghood. Decolonisation asserts that Black Bodies, too, are 
Beings and, therefore, African epistemic traditions need to be developed to assert 
the outward Being of the Black Body.  
                                                             
197  Van der Walt AJ & Pienaar GJ Introduction to the Law of Property (6 ed) 13. See further, 
Mostert H et al The Principles of Law of Property in South Africa 21. 
198  De Zulueta F The Institutes of Gaius 12-14: ‘Corporeal things are tangible things, such as 
land, a slave, a garment, gold, silver, and countless other things. Incorporeal are intangible, 
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199  Du Bois M ‘Justificatory Theories for Intellectual Property Viewed through the Constitutional 
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the development of a natural-law theory for the recognition of intellectual property.’   
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studies of the law, the concept of ‘natural law’ has been largely discarded as a legal 
misnomer. Du Bois ibid cites it as a principle that determined ownership for specificatio, 
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201  Du Bois ibid 7. 
202  By virtue of their whiteness, Romans and all Europeans are accorded the status of Beings 
among other Beings, in contrasts to Black Bodies who are Non-Beings. See Chapter 2 on 
the Coloniality of Being.  
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Drahos argues that the exercise departing from Gauis by construing pictura as a 
first step towards recognising intellectual property on natural-law principles 
illuminates the reality that Roman private law is the origin of the discussion on 
justificatory theories of intellectual property law.203 Transmodernity calls for a 
justificatory debate that includes nuanced African epistemic perspectives.204 Drahos 
takes the discussion further and says that there should be critical historical 
investigations which would make examination of intellectual property less 
Eurocentric.205  
3.3  Justificatory theories 
3.3.1  Incentive-to-innovate theory 
The challenge to the privileging of class antagonism as the exclusive site of 
contradiction requires a critique of Western Marxism’s assumption of the 
universality of capitalist development.206  
The central premise of modern copyright (and patent) law is that creators of 
innovative works need to be economically incentivised on the assumption that this 
incentive will encourage greater innovation.207 It is accepted, in terms of this theory, 
that innovation only occurs when works of intellectual property are incentivised by 
the protection against economic exploitation by others.  
‘Incentive’ is interpreted in this narrow sense because it refers only to monetary 
reasons to create, meaning that it is seen as the driver of individual economic 
interests in the market setting.208 The capitalist interpretation of ‘incentive’ suggests 
that the individual who is incentivised in monetary terms is the driver of innovation, 
giving impetus by the capitalist tenets of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
                                                             
203  Drahos P A philosophy of Intellectual Property 15. 
204  On the concept of Transmodernity see generally Chapter 2.  
205  Drahos P A philosophy of Intellectual Property 15. 
206  See generally, Lowe L & Lloyd D The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital. 
207  Du Bois M ‘Justificatory Theories for Intellectual Property Viewed through the Constitutional 
Prism’ 22 provides a rationale for the incentive theory: ‘The incentive theory advocates 
promoting the creation of valuable intellectual works by granting property rights in such works 
since copyright, patent, and trade secret property protection provide the only adequate 
incentives for the creation of a socially optimal output of intellectual products.’ See further, 
Dreyfuss R & Frankel S ‘From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is 
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property’ (2015) 36/4 Michigan Journal of International Law 
560-561.  
208  Ibid 562-563. 
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of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement209).210 This is a justification 
that suggests that money is the strongest driver of innovation. Sunder illustrates that 
this is a unidimensional and narrow economic discourse that has seldom been 
challenged. It postulates that there can only be innovation when works of intellectual 
property are incentivised.211 In a United States’ (US) experiment on the value of the 
paternity right (moral right) it emerged, among other things, that ‘[p]eople's 
innovation decisions are not strongly influenced by objective assessment of the 
costs and benefits of their choices. Instead, creators' internal beliefs and 
preferences about innovation contexts matter much more.’212  
Given that innovation was taking place long before the advent of intellectual property 
rights, and further that profits and sustained innovation are present in areas with 
relatively weak intellectual property protection, it is illogical to perceive economic 
incentive as the only driver of innovation.213 Sunder problematises the narrow 
definition of incentive and questions its rationale. She asserts that the Eurocentric 
rationale of the incentive theory should never be construed as a means to generate 
profits because this reduces intellectual property law to a money-making scheme 
which negates the non-monetary aspects of life.214 Rather, law should enable 
citizens to live a good life and not merely protect private capitalist interests.  
Intellectual property scholars should not insist on using the narrow lens of economic 
interests to construct a holistic vision of intellectual property law. Human 
flourishing215 depends on the developing world’s access to food, textbooks, and 
essential medicines. The capacity to earn a livelihood from one’s intellectual 
contributions to our global culture transcends the narrow economic-incentive lens 
that underpins the Eurocentric incentive-to-innovate theory.216 
                                                             
209  The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, see full document from 
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210  Ibid 563-566. 
211  Sunder M From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global Justice 25.  
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216  Sunder M From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global Justice 5. 
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Ghosh finds that intellectual property is commonly viewed as a matter of private law 
and private rights, whereas there are in fact parallels between the natural-monopoly 
theory and theories that justify intellectual property; this points to the involvement of 
public law.217 He observes that the incentive theory predicts very little about the 
structure of intellectual property rights, save for the implication that intellectual 
property rights need to be as strong as possible in order to maximise incentives.218 
He opines that the incentive-to-innovate theory is either entirely false, or at best 
misguided, in shaping an understanding of intellectual property systems.219 
The non-binary nature of the justificatory debate allows for the development of the 
incentive-to-innovate theory and for it to be extended to accommodate Africanised 
epistemic inquiries. For example, the incentive theory falls short in justifying 
intellectual property when it comes to works of art, in that many artists create art for 
the sake of art and not primarily because of the motivation offered under the 
incentive theory. Creative industries are unique insofar as the incentive rationale is 
concerned, because of the so-called ‘starving-artist’ argument that points to intrinsic 
motivation to create instead of financial motivation.220  
The argument against the incentive/ innovate theory does not necessarily mean that 
artists do not want to be compensated for their works.221 However, the argument 
that this chapter makes is that even though artists rightly demand to be remunerated 
for their works, this does not mean that they will not produce art without a monetary 
incentive. This argument suggests that financial income is not proportionate to the 
level of creation. 
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220  Searle N & Brassell M Economic Approaches to Intellectual Property: Economics of 
Copyright 76, with reference to Caves R Creative Industries: Contracts between Art and 
Commerce 2000. 
221  See, PEN ‘Afrikaans South African authors protest against Copyright Amendment Bill’ 23 
November 2018. Litnet Online. ISSN 1995-5928 Ingesluit LitNet Akademies. 
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Justificatory theories are built on individualism which originates from the great 
intellectual movement associated with the Enlightenment of the Renaissance222 and 
Aufklarung periods.223 This is one of the biggest reasons why the justificatory 
theories tend to be ill suited to Africa’s situation. Furthermore, the incentive theory 
is directed at fostering innovation, whereas indigenous knowledge systems 
frequently aim to protect against exploitation of traditional cultural expressions.224 
Roodt insists that contemporary law faculties should actively investigate the central 
questions that distinguish the discourse on indigenous knowledge(s) from the 
discourse on intellectual property law.225 Therefore, the paucity of comparative 
studies which incorporate African philosophies in intellectual property law is 
regrettable and calls for a change in academic thinking.  
In an effort to Africanise the incentive theory as taught in the LLB curriculum, 
Transmodernity proffers the African philosophy of Mohlomism. Sesanti provides an 
incisive account of Mohlomism, defining its central tenet as the outlook on life among 
the Basotho; it is the lens that the people use to navigate various complex societal 
questions.226  
Historical accounts show that Morena Mohlomi (1720–1815) was a mentor to the 
King of the Kingdom of Lesotho, King Moshoeshoe I.227 Mohlomi also travelled 
around Southern Africa teaching people about his philosophy of truthfulness, justice, 
peace, the love of mankind, and the pursuit of sane humanism.228 When he was not 
travelling, Mohlomi headed a leadership academy in Southern Africa. He has been 
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dubbed the ‘Socrates of Africa’ in that he epitomises the brilliance of pre-colonial 
African leadership.229 The teachings of Mohlomi are crucial as he represents African 
intellect and wisdom prior to colonial contact; in fact he never set eyes on a 
European, nor was he influenced by Eurocentric epistemic traditions.230 
The legal philosophy modules in the current LLB curriculum mention most Western 
philosophers who lived during the time of Mohlomi, but due to deliberate exclusion 
and epistemicide, the philosophical thinking of Mohlomi is strikingly absent from 
the LLB curriculum. Mohlomi’s teachings, like those of Western thinkers, were 
aimed at the problems of his community. Of course, circumstances in different 
communities tend to differ radically. Yet, the Eurocentric South African curriculum 
assumes that Western scholarship is without fail suited to regulating African 
situations and responding to African challenges. 
Mohlomism is based not only on Mohlomi’s individual musings, but also on the 
wisdom of the Supreme Being, Molimo, and on ancestral spirits, Balimo.231 
Mohlomism should rather be approached as a product of the mental and physical 
experience of Basotho society.232 
The most important aspects of Mohlomism which Transmodernity inserts in the 
incentive theory – and so too, the LLB curriculum – are the elements of truthfulness, 
justice, peace, and the pursuit of sane humanism.233 While innovation should be 
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incentivised to stimulate economic growth and protect individual claims to the fruits 
of the creator’s intellectual labour, this should be done in light of what is true, what 
is just, and what is humanely sane. For example, allowing for a longer copyright 
duration may bode well for copyright owners, but not so well for those reliant on the 
public domain. In this regard, Mohlomism invites an inquiry into whether it is more 
just and humanely sane to have a copyright endure for a longer or a shorter period. 
Given that the incentive to innovate is not paramount in the creation of indigenous 
knowledge systems, the concepts of justice, peace, love, and striving for sane 
humanism can be used as justificatory theories to describe the protection afforded 
indigenous knowledge systems and traditional cultural expressions. 
Colonial education deliberately ignores African philosophy and assumes that African 
people had neither a philosophy nor an epistemology. Including the thinking of 
Mohlomi in the curriculum could deconstruct colonial education.234 Odora-Hoppers 
argues that: ‘It [decolonial education] needs to expose the established hegemony of 
Western thought and beseech it to feel a measure of shame and vulgarity at 
espousing modes of development that build on silencing of all other views and 
perceptions of reality.’235   
Mohlomism contributes to decolonisation, not by being inserted into the justificatory 
debate merely to provide a nuanced conception of the incentive theory, but to rid 
the theory of certain of the characteristics which are alien to the African situation. 
Moreover, it seeks to reverse epistemicide by asserting the Black Body as a Being 
among other Beings, capable of producing knowledge and worthy of legal 
recognition. This engenders an approach to Mohlomism laden with an attitude of 
justice and liberation which deeply appreciates decolonisation as a project to 
dismantle didactic Western hegemonic orders. 
It must be borne in mind that African knowledge(s) should be elevated to the same 
platform as the Eurocentric knowledge(s) which dominate the academy. The 
proposal to incorporate Mohlomism in the incentive theory does not mean that 
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Moholomism should be accepted as is and without criticism or academic peer 
engagement. Indeed, academics should be encouraged to grapple with the 
philosophy of Mohlomism in the copyright curriculum, just as with the ideas of male 
European thinkers. Mapesela argues that the contestation surrounding Basotho 
indigenous knowledge(s) as a science stems from a lack of knowledge of some 
Sesotho philosophies.236 He contends that Sesotho philosophies should be 
introduced into higher education, and that deconstruction237 should be vehicle by 
which some of the mysteries and hidden meanings that have shrouded these 
philosophies in controversy may be explained.  
Intellectual property law as currently taught is premised on systematic tension 
between the incentive to innovate and access to the products of innovation. Sunder 
argues that, ‘[f]or most critics of intellectual property law today, these two values: 
incentives and access, are the two that matter. Other values are subsumed by these 
two broad categories.’238 Sunder exposes how narrow the debate has become, as 
it concentrates on productivity which then translates to incentives. Mohlomism, on 
the other hand, argues that the values of access and incentive should be interpreted 
in light of the demands of justice and sane humanism.239 
3.3.2  Labour theory of property 
The labour theory of property originates in the work of John Locke that provides that 
as persons own their own labour, they are entitled to the fruits of that labour.240 This 
is the principle of first appropriation.241  
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47 
 
According to Locke, inventions and creations are products of an individual’s toil and 
labour.242 The labour theory is significant to this study as it plays a major role in the 
recognition of modern intellectual property rights;243 although postmodern thinkers 
have deconstructed this thinking exhaustively.244 
Roodt points out that, ‘[f]ormal regimes [like the current labour theory] are 
characterised by adaptability, but individualised rights are not fully responsive to the 
cultural nature of traditional and indigenous knowledge.’245 The individualistic 
framework on which the labour theory is built proves unable to respond adequately 
to the African situation because the natural-rights discourse begins and ends with 
an individualistic proprietorial focus.246 
Locke produced a theory of property that is amenable to various interpretations. On 
intangible property, the question is whether natural rights exist and if they do, how 
do they operate?247 Locke’s response is three-fold. First, he presupposes a pool of 
communal rights which he refers to as the ‘state of nature’ which originates in the 
will of God. Second, adding labour to the state of nature results in individual claims 
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to private property.248 And, third, labour only gives rise to a property right where the 
remaining ‘state of nature’ is sufficient to serve the interests of others.249   
Drahos rightly asks why labour should be the criterion to qualify property rights in 
preference to, for example, intention or possession.250 Both Tully and Macpherson 
attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies in Locke’s arguments, each concluding that 
Locke’s ideologically amoebic formulation leads to confused interpretations of the 
labour theory.251 The former argues that Locke’s philosophy represents a philosophy 
of religious praxis, whereas the latter construes Locke as a crusader for capitalist 
hopes and desires.252  
Further, the labour theory is overly individualistic253 and assumes – incorrectly – that 
all works are authored by an individual.254 This is untrue in the context of African 
indigenous knowledge(s) and indigenous cultural expressions.255 The 
individualistic256 bent of Locke’s labour theory opens up a dialogue on the meaning 
of community and its social context.257 
3.4  Authorship and African modes of communal ownership 
One antithesis to the current Eurocentric258 and individualistic labour theory, is an 
engaged study of authorship in the context of African indigenous knowledge(s) and 
African modes of communal ownership.259 A deepened study of African modes of 
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communal ownership in relation to works of authorship provides a richer perspective 
of the current labour theory. 
The South African Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 28 of 2013 (the 
IPLAA) defines an indigenous community as: 
Any recognisable community of people originated in or historically settled in a 
geographic area or areas located within the borders of the Republic, as such 
borders existed at the date of commencement of the Intellectual Property Laws 
Amendment Act, 2013, characterised by social, cultural and economic 
conditions which distinguish them from other sections of the national 
community, and who identify themselves and are recognised by other groups 
as a distinct collective.260 
This definition of an indigenous community means that the owner of the copyright 
in an indigenous work is the author, and that the author of an indigenous work is 
the indigenous community. The legislative concept of community renders 
traditional labour theory even less relevant to indigenous knowledge(s) as it makes 
it impossible for the author to be either an individual or a joint author as defined in 
the Copyright Act.261  
The Eurocentric intellectual property (and specifically copyright law) regime poses 
a concept of authorship which accommodates only single authors and joint-
authors. In African culture and mythology, authorship may also extend to 
ancestors and the yet-to-be-born – a perception which should feature in teaching 
the concept of authorship in the LLB curriculum. 
The fruits of one’s labour as defined by the labour theory, means that the 
community that authors a work by way of African belief systems of Balimo and 
Molimo, cannot resonate with Locke’s logic as under the labour theory ‘fruits’ do 
not take ancestors and the yet-to-be-born into account.262 Equally, the concept of 
joint authorship fails to define a community in that it does not include Badimo and 
the yet-to-be-born.263  
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Geyer posits that: ‘Indigenous community does not refer to the public or society in 
general, that is, to South Africans generally, but to a plurality of groups.’264 She 
argues that the community needs to be understood as encompassing plural and 
nuanced factors rather than focusing on a set definition.265 Geyer defines the 
image of community as one that, ‘can, inter alia, be defined in terms of the area in 
which a group of people lives or in terms of a group’s common background or 
shared interests’.266  She addresses the definitional gaps presented by the 
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill, 2010. Although there have been more 
recent drafts of this Bill subsequent to the text relied on by Geyer, the definition of 
a community does not appear to have changed.  
The Copyright Act always defines an author as a ‘person’267 and uses the term ‘co-
authors’ in the case of joint authorship. The IPLAA268 deviates slightly from the 
Copyright Act’s individualistic definition by providing that the author of an indigenous 
work is the indigenous community from which the work originated and acquired its 
traditional character. 
Sesanti provides an ‘Africanised’ definition of community: ‘In African traditional 
culture, “community” is defined as the departed souls (the dead), the living and those 
yet to come (the unborn).’269 This means that in African culture the death of a person 
does not break the bond that exists between the living and the dead – hence, the 
inclusion of the dead.270  
                                                             
that Geyer is correct, however, in light of the labour theory and the subsequent definition of 
an indigenous community, the conception of joint-authorship, co-authorship is a misfit in 
decoloniality.  See Geyer S ‘Copyright in Traditional Works: Unravelling the Intellectual 
Property Laws Amendment Act of 2013’ (2017) 27/1 South African Mercantile Law Journal 
54. 
264  Geyer S ‘Towards a clearer definition and understanding of "Indigenous Community" for 
purposes of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill, 2010: an exploration of the 
concepts "Indigenous" and "Traditional"’ (2010) 13/4 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
132-180.  
265  This lends credence to an argument that the single, joint, and communal authors may not be 
sufficient to define the African community. 
266  Geyer S ‘Towards a clearer definition and understanding of "Indigenous Community" for 
purposes of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill, 2010: an exploration of the 
concepts "Indigenous" and "Traditional"’ 132-180.  
267  The person, always denotes an individual, which means that the Copyright Act only views 
authorship as that which can only be attributed to an individual or individuals.  
268  Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 28 of 2013, s 3(a)-(k). 
269  Sesanti S ‘Africanizing the Philosophy curriculum through teaching African culture modules: 
An African Renaissance act’ 437. 
270  Bewaji J ‘The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose Debate on Ubuntu’ (2003) 22/4 South 
African Journal of Philosophy 393, states that the idea of a community meaning the onto-
triadic alive, dead, and yet-to-be-born, does not come without criticism, for example Bewaji 
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The amendment effected by the IPLAA does not dismantle the individualism of 
modern intellectual property law; nor does it address the particularities of Africa’s 
unique situation. Instead, it defines a community and indigenous works by fusing 
individual authorship and geographic proximity, and frames joint authorship in 
relation to cultural similarity.271 Students need to be brought to see that an author of 
indigenous works is sometimes neither an individual nor a composite group of 
individuals, but a community which includes ancestors and the yet-to-be-born.272  
3.5  Conclusion 
This chapter set out to show in practical terms how African philosophies such as 
Mohlomism can be included in the LLB curriculum. The chapter also critically 
analysed two Eurocentric justification theories to illustrate that the current theories 
fail to understand that, in the context of Africa, culture cannot belong to an individual 
person.273 It provides nuances specifically as regards the incentive theory, arguing 
that the current incentive-to-innovate approach lacks the epistemic depth to 
accomodate the Black Body. One intervention made in the chapter is that the 
incentive element should transcend monetary gain but encompass other factors. 
The economics of innovation are as important as calls for access, but the discussion 
ought not to end there. Mohlomism offers a nuanced and a more engaged dialogue 
in the incentive-to-innovate theory. As Sunder posits: ‘The fight over intellectual 
property should consider values beyond simply incentivising production.’274 Sunder 
                                                             
argues that the idea is problematic because he does not see ‘[h]ow translating a 
phenomenon that is purely utilitarian value into a religious linchpin for the construction of a 
theory of existence.’ It appears in Bewaji’s scholarship that the idea of ‘living dead’ is self-
contradictory. 
271  See, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 28 of 2013, s 3(f): ‘conditions which 
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and who identify themselves 
and are recognised by other groups as a distinct collective’. 
272  See generally, Ginsburg J ‘The concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright law’ (2002)  
52 DePaul Law Review. Ginsburg makes headway in a comparative analysis of the concept 
of authorship in various jurisdictions. She acknowledges that copyright laws in the United 
State of America and the rest of the world recognise the author only as the human creator of 
the work and nothing else. A decolonised copyright pedagogy goes into the deeper meanings 
of an author, transcending the definition of an author as someone who is alive, with the 
understanding that the dead (ancestors) play an authorship role in African communities 
either physically or spiritually. In African mythology, a person never dies, his or her spirit lives 
on and has practical application in the lives of the people that he/she has left behind.  
273  Note that although copyright does not protect culture, but rather works, this dissertation 
argues that in Africa’s situation there are instances in which works are an embodiment of the 
culture of the peoples of Africa. Therefore, when discussing the protection of some of these 
works you are also invariably discussing the protection of culture.  
274  Sunder M From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global Justice.31.  
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calls for cultural analysis in order to ensure a consideration of values that go beyond 
the simplistic incentive-to-innovate route.  
The chapter also examined the labour theory of property, illustrating that it was 
crucial in the creation of the theory of intellectual property. The argument advanced 
is that the labour theory in its current form is inadequate to describe African modes 
of communal authorship. It became essential for this chapter to problematise John 
Locke’s observations and formulation of the labour theory. Problematising Locke is 
important for two reasons: he represents the archetypical example of Eurocentric 
ideas which have been disproved by disuse in current legal philosophy; and critical 
analysis of Locke’s work also shows that European ideas alone are insufficient.275 
In the context of the creation of indigenous works, communalism needs to be studied 
in light of the reverence for ancestors in African philosophy. The inclusion of the 
element of reverence to ancestors is important in that it debunks and deconstructs 
the colonial myth that ancestral reverence is voodoo, barbaric, uncivilised or 
unscientific.  
Sesanti pleads for an understanding of the reverence for ancestors as ‘an act of 
appreciation [of] past achievements for future civilization’.276 The liberation-centred 
aspects of a decolonised copyright law curriculum should guide students to 
appreciate African spirituality and that communal authors of indigenous works derive 
some of their skills from ancestors.277  
This chapter offered two Afrocentric alternatives to extant Eurocentric intellectual 
property law justificatory theories. This sets the tone for the inquiry that follows in 
chapter 4, wherein the dissertation expressly posits the philosophy of Ubuntu as an 
alternative in teaching moral rights in copyright law. 
                                                             
275  Carys Craig argues that notwithstanding its wide acceptance by some scholars, the reliance 
on Lockean theory in copyright law is unhelpful and harmful to the development of a sound 
and effective copyright system. See Craig C ‘Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: 
A warning against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law’ 22-23. 
276  Sesanti S ‘Africanizing the Philosophy curriculum through teaching African culture modules: 
An African Renaissance act’ 436. 
277  Ramose M ‘The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose Debate on Ubuntu’ 408 notes two 
implications of the recognition of the living-dead: (1) the living-dead belong in a different 
sphere of Being, and that is the domain of the ontology of invisible beings, even though they 
are recognised as real and not a phantom of the imagination; and (2) the relations that the 
living-dead have with the alive directly contradict the Eurocentric theology in which there is 
one God with which the entire community identifies.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 COPYRIGHT IN A WORK: AN UBUNTU APPROACH 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter explores how the nature of copyright is taught in law faculties using the 
Dean and Dyer278 and Van der Merwe279  undergraduate student textbooks. The 
nature of copyright is an important topic in that it details the ambit of the protections 
afforded by copyright law. Where an expression fails to meet copyright requirements 
that expression will not attract copyright protection and will fall outside of the scope 
of the copyright regime.  
This chapter focuses on the exclusive rights of the owner – the notable privileges a 
copyright owner enjoys in relation to a work. This chapter’s dialectical significance 
is two-fold: (1) it establishes the scope and ambit of protections; and (2) it proposes 
strategies to make these protections fit the African situation. 
The chapter suggests that decolonised teaching of the concept of moral rights must 
embody the pillars of Ubuntu, recognition, and respect. These pillars deliberately 
cast moral rights as central to the social-justice agenda; indeed, ‘[a]t the centre of 
the “remembering” process is the restorative recovery project that is ranged against 
dismemberment and Europhonism’.280 In Africa, the coloniser-colonised dichotomy 
is omnipresent in the operations of cultural appropriation where the appropriator is 
always the dominant culture, and the appropriate the colonised culture as illustrated 
in the example of Die Antwoord. All of this is an enactment of coloniality which 
persists long after colonialism retreats.  
The renaming and owning281 concepts are essential to the decolonial project as they 
serve as an antithesis to coloniality steeped in images that entrench the symbolism 
                                                             
278  Dean O & Dyer A Introduction to Intellectual Property Law. 
279  Van der Merwe A Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2 ed). 
280  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order’   
(2015) 36/2 Australasian Review of African Studies 32. 
281  Note that ‘owning’ in this instance is used in light of its decolonial application, rather than 
ordinary copyright law jargon. Therefore, this owning has nothing to do with copyright 
ownership, but rather the decolonial demand for the Black Body to own the narrative in 
knowledge production and related epistemic endeavours. See Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ibid cited 
Chapter 2: ‘The reversal of epistemicide and subsequent re-membering of the dismembered 
involves a restorative recovery project of Black Bodies being given the power of owning and 
naming their own realities using their own epistemic perspectives.’  
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of the colonial worldview. Moreover, the three pillars allow for the practical 
enactment of re-membering the dismembered.  
Haunss and Shadlen point out that the current literature on intellectual property 
suffers from two fundamental weaknesses: (1) the field is overly generalised, with 
too much attention paid to the conflicts over international rules and legal provisions 
at the expense of analysis of what is happening within countries; and (2) the field is 
insufficiently theorised in the political sense: insufficient attention is given to how the 
politics of intellectual property may be informed by distinct dynamics and logics.282  
Francis raises nuanced questions which still await an academic response or in-
depth research. On cultural appropriation, he asks whether indigenous people 
themselves can or have been complicit or active players in the cheapening of their 
own traditional works – who has the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the ‘tribe’.283  
The chapter concludes by turning to three contemporary examples of indigenous 
knowledge(s) and the forms it can take.284 These case studies demonstrate the 
complex nature of the relationship between indigenous knowledge systems and 
copyright law. Some of the complexities include the inherent anomaly of 
commodifying and appropriating culture. The case studies further show that there is 
a definite overlap between intellectual property rights and cultural appropriation. The 
aim of the case studies is to unravel a specific complexity as regards the sphere of 
indigenous knowledge. Even though African communities derive their work ethic 
from communalism and collectivism, this is not always the case. In a nutshell, the 
story of NoStokana shows the intersectionality between the community and the 
individual as there are no fixed binaries between the community and the 
individual.285 
                                                             
282  Haunss S & Shadlen K Politics of Intellectual Property. Contestation over the Ownership, 
Use, and Control of Knowledge and Information 2-5. 
283  Francis S Who speaks for the tribe? The arogyapacha case in Kerala in Haunss S. and 
Shadlen K. Politics of Intellectual Property. Contestation over the Ownership, Use, and 
Control of Knowledge and Information 81-86.  
284  Shava S ‘The application/role of indigenous knowledges in transforming the formal education 
curriculum: Cases from Southern Africa’ 124-125 in Msila V & Gumbo M (eds) Africanising 
the Curriculum: Indigenous Perspectives and Theories, where the author posits that the 
subject of indigenous knowledge is at the epicenter of the decolonial project because 
colonialism’s theorectical underpinnings are heavily steeped in the domination, colonisation, 
devaluation, appropriation, misappropriation, primitivisation, invalidation, exclusion and 
rejection of indigenous knowledge(s) of the Black Body.  
285  Visser C ‘Some Thoughts on Making Intellectual Property Law Work for Traditional 
Knowledge’ (2002) 14/4 SA Mercantile Law Journal 660. 
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4.2  What is copyright?  
The Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (the Act) does not define what copyright is, and the 
same applies to both the Van der Merwe and Dean and Dyer textbooks. All nine 
editions of Cornish’s textbook also do not define what copyright is. He instead 
begins the discussion by tracing the steps in the development of history of copyright 
law in the United Kingdom. The action of detailing copyright history without defining 
copyright may be laid at the door of the fact that the meaning of copyright has shifted 
significantly from what it was at its inceptions. Today copyright no longer applies 
purely to the printing press and has developed to encompass far more than merely 
the right to make copies of literary texts.286 
Dean describes the systematic operation of copyright: 
Copyright law, like other branches of intellectual property law, seeks to create a 
system whereby the creator of an original work is afforded a qualified monopoly 
in the use or exploitation of his work in order, firstly, to compensate and reward 
him for the effort, creativity and secondly, to act as an incentive for him to use 
his talents and efforts to create more and better works or intellectual products.287  
The Act does not expressly define copyright but merely sets out which works are 
protected and the rights that subsist in them. Copeling defines copyright as, ‘that 
right which vests in the author of every original literary and artistic work and enables 
him to prevent the unsolicited copying of his work, provided always that the work is 
not of a kind which is contrary to public morality’.288 Copeling’s definition speaks 
more to the rights of the owner/holder/author of a copyright, than to the actual 
definition of the copyright itself.  
There is a difference between copyright law and copyright as a concept. The Van 
der Merwe textbook accordingly states that:289 ‘Copyright belongs to a category of 
subjective rights which is distinct from categories constituted by real, personal and 
personal rights.’ The textbook references Gallo Africa Ltd and Others v Sting Music 
(Pty) Ltd and Others (40/2010) [2010] ZASCA 96, 2010 (6) SA 329 (SCA), [2011] 1 
All SA 449 (SCA) [para 19] where the court noted that copyright is an incorporeal 
                                                             
286  See generally Chapter 2 on the history of copyright law. 
287  Dean O Handbook of South African Copyright Law (Online version) 1-1 
https://juta.co.za/products/3760-handbook-of-south-african-copyright-law/ (date of use: 
01/09/2019) 
288  Copeling AJC Copyright Law in South Africa 2. 
289  Pistorius T  ‘Copyright Law’ 179 in  A Van der Merwe (ed)  Law of Intellectual Property in 
South Africa (2 ed). 
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immovable property. The image of ‘incorporeal immovable property’ places the 
rights derived from copyright law in their own unique genus of rights, and this stands 
in contrast to section 22(1) of the Act which provides that, ‘[s]ubject to the provisions 
of this section, copyright shall be transmissible as movable property by assignment, 
testamentary disposition or by operation of law’. 
Pistorius lists five characteristics of the concept of copyright. First, copyright is 
territorial in nature, meaning that it enjoys protection in the country in which the 
works were made and is territorially extended by way of treaties.290   
Second, copyright is a negative right291  and prohibits292 others from performing 
certain actions. Copyright originally attained its negative nature in England where it 
was formulated as way for the printing press companies to prevent others from 
reproducing their publications. 
Third, copyright comprises a bundle of rights that protect both economic and moral 
rights. The economic rights vest in the owner, whereas moral rights vest in the 
author. These two clusters of rights have overlapping application and are 
conceptually intertwined.293  
Fourth, it sets the requirement for material embodiment which means that it applies 
to expressions presented in material form.294   
Finally, copyright is an exclusive right of limited duration.295  
The demands of creators of works in the global North differ from those of creators 
of works in Africa (and rest of Global South), especially where traditional cultural 
expressions are concerned. The pedagogical enquiry must be sensitive to the needs 
and realities of developed and developing countries respectively. Accordingly, the 
differentiation concept should be applied when teaching intellectual property, and 
                                                             
290  Ibid. 
291  Ibid. 
292  Feldman v EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Ltd 1035 JOC (W) 1037: ‘In essence copyright 
prohibits unauthorised copying by third parties. It has been described as a right enforceable 
against other, prohibiting them from performing infringing acts in relation to copyright work.’ 
293  Pistorius T ‘Copyright Law’ 180 in  A Van der Merwe (ed)  Law of Intellectual Property in 
 South Africa (2 ed). 
294  Ibid. 
295  Ibid 181. 
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students should be encouraged to question the uniformity of intellectual property 
law around the world.296 
The characterisation of copyright as comprising negative rights is misleading 
because copyright law has developed beyond its negative connotations.297 
Copyright law should not only prohibit certain actions, but also pronounce on 
indigenous knowledge systems. If this is heeded, the understanding of copyright 
could be transformed from being purely a collection of negative entitlements to a 
system that regulates social interaction more broadly than a subject matter of 
copyright protection. A broader conceptualisation of copyright is one that is attentive 
to the colonial epistemic realities of the global South.298  
The material-embodiment requirement is a mandatory provision in the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  (TRIPS) which insists that, 
‘[c]opyright  protection  shall  extend  to  expressions  and not  to  ideas,  procedures,  
methods  of operation or mathematical concepts as such’.299 There is general 
consensus that the material-embodiment requirement operates to exclude African 
indigenous knowledge from protection.300 To this end, some propose that African 
indigenous works should enjoy sui generis protection while others insist that the 
material-embodiment requirement should be amended to allow for current copyright 
legislation to also protect African indigenous knowledge(s).301 These aspects of 
copyright are indicative of its diverse nature, and justify a broader debate on moving 
the curriculum away from teaching copyright as a bundle of negative rights that 
prevent people from doing certain things.  
                                                             
296  Kelbrick R ‘The need for different perspectives’ (2008) 39/8 International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 883-886. 
297  As it had in the mid-1400s because the intention of copyright may have been to prevent the 
reproduction and/or copying of the products that were made by the print press. This is no 
longer the case.   
298  Pistorius agrees that copyright is a misnomer because the concept entails more than just the 
 right to copy (or make copied reproductions of a work) because it includes the right to publish, 
 perform, adapt, translate and transmit the work. See Pistorius T  ‘Copyright Law’ 181 in  A 
 Van der Merwe (ed) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2 ed). 
299  Article 9.2 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)  
300  Visser C ‘Some Thoughts on Making Intellectual Property Law Work for Traditional 
Knowledge’ 669-670.   
301  For a further discussion see Ncube C & Du Plessis E ‘Sui generis legislation for the protection 
of traditional knowledge in South Africa: An opportunity lost’ in Ncube C & Du Plessis E (eds) 
Indigenous Knowledge & Intellectual Property: Contemporary Legal and Applied Research 
Series.  
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4.3  Exclusive rights of the owner 
Exclusive rights are those advantages that accrue to the owner of the copyright in a 
work. The Act sets out these rights in sections 6 to 11B of the Act. The rights vary 
in accordance with the type of work involved. The exclusive rights that vest in literary 
or musical works are not the same as those that vest in artistic or other works.  
The American (US) Constitution describes why a copyright owner should be 
accorded rights over his or her work as ‘[to] promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for a limited time to authors and inventors, the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.’302 The reasoning in the US 
Constitution is unidimensional as it centres the incentive theory as the only reason 
for the rights of copyright owners to be protected. This view is limited in that it 
negates all other aspects of social interaction regulated by the copyright system.  
Section 22 of the South African Bill of Rights provides that ‘[e]very citizen has the 
right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely… [t]he practice of a trade, 
occupation or profession may be regulated by law’.303 This right to choose one’s 
profession rests in the author’s legitimate pursuit of the given creative industry. 
However, it does not guarantee any particular copyright system, but merely that a 
reasonable regulatory scheme must exist to allow free choice. Further, it is clear that 
intellectual property rights form part of constitutional property.304 Section 25(1) 
provides: ‘No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.’305 These two 
provisions in the Bill of Rights are not as precise and direct as the provision in the 
US Constitution, but they can be construed as the constitutional basis for the 
protection of a copyright owner’s rights.  
The Constitutional Court has confirmed the status of intellectual property for 
purposes of section 25 on numerous occasions. Du Bois narrates the findings of the 
court on the first such occasion, Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
                                                             
302  Constitution of USA, art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. See generally, James H ‘Rights of a Copyright Owner’ 
(1942) 17/373 Notre Dame Law Review  
303  Section 22, Chapter 2, of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
304  On constitutional property law see generally Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 
and Van der Walt AJ & Shay R ‘Constitutional analysis of intellectual property’ (2014) 17/1 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  
305  Section 25(1), Chapter 2, of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).306  
The Court decided that there exists no internationally recognised norm to 
protect intellectual property separately from the general property clause and that 
the general property clause is wide enough to include property interests that 
require protection according to international human rights norms.307  
In First National Bank of SA t/a Westbank v Commissioner, South Africa Revenue 
Service 2001 (4) SA 768 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that section 25 could 
be used to prevent the unlawful divestment of property rights by the state. The 
findings of the court provide a basis for the protection of intellectual property rights 
generally.308 Du Bois agrees with this sentiment saying that, ‘[t]here is no separate 
constitutional clause providing for intellectual property rights, and so only the 
constitutional property clause could provide recognition and protection ’.309 
Recognising intellectual property rights in the constitutional property clause is 
appropriate as the rights are recognised as property in private law.310 
4.4  Moral rights and cultural appropriation 
Two types of right flow from copyright: economic rights; and non-economic rights. 
Economic rights serve to provide patrimonial reward for the author’s skill and labour, 
while the author’s non-economic rights – sometimes termed ‘moral rights’ derived 
from the French phrase ‘droit moral’311 – protect the personality and professional 
dignity interests of the author.312  
Moral rights are provided for in section 20(1) of the Act: 
Notwithstanding the transfer of the copyright in a literary, musical or artistic 
work, in a cinematograph film or in a computer program, the author shall have 
the right to claim authorship of the work, subject to the provisions of this Act, 
and to object to any  distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work where 
such action is or would be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author: 
                                                             
306  Du Bois M ‘Recognition and Protection of Traditional Knowledge Interests as Property in 
South African Law’ (2013) 2/2 European Property Law Journal 144-170. 
307  Ibid 145 para 75 
308  Pistorius T ‘Copyright Law’ 180 in A Van der Merwe (ed) Law of Intellectual Property in 
South Africa. 
309  Du Bois M ‘Intellectual property as constitutional property: the South African Approach’ 
(2012) 24/2 SA Mercantile Law Journal 178. 
310  Ibid 180. 
311  Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law (4 ed) 272. 
312  Adeney E The moral rights of authors and performers: An international and comparative 
analysis. 
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Provided that an author who authorizes the use of his work in a cinematograph 
film or a television broadcast or an author of a computer program or a work 
associated with a computer program may not prevent or object to modifications 
that are absolutely necessary on technical grounds or for the purpose of 
commercial exploitation of the work. 
The section currently protects the right of attribution (also known as the right of 
paternity), and the right to integrity. Seeking to decolonise the teaching of moral 
rights, this chapter proposes that moral rights need to be taught in light of the African 
values of respect, recognition, and Ubuntu.  
The paternity right allows authors to claim authorship of their works. This right has 
a number of symbolic, economic, and cultural consequences.313  The right to be 
named the author of one’s works is intricately linked to asserting one’s Being as it 
is an innate desire for every person to have his or her Being affirmed.314  
Bentley and Sherman list a number of roles that the naming of the author play. Some 
of these roles may be used to assert the dismembered and silenced African Black 
Body, because they involve the management of intellectual works, the channelling 
of royalties, the interpretation of the work, the celebration of and reward for the 
author’s talent and genius, and the construction of the individual as the creator of 
an intellectual oeuvre.315 Students should be taught that the paternity right can be 
used to assert the Being of the Black Body. The Black Body is inclusive of those 
authors316 whose works have been silenced by way of the violence inherent in 
epistemicide, and these works continue to be under the continued stress of cultural 
appropriation.  
The right to integrity is the right to object to distortive and derogatory treatment of 
the work.317 The main focus is on the integrity of the work rather than the integrity of 
the person. This is paradoxical as this moral right understands that the protection of 
                                                             
313  Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law 275. 
314  This is something that is not unique to Africans; it is a characteristic inherent in mankind 
generally. I am stressing this point because the point of decolonising is also to return the 
Black Body to the family of human beings. Africa and Africans are therefore unique in their 
uniqueness but, they are still members of mankind generally. It is crucial to the Black Body 
because it is dismembered from the family of humans. The recovery project seeks not to re-
center the very colonial ideas that decolonisations seeks to decenter. See Madlingozi T 
‘Decolonising ‘decolonisation’ with Mphahlele’ New Frame 1 Nov 2018 
https://www.newframe.com/decolonising-decolonisation-mphahlele/ (date of use: 
28/22/2018). 
315  Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law 275. 
316  Including traditional, ethnic and native communities. 
317  Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law 282-283.  
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the integrity of the work also upholds the good standing of the author’s reputation. 
The right to integrity is closely linked to the right to object to false attribution in that 
objecting to false attribution allows individuals not to be named authors of work they 
have not created.318 The nexus between the two is that both are concerned with the 
integrity (or lack thereof) of a work, and the reciprocal effect on the reputation of the 
author.  
One of the ways in which cultural appropriation occurs is when an author creates a 
work and attributes it to a certain cultural grouping to which it does not belong. 
Rogers defines cultural appropriation as,  
[t]he use of a culture’s symbols, artefacts, genres, rituals, or technologies by 
members of another culture, is inescapable when cultures come into contact, 
including virtual or representational contact. Cultural appropriation is also 
inescapably intertwined with cultural politics. It is involved in the assimilation 
and exploitation of marginalized and colonized cultures and in the survival of 
subordinated cultures and their resistance to dominant cultures.319 
Very little has been theorised about cultural appropriation and its intersection with 
law in the LLB curriculum, even though cultural appropriation features prominently 
in the area of copyright law. Current copyright law, in its negative make-up, does not 
quell cultural appropriation because present legislation fails even to define the 
phenomenon. Carlin explains: 
There are two distinct types of source material used in Appropriation: 
commercial imagery culled from pop culture media, and existing artistic imagery 
in which the source is manipulated within a larger ensemble of imagery and 
artistic styles and pure appropriation where the artist simply copies the original 
and reattributes it to him or herself.320 
The world as we currently know it reflects two types of culture which are in a constant 
tussle: colonised culture; and dominant culture. The colonised rightly seek to 
decolonise their condition, whilst the dominant culture seeks to entrench its 
dominance, ensuring that the situation of the colonised remains unchanged. One of 
the numerous ways in which this is effected is by the immoral taking of one’s culture 
by another.  
                                                             
318  Ibid 280. 
319  Rodgers R ‘From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation: A Review and Reconceptualization 
of Cultural Appropriation’ (2006) 16/4 Communication Theory 474-503. 
320  See generally, Carlin J ‘Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law’ 
(1988) 13/103 Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts 107. 
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There are two common tensions that should arise when the subject of cultural 
appropriation is discussed. First, the tension between the development of a culture, 
which arises from the flow of the interracial and intercultural mix between people 
from different cultures, in different parts of the world, and the need to protect the 
cultures of the colonised from being appropriated by the coloniser. And second, the 
tension between narrow nationalist, regionalist, tribal, xenophobic, racist ideas that 
masquerade as a drive to protect the dignity of the colonised while in reality 
advancing its own non-liberational ideas, and the genuine need to protect the 
cultures of the colonised from being appropriated by the coloniser. These two 
tensions are a product of both Eurocentric modernity and globalisation.  
Decoloniality perceives these tensions as colonial stratagems which seek to use 
globalisation to cast doubt on the reality of cultural appropriation. The appropriation 
of the cultures of Black Bodies can be likened to what Ndlovu-Gatsheni terms the 
‘objectification and dehumanisation of black people’ on a world scale.321 The excuse 
that different cultures mix, and thus instances of cultural appropriation are 
unavoidable, is an example of the colonial resistance that Ndlovu-Gatsheni warns 
against as a worldwide dehumanisation of black people.  
A contemporary example of cultural appropriation is the iconic TV-series on the life 
of King Shaka Zulu KaSenzangakhona.322 Henry Cele, the actor who plays the role 
of King Shaka, is seen in this series doing things that are attributed to be 
characteristics of the Zulu culture and the people of KwaZulu. Most of these things 
are tantamount to false attribution and also overlap with cultural appropriation. King 
Shaka is depicted in the TV series, as a ruthless killer and a merciless king who 
slaughtered his own people with impunity. He is also shown speaking fluent English 
with British colonisers. The image of a Zulu King, who is the embodiment of the 
isiZulu language, displayed as one who negotiates with the British in fluent English, 
is, apart from absurd, also cultural appropriation.323 The screenplay creates a false 
impression of Zulu culture and the people of KwaZulu. The people of KwaZulu are 
                                                             
321  Ndlovu-Gatsheni Sabelo J ‘Decoloniality as the Future of Africa’ (2015) 13/10 History 
Compass 490. 
322  See, Shaka Zulu 1986. Rotten Tomatoes Online Movie critic. 
https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/shaka_zulu/ (date of use: 01/02/2020). 
323  For further reading on this topic see, Rosemary J Coombe ‘The Properties of Culture and 
the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 
(1993) 6/July Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 249-285.  
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a proud people, proud of their language, and proud of their victories, yet none of this 
pride emerges from the TV series. The story of Shaka Zulu in all its distorted 
depictions, presents an immoral taking of one’s culture, its distortion, and hence a 
firm case for cultural appropriation.  
Biko argues that the essence of colonial education is that it always depicts the Black 
Body as subservient to the coloniser.324 He alleges that colonial hegemonic orders 
always recount triumphant stories of Europeans, while telling distorted stories of 
failure and defeat of African people.325 Biko proposes intense research to provide 
an alternative truth of the history of African people – a history that does not depict 
Africans as losers, failures, and those who voluntarily spoke the language of the 
coloniser instead of their own.326  
A decolonised copyright curriculum creates an opportunity to use existing copyright 
law concepts, such as the right against false attribution in moral rights, to teach of 
the need not only not to falsely attributing to the Black Body what is not its culture, 
but also for the culture of the Black Body not to be distorted. This type of curriculum 
re-members the dismembered Black Body, expressly using what exists to assert a 
decolonial vision of re-humanising the Black Body by restoring its misappropriated 
and distorted culture.  
4.5  Ubuntu in moral rights 
4.5.1  Introduction 
A colonial mentality suggests that African concepts and philosophies are optional 
and should, therefore, not enjoy a status equal to Roman-Dutch or English law in 
the LLB curriculum.327 There has been a colonial attitude towards the philosophy of 
Ubuntu in our law,328 one that contends that Ubuntu has been proverbially put in a 
                                                             
324  Biko S ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity’ in Steve Biko  I write what 
I like. Selected Writings 95. 
325  Ibid. 
326  Ibid. 
327  Bennet T ‘Ubuntu: An African Equity’ (2011) 14/4 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 31. 
A colonial frame of mind features prominently in the scholarship of Bennet who argues that 
Ubuntu is a ‘newcomer in a strange environment’ (referring to the law) and as such it should 
be made to ‘fit in with existing legal terms and concepts’. See further Bennet ibid 49. 
328  Mokgoro Y & Woolman S ‘Where dignity ends and uBuntu begins: An amplification of, as 
well as an identification of a tension in, Drucilla Cornell’s thoughts’ (2010) 25/1 South African 
Public Law 403 where the authors note the importance of Ubuntu for South Africa and her 
people, positing that more needs to be done to infuse Ubuntu into South African 
jurisprudence than it is currently the case.  
64 
 
bottle and placed on a shelf, only to be used when it is convenient for the user,329 
this is a phenomena that Cornell and Van Marle refer to as the unidimensional 
treatment of Ubuntu.330 This notwithstanding, Ncube asserts that Ubuntu is 
applicable to constitutional, criminal, delictual, contractual, and defamation matters 
and that it is part of the legal canon.331 Taylor finds that many authors write about 
Ubuntu but are reluctant to acknowledge it as a principle of what he terms ‘right 
action’.332 
This chapter proposes that the African philosophy of Ubuntu must be used as a 
cornerstone in teaching moral rights in a decolonised copyright law curriculum. It 
analyses Ubuntu critically, showing some of its shortcomings as expressed in South 
African jurisprudence. It problematises current scholarship on Ubuntu and argues 
that it follows colonial archetypal modalities to articulate African philosophies, 
trivialising African philosophy to vernacular maxims, and reducing the epistemic 
traditions of the Black Body to a series of catchphrases. In this way it centres the 
very ideas that decoloniality seeks to de-centre.333 Moreover, the praxis of Ubuntu 
is not well served in the courts which interpret it but fail to offer any substantive guide 
on its judicial application in all matters brought before them.334 Decolonial 
articulations allow for clear theorisation of the concept of Ubuntu335 and its practical 
                                                             
329  I am indebted to Emile Zitzke for this metaphorical expression of Ubuntu and the bottle on a 
shelf. This emerges from scholarly conversations in a Unisa Mercantile Law departmental 
reading group (2018) at which Zitzke was an invited speaker under the topic ‘Common-law 
purism’. On common-law purism, see generally Zitzke E ‘The history and politics of 
contemporary common-law purism’.  
330  Cornell D & Van Marle K ‘Exploring Ubuntu: Tentative reflections’ (2005) 5/2 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 196. See also Ncube who describes the meaning of Ubuntu as ‘elusive’ 
in Ncube C ‘Calibrating copyright for creators and consumers: Promoting distributive justice 
and Ubuntu’ 262 in Giblin R & Weatherall K (eds) What if we could reimagine copyright?  
331  Ibid. see further Mokgoro Y & Woolman S ‘Where dignity ends and uBuntu begins: An 
amplification of, as well as an identification of a tension in, Drucilla Cornell’s thoughts’ 402. 
The authors are of the opinion that Ubuntu should provide a distinctly South African lens 
through which judges and lawyers should determine the extension of the actual provisions 
of the law.  
332  Taylor D ‘Defining Ubuntu for Business Ethics – A deontological approach’ 332. 
333  See Madlingozi T ‘Decolonising ‘decolonisation’ with Mphahlele’ New Frame 1 Nov 2018 
https://www.newframe.com/decolonising-decolonisation-mphahlele/ (28/11/2018) who 
argues that sometimes decolonial projects make the mistake of centering the very ideas they 
initially sought to de-center.  
334  Taylor D ‘Defining Ubuntu for Business Ethics – a deontological approach’ 333 states: ‘So 
many authors give lists of characteristics but no ground rules as to why these characteristics 
and not others constitute Ubuntu.’ 
335  Gade C ‘What is Ubuntu? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African Descent’ 
(2012) 31/3 South African Journal of Philosophy 488. The author observes that there are two 
clusters of answers in responding to the question: What is Ubuntu? The one cluster defines 
Ubuntu as a moral quality of a person, whereas the second cluster defines Ubuntu as a 
philosophy and an ethic of African humanism. It is interesting that the author frames these 
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application in teaching moral rights in copyright law. It identifies respect and 
recognition as the key aspects of Ubuntu available to produce a moral-rights 
pedagogy which reflects the epistemological aspirations of the Black Body.  
4.5.2  The praxis of Ubuntu 
The entrenchment of the colonial order sees South African jurists attempting to 
interpret the philosophy of Ubuntu using a Eurocentric mode of thought.336 The 
decolonial project is obliged to provide a sound account of the philosophy of 
Ubuntu337 which reflects the importance of moral rights in the copyright law 
curriculum – especially in the African context.  
The concept of Ubuntu has been interpreted by many South African courts.338 For 
example, in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (CCT 53/03) [2004] 
ZACC 7; 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) (1 October 2004) [Para 
37] the Constitutional Court defined and interpreted Ubuntu to mean: 
The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the 
population, suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights 
with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which 
is nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and operational declaration in our 
evolving new society of the need for human interdependence, respect and 
concern. 
Tshoose echoes the Constitutional Court in offering a comparable definition: 
Ubuntu is a literal translation of collective brotherhood (personhood) and 
collective morality. It originally implied a sense of hospitality and the integration 
of strangers. This was, however, understood as something to be encouraged, 
as opposed to a description of an extant virtue or type of community. Similarly, 
                                                             
two clusters without appreciating that there might be a third cluster, because Letseka has 
argued elsewhere that Ubuntu means both personhood and a philosophy guiding 
personhood. See Letseka M ‘Educating for Ubuntu/Botho: Lessons from Basotho Indigenous 
Education’ (2013) 3/2 Open Journal of Philosophy 340. 
336  Cornell D ‘A call for a nuanced constitutional jurisprudence: Ubuntu, dignity, and 
reconciliation’ (2004) 19/1 South African Public Law 670, observes that Ubuntu is an 
irreducible ideal that could be used to promote the different set of ideals for interpreting the 
Bill of Rights, yet it has to swim upstream against resistance from Western notions of social 
contract traditions.   
337  Cornell D ‘Is there a difference that makes a difference between uBuntu and dignity?’ (2010) 
5/1 South African Public Law 394, insists that Ubuntu should be grasped as part of African 
jurisprudence and view of law, with the appreciation that it is a representation of a different 
story of law than the one imagined in the West. She continues (at 396): ‘In a profound sense, 
uBuntu encapsulates the moral relations demanded by human beings who must live 
together…[i]t implies a fundamental moralisation of social relations, and what never changes 
is that society is inherent moral.’ 
338  See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Limited and Others [2006] ZAGPHC 21, 
2007 (1) SA 78 (W), [2006] 2 All SA 240 (W), 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W) (3 March 2006). 
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Ubuntu could be used to request solidarity, which is often a necessary 
precondition for survival in communities, like South African townships, that are 
characterized by poverty.339 
Radebe and Phooko340 agree with the judicial definition of Ubuntu but also claim 
that jurists ‘[f]all short by overlooking many of the components that form part of the 
substantive content of Ubuntu’.341 
The courts all tend to commit three similar mistakes in their definition of Ubuntu.  
(1) They fail to establish a link between values underpinned by the concept of 
Ubuntu and how these values influence courts in adjudicating matters before them 
or how law teachers should teach the law to students at universities. For example, 
Tshoose posits that: ‘Everybody should contribute to the community and generosity 
from others, particularly relatives, should be reciprocated in the future.’342 This fails 
to show how the community and communitarianism values of Ubuntu can be applied 
by the courts.343  
(2) They use popular African vernacular maxims to explain Ubuntu, without critically 
engaging those maxims to establish their application to the law. Examples of these 
maxims include, umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye abantu or motho ke motho ka batho 
                                                             
339  Tshoose C ‘The Emerging Role of the Constitutional Value of Ubuntu for Informal Social 
Security in South Africa’ (2009) 3/1 African Journal of Legal Studies 13. 
340  Radebe S & Phooko M ‘Ubuntu and the law in South Africa: Exploring and understanding 
the substantive content of Ubuntu’ (2017) 36/2 South African Journal of Philosophy 240.  
341  Ibid. They offer a prime example demonstrating that Ubuntu’s relevance to the law remains 
largely limited and thus bottled on a shelf, because the article premises itself on providing a 
substantive definition and application of the concept of Ubuntu in the law, yet does not 
succeed in doing so. 
342  Tshoose C ‘The Emerging Role of the Constitutional Value of Ubuntu for Informal Social 
Security in South Africa’ 13. 
343  This study has taken note and heed of case law such as S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC), 
1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC), wherein the court held: ‘The Constitution introduces democracy 
and equality for the first time in South Africa. It acknowledges a past of intense suffering and 
injustice, and promises a future of reconciliation and reconstruction....To treat it with the 
dispassionate attention one might give a tax law would be to violate its spirit as set out in 
unmistakably plain language. It would be as repugnant to the spirit, design and purpose of 
the Constitution as a purely technical, positivist and value-free approach to the post-Nazi 
Constitution in Germany’. Here the court speaks of fundamental rights that can be likened to 
the values which are underpinned by Ubuntu, yet this can never be claimed to be a case 
which sets out a framework for the use of Ubuntu by our courts. 
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ba bangwe;344 ingane yami yingane yakho;345 and simunye346. These vernacular 
maxims should be interpreted in the context of the rights to paternity and integrity. 
One such example is the maxim izandla ziyagezana347 – loosely translated as 
“hands wash each other”. The essence of this isiZulu saying is that in washing one’s 
hands, the left hand washes the right hand (and vice versa), and therefore that 
actions are reciprocal. We could use the izandla ziyagezana element of Ubuntu in 
the copyright curriculum to explain to students the need for an author to be 
acknowledged as a true author of a work even after the currency of the copyright 
has lapsed, or even in a situation where the copyright is owned by someone else. 
Although one may hold the copyright in a work and enjoy the benefits this confers, 
this very act of ‘holding’ gives rise to the reciprocal obligations embodied in the 
concept of ubuntu.   
Radebe and Phooko also borrow a Sesotho vernacular maxim from Mogobe 
Ramose: Feta kgomo o tshware motho348 – loosely translated: pass the beast and 
focus on the person. Its deeper symbolic meaning is that when one is faced with a 
situation in which one must choose between the acquisition of wealth and the 
preservation of another human being’s life, one should choose to preserve the life. 
In the context of moral rights – and integrity in particular – this should be likened to 
the need for copyright owners not to distort the integrity of the original works of an 
author for material gain, but respect the integrity of the author.  
An engaged discussion of how these maxims could be used to develop an 
Afrocentric doctrine of the law, or even to create an Afrocentric common law, the 
lack of a critical engagement has reduced current scholarship to an exercise of 
translating the terms without slotting them into the South African legal discourse.  
                                                             
344  Radebe S & Phooko M ‘Ubuntu and the law in South Africa: Exploring and understanding 
the substantive content of Ubuntu’ 240. These are isiZulu and Setswana maxims which 
mean that a person is a person because of others 
345  Ibid. This is an isiZulu maxim which means my child is your child. And therefore, it takes a 
community to raise a child.  
346  Tshoose C ‘The Emerging Role of the Constitutional Value of Ubuntu for Informal Social 
Security in South Africa’13. This is an isiZulu term which means we are one, or we are united.  
347  Radebe S & Phooko M ‘Ubuntu and the law in South Africa: Exploring and understanding 
the substantive content of Ubuntu’ 241. 
348  Ibid 243. 
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When issues of Ubuntu are relevant in the courts,349 it appears that it is called upon 
as no more than a convenient means by which to justify extant legal doctrines from 
the English and Roman-Dutch law tradition. South African courts are yet to see a 
case in which counsel has – either successfully or unsuccessfully – raised the 
concept of Ubuntu to argue against common-law logic. Ubuntu continues to be 
applied as a by-the-way concept or afterthought, or as a concept to give an ‘African 
feel’ to existing Eurocentric legal concepts.  
(3) They analyse the concept of Ubuntu, almost as a sociological and non-legal 
construct rather than asserting it as a concept of inherent justice.350 This is a 
reductionist approach which attempts to illustrate how African communities lead 
their lives. The use of African lifestyles and/or living arrangements, does not 
necessarily define Ubuntu. This is a mistake often made by decolonial scholars who 
re-centre the very ideas that they are seeking to de-centre.351 
Lenkabula opines that the current limited definitions of Ubuntu lead to actions that 
are inadequate: 
Anthropocentric interpretations, that is, interpretations which regard human 
beings as the most significant entities for the universe; or interpretations that 
tend to assess reality and religious experiences or life exclusively in terms of 
human values, needs, etc., are inadequate.352  
She points to ecological degradation as an example and suggests that Ubuntu need 
not be responsive solely to human relations, but is also relevant to questions such 
as capitalism and ecological degradation. This use of the concept of Ubuntu requires 
it to be a concept of continuous application in our daily lives, in our activism, and in 
our policy-making.  
                                                             
349  Note the listing of the court in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 
(11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 23: ‘here can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and 
equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing 
or shelter. Affording socio economic rights to all people therefore enables them to enjoy the 
other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The realisation of these rights is also critical to the 
advancement of race and gender equality and the evolution of a society in which men and 
women are equally able to achieve their full potential.’ 
350  Ramose M ‘Ubuntu’ in Giacomo D, Federico D, and Giorgos K (eds) DeGrowth: A 
vocabulary for a new Era 212-214. Ramose correctly argues that Ubuntu is a philosophy of 
social justice, redress and equality. 
351  Madlingozi T ‘Decolonising ‘decolonisation’ with Mphahlele’ New Frame  1 November 2018 
https://www.newframe.com/decolonising-decolonisation-mphahlele (date of use 
28/11/2018) 
352  LenkaBula P ‘Beyond Anthropocentricity – Botho/Ubuntu and the Quest for Economic and 
Ecological Justice in Africa’ (2008) 15/3 Religion and Theology 375-394. 
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In the context of legal discourse, Ubuntu must be taken out of the bottle on the shelf, 
and be developed by the courts, the legislature, and academics, as theory and 
concept to be used by the courts in their daily adjudication. For example, Bewaji 
does something worthwhile with the concept of Ubuntu, opining that it has sound 
therapeutic value for the souls of the oppressed and wretched of the earth in that it 
affords them a way to come to terms with their humiliation and defeat by the 
colonisers.353 
4.5.3  Recognition 
The Black Body is calling to be heard, to be seen, and to be recognised. The Ubuntu 
value of recognition should not be misconstrued and conflated with the right to be 
recognised as an author. Rather, this pillar of moral rights recognises Black Bodies 
as a people who are thinkers, capable of knowledge production, who can feed into 
creative industries and the academy. 
The teaching of moral rights must be geared at re-membering epistemic traditions 
of the global South and reversing epistemicide. This contributes to decolonisation 
as it nullifies epistemicide and resuscitates the knowledge(s) of the Black Body and 
places it at the apex of existing knowledge(s). This results in the knowledge(s) and 
works of the colonised sharing the same platform and status as Western 
knowledge(s). 
The paternity right and the right of integrity must be taught within the framework of 
the recognition of the ‘Other’ and the dis-membered. These two moral rights involve 
attributing the work to the author, and preserving the integrity of the work 
respectively, this shifts the focus from the work to the authors – it is not a call to 
recognise the author’s work, but rather to recognise the author him, her or 
themselves. 
4.5.4  Respect 
A decolonised copyright law curriculum is to be infused with the teachings of respect 
for traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, intangible traditional 
expressions, indigenous knowledge, folklore, and any similar form of intellectual 
                                                             
353  Bewaji J ‘The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose Debate on Ubuntu’ 381, and (at 385): 
‘Being prophetic, Ubuntu philosophy seeks to address fundamental ills in the make-up of 
urban, globalised Southern Africa: the social life world of its academic authors.’  
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property. These types of work must be respected as they are more than mere ‘work’ 
– they are an embodiment of the culture and heritage of the African people and a 
representation of the Black Body. The ethereal nature of these works means that 
they fall outside of the scope of mainstream intellectual property law protection.  
Western intellectual property laws demand strict observance of the material 
embodiment requirement. But in the African context, so strict an application results 
in disjuncture between traditional cultural expressions and copyright law 
protection.354  
Respect is posited in this instance, not on its generic value-neutral normative 
framework, but rather expressly to rebuke the contempt with which traditional 
cultural expressions are excluded from copyright protection simply for not meeting 
the material-embodiment threshold.355 
4.6  Indigenous Knowledge: Case Studies 
4.6.1  Louis Vuitton and the Basotho Blanket 
 
City Press Tags: Basotho Plaid menswear range, cultural appropriation, Designer Thabo Makheta, 
French luxury brand Louis Vuitton.356 
The original prints on the Basotho blankets hold deep meaning for the Basotho 
people from the Kingdom of Lesotho. Louis Vuitton used the traditional, iconic, and 
                                                             
354  See generally, Picart C & Fox M ‘Beyond Unbridled Optimism and Fear: Indigenous 
Peoples, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and the Globalisation of Traditional 
Knowledge and Expressions of Folklore: Part I’ (2013)  15/3 International Community Law 
Review. 
355  The subject of material embodiment is discussed in Chapter 5.  
356  Van Niekerk G ‘Louis Vuitton wants to wrap you up in a blanket’ City Press Online  
https://city-press.news24.com/Trending/louis-vuitton-wants-to-wrap-you-up-in-a-blanket-
20170701 (date of use: 28/05/2018).  
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sacred prints from a traditional Basotho blanket to create men’s fashion wear and 
to sell it for exorbitant sums of money.357  Mbete notes that the Seanamarena- 
design which features on the blankets sold for R33 000, are generally worn by young 
brides during wedding ceremonies and have been used in sacred rituals for 
centuries.358  
The controversy of Louis Vuitton’s actions has enticed debate on whether the luxury 
brand was exploiting the Basotho culture or merely appreciating it.359 The contention 
of this dissertation is that when works of traditional cultural expression are used in 
the way Louis Vuitton has used them, it amounts to exploiting them for profit. 
Louis Vuitton ought to go out of its way to make it known to its customers that the 
Seanamerena prints on its fashionwear, are not a product of its own genius but were 
taken from the Basotho people and the Sesotho culture. The damage can be cured 
through recognition so that the people of Lesotho, who are the legitimate originators 
of this cultural work, can enjoy the spin-offs that come with being branded and 
marketed by an international company.  
Copyright law currently has moral rights which are an example of non-pecuniary 
recognition that could be expanded to communities that produce works of traditional 
cultural expression.  
The Seanamarena prints on the Basotho blankets hold a deeper meaning for the 
people of Lesotho; fashion companies like Louis Vuitton should not be permitted to 
distort these prints merely to increase their sales as this intrudes on the integrity of 
the Basotho people. 
Students must be taught that, in line with the principle of Ubuntu, Louis Vuitton 
should rather feta kgomo o tshware motho, which means respect, recognise and 
show Ubuntu towards the people of Lesotho instead of distorting their work solely 
for its financial gain.  
                                                             
357  Mbete B ‘Louis Vuitton appropriates Basotho blanket into R33k shirt’ Destiny Connect.Com 
10 July 2017 http://www.destinyconnect.com/2017/07/10/louis-vuitton-appropriates-
basotho-  blanket-r33k-shirt/ (date of use: 28/07/2018) 
358  Ibid. 
359  Luvhengo P ‘Why is Louis Vuitton’s Basotho blanket ‘appropriation’ controversial?’ 
http://www.destinyconnect.com/2017/07/18/louis-vuitton-basotho-appropriation-
controversial/ (date of use: 28/07/2018) 
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4.6.2  Esther ‘NoStokana’ Mahlangu’s Ndebele artwork. 
013Mpumalanga news Online Portal. Gogo Esther Mahlangu nominated for South African of the 
Year award. 22 September 2017. 360 
The amaNdebele people of South Africa have a long history of wonderful paintings 
which symbolise various cultural, spiritual, and sacred isiNdebele messages. These 
paintings are called Umgwalo. Janse van Vuuren provides an incisive account of 
the intangible value behind Ndebele architecture and artwork such as Umgwalo.  
These designs constitute specific cosmological or religious concepts, and are 
representations of ethnic identity which were developed within a specific socio-
political environment in South Africa – Ndebele mural art has earned this 
community a distinguished cultural identity.361  
Van Vuuren’s explanation establishes two things: (1) that works such as Umgwalo 
represent a common heritage of the amaNdebele; and (2) the works assert the 
identity of the amaNdebele as an embodiment of their Being. 
Gogo Esther Mahlangu, or ‘NoStokana’ as she is affectionately known in her 
community of the former KwaNdebele homeland, in the now Mpumalanga Province 
of South Africa, is a world-acclaimed artist who produces unique artwork. Her 
artwork has gained international prominence and she has been awarded numerous 
                                                             
360  Masina M  ‘Gogo Esther Mahlangu nominated for South African of the Year award’ 
013News Mpumalanga https://013.co.za/2017/09/22/gogo-esther-nominated-south-african-
year-award/ (date of use: 22/09/2017). 
361  Van Vuuren CJ ‘The intricacy of intangible cultural heritage: Some perspectives on Ndebele 
earthen architecture’ (2008) 23/2 South African Journal of Art History 20-21.  
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accolades both locally and internationally.362  NoStokana’s work is revered the world 
over because of its uniqueness which stems, for the most part, from the traditional 
and artistic expressions of the Ndebele cultural community.  
Janse van Vuuren provides a clear account of how the works created by NoStokana 
are both for the individual and for the community: 
Since the mid-1980s the success of another Ndebele icon has received further 
impetus when a single mother, Esther Mahlangu, accepted an invitation by the 
French embassy in Pretoria to paint a mural in the Pompidou centre. Steadily 
the Ndebele image shifted to the prowess of the individual creative artist, as 
other Ndebele women also received international invitations.363 
These complexities between the individual and communal authorship in the context 
of indigenous works raise questions which must be brought to students’ attention.  
Even if a work is based on the collective authorship of the community, it can still be 
authored by an individual. The collective authorship of indigenous works denigrates 
neither the labour of the individual nor the contribution of the community as it is 
understood that the interests of the individual and those of the community are not in 
competition. However, it is simplistic to claim that indigenous works are always a 
product of the community without acknowledging the contribution of the individual. 
This complexity must be illustrated in the copyright law curriculum because a hard-
line understanding of community and the individual, downplays the relation between 
the two.  
Traditional cultural expressions and indigenous knowledge(s) need to be protected, 
not merely from the usual exploitation of  other works protected under copyright law, 
but also from what Whitt calls the ‘[c]ommodification of culture’.364  When the world 
comes into contact with Umgwalo, it seeks ways to commercialise it for financial 
gain. When the rituals and objects of colonised nations and cultures are transformed 
and modernised into commodities, political and economic powers converge to 
perpertuate cultural imperialism.  
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363  Van Vuuren C ‘Iconic bodies: Ndebele women in ritual context’ (2012) 27/2 South African 
Journal of Art History 327.  
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One international corporation that latched onto the opportunity for cultural 
commodification is the German automobile manufacturer, Bayerische Motoren 
Werke AG (BMW). BMW partnered with NoStokana to use isiNdebele artwork to 
redesign both the interior and exterior of a special edition of the company’s iconic 
flagship model. She used the indigenous knowledge of Umgwalo to create these 
artistic designs for the company. A partnership of this nature is important because 
it may help assert the Being of amaNdebele. While the aspect of commercialisation 
is not in itself a problem, it become problematic when commercialisation means 
distorting the authorship and integrity of the work for economic gain.365 Van Vuuren 
recounts: 
The intangible dimension in Ndebele mural art is woven into the wall surface art 
product. Ndebele mural art has become a well-known tourist commodity since 
the 1950s, and Esther Mahlangu has catapulted this art form into the global 
arena. An Ndebele woman paints from memory, and her knowledge of pigment 
mixtures and designs is based on oral knowledge passed down from elderly 
women. The process is essentially a repertoire as is clear from the performance 
of intangible culture.366 
Those who use traditional cultural expressions which hold sacred meaning must be 
taught not to distort these expressions as this vulgarizes the cultural sentiment they 
express and further entrenches colonial subjugation of these cultures. For example, 
if the Seanamarena blanket has yellow prints or lines to symbolise sacred meaning, 
Louis Vuitton must not change those prints to a different colour or design as this will 
effectively mutilate the artwork.367 
NoStokana’s work has raised both the individual and the Kwa-Ndebele community 
to the international platform and her story is an example of how the Black Body can 
                                                             
365  Van Vuuren CJ ‘The intricacy of intangible cultural heritage: some perspectives on Ndebele 
earthen architecture’ 22-23. Van Vuuren admits to the prevalence of the commercialisation 
of culture and that Ndebele women embrace it: ‘Clearly, the ability to “read” change in the 
world of commodity gave Ndebele women an edge and has added new meaning to the 
notions of ethnic art, identity and the life history of mural art.’ 
366  Ibid 22.  
367  This is a moral right that is catered for under s 20(1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 which 
provides: ‘Notwithstanding the transfer of the copyright in a literary, musical or artistic work, 
in a cinematograph film or in a computer program, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work, subject to the provisions of this Act, and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of the work where such action is or would be prejudicial to 
the honour or reputation of the author: Provided that an author who authorises the use of his 
work in a cinematograph film or a television broadcast or an author of a computer program 
or a work associated with a computer program may not prevent or object to modifications 
that are absolutely necessary on technical grounds or for the purpose of commercial 
exploitation of the work.’ 
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be re-membered.368 Commodification of culture is typically to the detriment of the 
culture as it entrenches the essence of coloniality. But the story of NoStokana shows 
that the opposite can also be true. This means that instead of detriment, the 
commodification of culture when approached through a decolonial praxis can serve 
the purpose of preserving cultural heritage for the people of South Africa, while 
simultaneously recognising their Being.  
4.6.3  Die Antwoord and the AmaXhosa initiation school blanket 
  
(Photo taken by Highsnobiety/ Die Antwoord)369 
Die Antwoord is a South African duo of white Afrikaans musicians, Ninja and Yolandi 
Visser, known for producing racist and provocatively controversial music.370 The duo 
produced a music video in which one of them is seen wearing a blanket usually worn 
by amaXhosa boys who are undergoing the sacred traditional initiation school, 
ulwaluko. He (the musician) is also wearing the traditional Basotho thatch hat and 
                                                             
368  Ncube C ‘Calibrating copyright for creators and consumers: Promoting distributive justice 
and Ubuntu’ in Giblin R & Weatherall K (eds) What if we could reimagine copyright? 279. 
The author seeks to highlight the complexity of finding a balance between public interest 
(community) and the interests of the individual which will satisfy both creators and users. 
See further Cornell D & Van Marle K ‘Exploring Ubuntu: Tentative reflections’ 206. 
369  Mvandaba Z ‘”Die Antwoord” Continues to Offend ond Outrage South Africans through 
their controversial antics’ Huffington Post UK 28/06/2017  http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/ 
zimkhitha-mvandaba/die-antwoord-continues-to-offend-and-outrage-through-their-
contra_23005690/ (date of use: 22/09/2018) 
370  Ibid.  
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carrying traditional amaXhosa sticks, while streams of blood appear to be gushing 
from his mouth and neck. 
Apart from their clear disrespect towards the AmaXhosa, their music routinely 
features overtly racist slurs. The male singer has described himself as ‘die wit 
kaffir’371 on a separate occasion when they were called out for performing a song 
titled ‘Fatty Boom Boom’372 in which Yolandi Visser donned the infamously racist, 
‘black face’ symbol. Mvandaba problematises this method of cultural appropriation:  
The band appropriated a part of Xhosa tradition, using it as a means of creative 
expression, to add insult to injury they have shown absolutely no respect for the 
rite of passage of initiates, which is a core belief system of the amaXhosa … 
[t]his age-old tradition, although a topic of debate, should be respected as a 
tradition of amaXhosa and should not be reduced to a tool of appropriation.373  
Not only does Die Antwoord claim to be creating art, they are also wrongly using 
traditional cultural expressions to boost their commercial brand and sell their music. 
The copyright framework does not allow space to mediate such problems.374 
4.7  Conclusion 
This chapter defines copyright by showing some of the exclusive rights of a 
copyright owner. The chapter proposes that the topic of moral rights in copyright 
should be taught in line with the three pillars of recognition, Ubuntu, and respect. 
The novelty in the proposal of these pillars of moral rights is supplemented by the 
inclusion of Ubuntu, and is a radical departure from how moral rights are currently 
taught. Decolonisation does not begin and end with changing the way we think about 
certain concepts; it also involves the renaming and redefinition of those concepts 
using an African lens. The concept of Ubuntu should be used, not as an afterthought 
but as a mainstay in the copyright module when teaching moral rights.  
                                                             
371  See ‘Lyrics Freak Online Portal. Die Antwoord – Never Le Nkemise 1 Lyrics’ 
https://www.lyricsfreak.com/d/die+antwoord/never+le+nkemise+1_21081777.html (date of 
use: 21/01/2020) 
372  See also, ‘“Die Antwoord” Fatty Boom Boom YouTube on Google 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AIXUgtNC4Kc (date of use: 21/08/2018) 
373  Mvandaba Z ‘“Die Antwoord” Continues To Offend And Outrage South Africans Through 
Their Controversial Antics’ Huffington Post South Africa. Online Portal. 
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/zimkhitha-mvandaba/die-antwoord-continues-to-offend-
and-outrage-through-their-contr_a_23005690/ (date of use: 29/09/2018). Mvandaba does 
not mention cultural appropriation but it is apt to assume that she is referring to it when 
mentioning the image ‘reduced to a tool of appropriation’. 
374  This is the reality notwithstanding the IPLAAs ambitious amendments and its wider 
recognition of indigenous knowledge systems.  
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The chapter concludes by presenting three indigenous knowledge case studies as 
examples of how complex this subject is and that it is currently under-theorised. 
From the discussion it emerges that the missing commonality between the IPLAA 
and the three indigenous knowledge case studies, is that IPLAA misses the 
opportunity to explain the extent, meaning, and depth of the sacred nature of items 
as the amaXhosa initiation school blanket, and the Basotho Seanamarena blanket. 
The roots of this sacred and spiritual character can only be traced by teaching 
students not merely about who authored them, but also how they were authored. 
Although both Louis Vuitton and Die Antwoord were obviously doing this for material 
and financial gain, it is conceivable that they could easily deny knowledge of the 
sacred nature of these works in that neither the law nor the curriculum offers 
adequate guidance in this regard.   
The decolonial project impels an Afrocentric conceptualisation of rights and how 
they relate to each other. This is a view advanced by Asante who argues that: 
Afrocentric education represents a new interpretation of productive transmission 
of values and attitudes [in which] students are made to see with new eyes and 
to hear with new ears.375 
The image ‘see with new eyes and to hear with new ears’376 comports with the 
theoretical framework as set out in the previous two chapters, as it calls for a 
copyright curriculum that embraces new ways of knowing. This sets the ground for 
the next chapter which offers a critique of the requirements for subsistence of 
copyright.  
                                                             
375  Molefi K Asante An Afrocentric Manifesto: Toward an African Renaissance 83. 
376  Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 5  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SUBSISTENCE OF COPYRIGHT 
5.1  Introduction 
The Copyright Act377 (the Act) lists nine types of work, excluding everything that 
does not conform to the legislative definition.378 Any expression that is eligible for 
protection must still comply with both inherent requirements and one of two formal 
requirements.379 This chapter focuses only on the inherent features – originality and 
material form.380  
This chapter uses Dean and Dyer’s Introduction to Intellectual Property Law and 
Van der Merwe et al, Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa as the basis to 
explain how copyright law is taught at various South African law faculties. 
The decolonising inquiry builds on the discussion in previous chapters by analysing 
the inherent requirements for the subsistence of copyright and how these exclude 
traditional cultural expressions which are, in the main, not regarded as ‘works’ under 
the Eurocentric copyright law regime. The paucity of African epistemologies is at the 
core of the call to decolonise the LLB curriculum. Notwithstanding the findings of the 
court in Waylite Diary CC v National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA 645 (A) 653F-G (the 
Waylite case), if an expression does not constitute a work the question of originality 
does not arise. This shows that originality and work are inextricably intertwined. This 
chapter intentionally construes works of traditional knowledge (TK), indigenous 
knowledge systems (IKS), and Traditional Cultural Expressions (TCEs), as bona 
fide works when defined using an African lens, despite their not conforming to the 
conceptual strictures of the Act. 
The nine types of works, and the originality and material form requirements, are 
examined in light of both section 3(k) of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment 
Act 28 of 2013  (the IPLAA), and section 1.3 of the Swakopmund Protocol.381 The 
                                                             
377  Copyright Act 98 of 1978 
378  Geyer S ‘Towards a clearer definition and understanding of "Indigenous Community" for 
purposes of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill, 2010: an exploration of the 
concepts "Indigenous" and "Traditional"’ 127, 180. 
379  Pistorius T ‘Requirements for the subsistence of copyright’ in Van der Merwe A (ed) Law of 
Intellectual Property in South Africa (2 ed). 
380  The Act lists formal requirements in ss 3 and 4.  
381  ARIPO ‘Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions 
of Folklore’ Swakopmund, Namibia, 2010 (hereafter the Protocol). 
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final section of this chapter discusses the IPLAA and the Swakopmund protocol, to 
study how these two can be used as a stepping stone towards better understanding 
the complex nature of traditional cultural expressions as they relate to the 
requirements for the subsistence of copyright. 
Traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore do not always conform to inherent 
requirements. The chapter deconstructs the concept of copyright as a purely 
negative right.382 It contends that a decolonised copyright law curriculum should 
teach students not to perceive copyright law as something which solely restricts or 
prohibits conduct, rather law should be conveyed as something that educates, 
defines, and is proactive in fostering just social interaction. This chapter applies an 
African lens to copyright law exposing the consequences of an overly rigid approach 
to copyright protection.  
5.2  Inherent features 
5.2.1  Originality 
Originality is introduced, but not defined, by the Act and its meaning has been 
clarified by the courts in successive judgments. Given South Africa’s colonial history, 
copyright law has inherited the attitudes of the United Kingdom – the sweat of one’s 
brow is sufficient for a work to meet the originality requirement.  In the recent 
decision in Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd v Media 24 Ltd & Another,383 (hereinafter Moneyweb 
v Media 24) the court held that the determination of originality involves the work in 
its entirety and not only specific parts of the work.384 The court further held that, 
‘[o]ur law still regards the time and effort spent by the consideration in determining 
originality.’385 
Pistorius compares US and United Kingdom (UK) law. The US demands that a work 
should have a distinct degree of creativity, or rather the so-called ‘creative spark’ in 
                                                             
382  See previous chapter on the nature of copyright. Copyright is a negative right, which means 
that copyright is largely a right that prevents or prohibits others from taking certain actions.  
This is due to the history of the foundations of copyright law in Britain in the mid-1400s.  
Pistorius T ‘Introduction’ in Van der Merwe A (ed) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 
179-181. See further, Feldman v EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Ltd 1035 JOC (W) 1037: ‘In 
essence copyright prohibits unauthorised copying by third parties. It has been described as 
a right enforceable against other, prohibiting them from performing infringing acts in relation 
to copyright work.’ 
383  [2016] 3 ALL SA 193 (GJ), 2016 (4) SA 59. 
384  [2016] 3 ALL SA 193 (GJ), 2016 (4) SA 591 para 16. 
385   Ibid para 15. 
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order to meet the originality requirement. The UK, on the other hand, requires no 
form of creativity,386 but ‘[r]equires a substantial (not trivial) degree of labour and 
judgment to meet the requirement of originality’.387 
In line with the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine, it is the effort or the labour that counts 
and not the skill applied in a work or any level of creation.388 The court in National 
Soccer League T/A Premier Soccer League v Gidani (Pty) Ltd (10/48519) [2014] 
ZAGPJHC 33, [2014] 2 All SA 461 (GJ) grappled with the standard used to establish 
originality in copyright law. The court found that the activity of putting together a 
fixture of soccer games to be played in a soccer season, requires skill and 
judgment.389 It held further: 
Under certain circumstances, extensive effort in making a compilation may be 
enough to render it original, even where there may be less skill involved.  
Accordingly, there is merit in the submission (by plaintiff) that where enough 
effort has been put in compiling a work, that is sufficient to make the work 
original and susceptible to copyright protection.390 
In Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd and Others (118/05) 
[2006] ZASCA 40, 2006 (4) SA 458 (SCA) the court held that, 
[c]reativity is not required to make a work original. Save where specifically 
provided otherwise, a work is considered to be original if it has not been copied 
from an existing source and if its production required a substantial (or not trivial) 
degree of skill, judgment or labour.391 
There is consensus in the textbooks that the sweat-of-the-brow standard is 
appropriate for originality – ‘the question as to whether the work is original is a 
factual inquiry and, where appropriate, evidence to support this proposition must be 
adduced’.392 However, neither of the textbooks addresses the purpose served by 
originality requirement; they are more concerned with defining originality than 
                                                             
386  Pistorius T ‘Requirements for the subsistence of copyright’ 204-208. 
387  Ibid where the author paraphrases Harms J in explaining the test used for the ‘sweat of the 
brow’ principle.  
388  This is the opinion of the court in Bosal Africa (Pty) Ltd v Grapnel (Pty) Ltd and Another 1985 
(4) SA 882 (C) 893C (hereafter the Bosal Africa case) where the court felt that the onerous 
task of compiling a list of numbers on a price list and the compilation of a telephone directory, 
although not requiring much skill, requires a considerable amount of labour, and therefore 
qualifies as original in light of the sweat of the brow principle. See also, National Soccer 
League t/a Premier Soccer League v Gidani (Pty) Ltd (10/48519) [2014] 2 All SA 461 (GJ) 
(28 February 2014) para 62. 
389  Ibid para 37.14. 
390  Ibid para 63. 
391  Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd. and Others para 35. 
392  Dean O & Dyer A Introduction to Intellectual Property Law 16. 
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historicising and taking the student through the underlying reason behind the 
requirement. Teaching the purpose of originality is important to show how it differs 
from the requirements of ‘novelty’ and ‘an inventive step’ that we find in patent law.  
The Act’s silence on the meaning of originality opens the concept up to differing 
interpretations. This may be illustrated with Esther Mahlangu’s isiNdebele mural 
paintings. The originality requirement is only applicable insofar as she is the 
individual author of the work who expended skill and labour in its creation.393 If the 
author of the paintings is construed as the amaNdebele community, the originality 
requirement does not accommodate the situation as it must be borne in mind that, 
in the African community and African mythology, the community includes not only a 
specific group of people, but also ancestors and the yet-to-be-born, and this falls 
outside of the normative copyright law paradigm.394 However, from a natural-rights 
perspective as encountered in continental European law, the originality requirement 
is satisfied when the author’s personality is reflected in the work.395  Although, the 
meaning of personality remains individualistic and so excludes communal 
authorship, it could be argued that the traditional expression reflects the cultural 
history, identity, and personality of amaNdebele community which includes the 
living, the dead, and the yet-to-be-born.396  
An Africanised conception of the originality requirement is divorced from both 
individualistic constructions of the individualised personality test and the skill-and- 
labour standard, and is also a conception which expressly asserts the spiritual and 
intangible labour of ancestors and the yet-to-be-born.  
The foundations of the history of copyright show that its initial purpose was to benefit 
authors and the print press.397 It is trite that this single objective has multiplied over 
                                                             
393  On the standard of ‘skill and labour', see generally, Bosal Africa (Pty) Ltd v Grapnel (Pty) Ltd  
394  Sesanti S ‘Africanizing the Philosophy curriculum through teaching African culture modules: 
An African Renaissance act’ 436. 
395  Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law (5 ed) 95.  Bently and Sherman teach this 
distinction cogently opining that ‘[f]rom a natural rights perspective, the requirement of 
originality merely reflects the premise that copyright ought to protect the personality of 
authors as expressed in their works’. This means that the test for originality is formulated as 
determining whether an author’s personality is reflected in the works. The Bently handbook 
gives various other perspectives, these include the reward, utilitarian, and others. The book 
speaks with greater depth, a depth that is not necessarily tailored for LLB-level students. 
However, teaching a concept, without teaching its purpose, renders the concept incomplete. 
396  Ibid and see generally, Kopytoff I ‘Ancestors as Elders in Africa’ International African Institute 
(IAI) Volume 41, No. 2. 1971  
397  Pistorius T Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 177. 
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the years to cover a wider scope of interests and industries. The Western conception 
of originality mirrors this development: both in its reflection of the personality-based 
vision (wanting to assert the author’s rights) as well as in the industriousness 
threshold (wanting to reward the author for his or her labour). Critical scholarship, 
however, points to the fact that these two themes do not include public interest. In 
modern copyright law the urge to reward the author and recognise his or her 
personality, is accompanied by the ubiquitous need to disseminate creative and 
cultural works.398 Decoloniality argues that the dissemination of these works, if 
achieved, should not be to the only encapsulation of public interest. Decolonial 
articulations of law generally demand the recognition of ‘the Other’. From this 
perspective, copyright law should include ancestors and the yet-to-be-born as 
originators of a work. In so doing, the dismembered Black Body is re-membered and 
the ‘Other’ morphs into the ‘us’.399  
While the West uses a combination of pure industriousness and personality-based 
doctrine to establish originality,400 decoloniality calls for a radical reconstruction of 
the authorship logic as applied to the originality concept – it proposes the 
introduction of a non-individual (communal) author in copyright. Esther Mahlangu’s 
craft has been passed down to her by generations of her ancestors and assert the 
dismembered Being of the Black Body in the amaNdebele community. Decoloniality 
demands the recognition of amaNdebele community as part originators of the 
works.401 Decoloniality demands that the community of Ndebele people be seen to 
have infused the work of the individual (Esther Mahlangu) with their skill, judgement, 
labour, and knowledge.  
                                                             
398  See generally, Craig C ‘The Evolution of Originality in Canadian Copyright Law: Authorship, 
Reward and the Public Interest’ 2005 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 425.   
399  Ibid 427. Decoloniality introduces a new aspect in the determination of public interest by 
insisting that it should open for the widened meaning of the relationship between the author 
and his work. On a discussion of personality, individuality, and authorship, see Ginsburg J 
‘Creation and Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information’ 1990 Columbia Law 
Review 1881-1888. Decoloniality seeks to make an abrupt entry into the two-sided debate 
between the personality-based theories (the author’s personality reflected in the works and 
therefore having a right over the work) and the labour-based theories (the author’s labour in 
the work distinguishes it from other works), by re-defining personalities to define a 
community in broad terms which include ancestors and the yet-to-be-born.  
400  Craig C ‘The Evolution of Originality in Canadian Copyright Law: Authorship, Reward and 
the Public Interest’ 430. 
401  Esther Mahlangu’s skill, judgment, labour and knowledge are not contested when they 
pertain to establishing the originality of works as individually authored by her. The individual 
exists in African mythology, and is worthy of the traditional copyright protection, as it were.  
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As regards originality, it may be helpful to consider the Protection, Promotion, 
Development and Management of Indigenous Knowledge Act 6 of 2019, as it 
embodies a threshold which differs from that in the Copyright Act although it is aimed 
at protecting the same type of work.402 Section 11 of the Act sets three criteria for 
eligibility for protection, none of which is originality or material embodiment.403 This 
new legislation is suggestively, peculiar in that it paves way for the protection of 
indigenous knowledge systems and traditional knowledge, within the intellectual 
property framework but outside of the strictures of the copyright regime.  
5.2.2  Material form 
The second inherent requirement is that to qualify for copyright protection an 
expression must exist in material form. This requirement is encapsulated in section 
2(2)(b) of the Act which provides that, ‘[a] literary, musical or artistic work shall not 
be eligible for copyright unless the work has been written down, recorded or 
otherwise reduced to material form’. This definition, although not exhaustive, stems 
from international obligations404 and means that, generally, copyright cannot reside 
in ideas, thoughts, or facts alone, but rather in the material expression of those 
 ideas.405 Dean and Dyer sum it up saying that, ‘[t]he concept of having to be in a 
material form is often expressed in the maxim that ‘there is no copyright in ideas’.406  
                                                             
402  Section 3(a) of Protection, Promotion, Development and Management of Indigenous 
Knowledge Act 6 of 2019 provides: ‘The objects of this Act are to — protect the indigenous 
knowledge of indigenous communities from unauthorised use, misappropriation and 
misuse.’ 
403  Section 11(a)–(c) of Protection, Promotion, Development and Management of Indigenous 
Knowledge Act 6 of 2019 provides that, ‘[t]he protection of indigenous knowledge 
contemplated in section 9 applies to indigenous knowledge, which — has been passed on 
from generation to generation within an indigenous community; has been developed within 
an indigenous community; and is associated with the cultural and social identity of that 
indigenous community.’ 
404  See generally, the TRIPS Agreement art 9.2. The TRIPS Agreement is an international legal 
agreement between all the member nations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Significant herein is that Pistorius makes use of art 9 of the TRIPS Agreement and art 2 of 
the World Copyright Treaty (WCT) in the discussion about the material embodiment 
requirement.  
405  See Kalamazoo Division (Pty) Ltd v Gay and Others 1978 (2) SA 184 (C).  
406  Dean O & Dyer A Introduction to Intellectual Property Law 18-19. This is in line with 
guidelines in art 2(2) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
of 9 September 1886: ‘It shall, however, be a matter for legislation in the countries of the 
Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified categories of works shall not be 
protected unless they have been fixed in some material form.’  
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Pistorius approaches the discussion  by introducing it as the ‘[i]dea versus 
expression dichotomy’.407 
Although Africa has a history of written literature that predates colonial contact, it 
also boast a wealthy oral culture.408 Inter-generational traditions that are passed 
down through an oral culture remain unrecorded in either writing or digitally. The 
songs sung by maidens participating in the traditional annual isiZulu reed dance 
ceremony (Umkhosi woMhlanga) are an example of such oral expressions. Because 
of their sacred nature, these songs remain unrecorded. They consequently do not 
meet the material embodiment threshold which would qualify them for copyright 
protection. This renders them vulnerable to exploitation by those who may wish to 
profit from them.  
A different form of exploitative action is what may be termed ‘cultural imperialism’.409 
This happens when cultural expressions are given material expression so exploiting 
their till then unrecorded form to make a profit. For example, a Western recording 
company records the songs sung during the Umkhosi WoMhlanga and sells the 
recordings for commercial gain. The expressions produced by African communities, 
such as Umkhosi WoMhlanga songs, need to be protected from capitalist 
exploitation.  
While the fact of a material embodiment is crucial to establishing authorship and 
subsequent ownership of works, the failure of the law to recognise traditional 
expressions which are not materially embodied, perpetuates the coloniality of Being 
and commodifies Black Bodies. The call to decolonise copyright law seeks to 
expand the understanding of copyright beyond merely protecting the rights of the 
individual author, to protect the cultural dignity of Black Bodies and of Africa. 
Decolonial articulations, as reflected in Transmodernity, necessitate a change in 
                                                             
407  Pistorius T Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 216. 
408  On Africa’s literary and oratory traditions pre-colonial disturbance, see generally, Anta Diop 
C Pre-Colonial Black Africa. See further Anta Diop C The African Origin of Civilization. 
409  On cultural imperialism and its intersectionality with copyright law, see generally Whitt L 
Science, Colonialism, and Indigenous Peoples: The Cultural Politics of Law and Knowledge 
6-7. The essence of cultural imperialism is that it allows for the exploitation of traditional 
knowledge that vulgarises the sacred aspects of indigenous cultures. An example of 
exploitation that does not entrench the coloniality of Being is when such IKS expressions are 
exploited for commercial use but without distorting them, and are expressly attentive to their 
intrinsic sacred value.  
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how material embodiment is conceptualised so as to reflect the epistemic traditions 
of the global South.  
5.3  Decolonial discussions on originality and material embodiment 
5.3.1  The Swakopmund Protocol alternative 
The Swakopmund Protocol (the Protocol) is a regional international intellectual 
property law treaty, the product of the African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organization (the ARIPO). The Protocol follows the adoption of the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Folklore at the 11th session of the ARIPO 
Council of Ministers, held in Maseru in the Kingdom of Lesotho, on 23 November 
2007.410 The ARIPO’s adoption of the Protocol set the ground for member states to 
contract into it, which South Africa is yet to do.411 
The preamble to the Protocol emphasises that the intellectual property protection 
flowing from the Protocol must be tailored to the particular characteristics of its 
subject matter, be sensitive to the unique collective or communal context, and to the 
intergenerational nature of its development.412  
The preamble affirms the ARIPO’s commitment to creating an intellectual property 
law environment that allows for an engaged dialogue on traditional cultural 
expressions, traditional knowledge, traditional cultures, folklore, and all their 
uniquely African attributes.413 The Protocol claims to be mindful of the need to 
respect cultural dignity and integrity inhering in these expressions.414 It paves the 
way for protection to be extended to cover expressions of spiritual values.415 The 
concept of ‘spiritual values’ speaks to the need for law to accommodate expressions 
that do not conform to the expectations of material embodiment and originality. This 
recognition of the spiritual component of African indigenous knowledge systems 
                                                             
410  Jeremy B ‘Swakopmund Protocol: History made, but have you got a copy?’ http://afro-
ip.blogspot.com/2010/08/swakopmund-protocol-history-made-but.html (date of use: 01 
September 2010). 
411  Tong L ‘Aligning the South African intellectual property system with traditional knowledge 
protection’ (2017) 12/3 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 181. South Africa is 
not party to the Protocol, and the signatories are Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
412  Preamble, Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and 
Expressions of Folklore  6. 
413  Ibid 5.  
414  Ibid. 
415  Ibid. 
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validates the claim that works can be authored by ancestors and the yet-to-be-born, 
thus advancing a decolonised approach. Consequently, traditional works that hold 
sacred spiritual value are protected despite their not being materially embodied. 
Although the preamble does not use either plain language or the decolonial lexicon 
of Molimo and Balimo, it affirms the African reality.416  
However, the phrase ‘custodianship, guardianship, or collective cultural 
responsibility’ could feasibly be construed to include such traditional knowledge. 
Section 4 (iii), provides: 
Protection shall be extended to traditional knowledge that is integral to the 
cultural identity of a local community that is recognized as holding the 
knowledge through a form of custodianship, guardianship or collective and 
cultural ownership or responsibility.417 
Unfortunately, the words ‘local’ and ‘traditional’ do not clarify what constitutes a 
community in light of the complexities that define the subject of traditional and 
indigenous knowledge systems. 
Collective guardianship is in line with communalism and must be a mainstay in how 
intellectual property law is taught. Communal intellectual property law rights, as 
rights of both the community and the individual, should be taught as mechanisms 
that benefit relationships within the community as a whole.  
5.3.2  The case for the IPLAA 
The previous chapter, showed that the concept of an African community as 
explained in the IPLAA is largely facile and articulated within the individualistic 
confines of the predominant intellectual property law framework. In keeping with this 
theme, the IPLAA introduces indigenous knowledge as a species of intellectual 
property.418  
                                                             
416  See Chapter 3, Sesanti S ‘Africanizing the Philosophy curriculum through teaching African 
culture modules: An African Renaissance act’ 436. The latter part of Chapter 3 is at pains to 
address the culture of Africa’s reverence to ancestors and the intersectionality with copyright 
law and the concept of authorship therein. 
417  See Swakopmund Protocol 8, s 4(iii) which compensates for the simplistic definition of 
community in s  2.1 
418  Ncube CB ‘Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Access to 
Knowledge in South Africa’ in Matthew Rimmer (ed) Indigenous Intellectual Property: A 
Handbook of Contemporary Research 543-564  
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The long title and the preamble to the Act recognise that manifestations of 
indigenous knowledge can qualify as a species of intellectual property and should 
be protected under the current intellectual property law framework. This recognition 
comes notwithstanding that some of these manifestations fall short of meeting the 
material embodiment and originality requirements. This presents a radical shift in 
respect of both pre-conditions for protection.  
Tong narrates that the development of intellectual property law has been swamped 
by discussions seeking to find ways to secure legal protection for expressions with 
unique characteristics which deviate from the individualist notions currently 
dominating copyright. This has led to calls for a sui generis approach to certain 
expressions of traditional knowledge.419 Tong posits that, ‘[a]lthough the IPLAA 
introduces specific provisions dealing with eligibility criteria, in some instances, the 
criteria for protection of traditional version is similar to that of the existing subject 
matter in the specific statute.’420 This causes confusion as to the boundaries 
between the IPLAA and existing legislation, including the Act.  
Various scholar have pointed to the IPLAA’s shortcomings. They argue that it fails 
cogently to address the myriad of traditional cultural expressions that continue to be 
exploited and are largely unprotected.421 
Before addressing whether or not the IPLAA offers a form of sui generis protection 
for traditional knowledge, it is important to revisit certain questions. These include 
the definition of an indigenous community and its part in the authorship of traditional 
knowledge. Geyer opines that, “the complexities and inconsistencies of the IPLAA 
                                                             
419  Tong L ‘Using intellectual property rights to protect traditional rights’ 555 in Van der Merwe 
(ed) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa. The author further asserts (at 556) that 
intellectual property laws (including the IPLAA) are not suited to the task of protecting 
traditional expressions. 
420  Ibid 567 
421  See, for instance, Sibanda OS ‘The Prospects, Benefits and Challenges of Sui Generis 
Protection of Geographical Indications of South Africa’ (2016) 51/3 Foreign Trade Review 
219. The author illustrates the IPLAA’s shortcomings in the subject of geographical 
indications:  ‘Unfortunately, the provisions of IPLAA on GI protection are inadequate and 
offer no strengthened protection of GI as already provided by various legislations discussed 
above. To begin with, a cursory reading of the preamble of IPLAA reference to “further 
protection” of GI is made specifically to IK. Surely, products befitting of GI registration and 
protection extend far beyond IK products.’ See further Tong L ‘Aligning the South African 
intellectual property system with traditional knowledge protection’ (2017) 12/3 Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 184. See further Nwauche E The sui generis and 
intellectual property protection of expressions of folklore in Africa 157 LLD Thesis, North-
West University 2016. 
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go beyond the basic misfit between intellectual property and traditional 
knowledge’.422 This means that the definitional paradigm under the IPLAA is wide 
and seeks to group together various intellectual property law concepts. The IPLAA 
can, therefore, not be validly construed as offering sui generis protection – 
notwithstanding its objective of improving the living conditions of traditional 
communities.423   
5.4  Conclusion 
The central inquiry in the decolonisation discourse is to conceive a curriculum that 
engenders critical thinking; a curriculum which not only challenges students to 
engage with various concepts, but also to bring their own knowledge(s) to the course 
content. This is the sentiment that this chapter has sought to apply to the traditional 
requirements for copyright. The two   which formed the basis for discussion are 
incomplete insofar as they address the definition of originality, and fail to offer an 
explanation of why works are original. A decolonial engagement requires the 
teacher to focus not only on the techno (how), but also on the telos (purpose) of a 
concept.  
The contention of this chapter is that Transmodernity demands a paradigm shift in 
the conceptualisation of the material embodiment and originality requirements for 
copyright. This may be achieved in two ways: (1) by understanding that the 
variations of these two concepts are defined by the British and Americans, in light 
of an African lens and with the intention to nuance these definitions; and (2) that the 
copyright protections provided for works should not apply to the individual author 
only, but also the community – including ancestors and the yet-to-be born. 
The chapter concludes by analysing the Swakomund Protocol and the IPLAA. It 
finds that the Protocol is progressive in its proposals and contains wider definitional 
clarity on concepts that South African legislators are struggling define. The chapter 
suggests that South Africa debate whether it either signs the protocol, or learns from 
it in its quest to develop a vocabulary of its own by which to articulate and navigate 
within indigenous knowledge systems, traditional expressions, and their spiritual, 
                                                             
422  Geyer S ‘Copyright in Traditional Works: Unravelling the Intellectual Property Laws 
Amendment Act of 2013’ 44. 
423  Tong L ‘Using intellectual property rights to protect traditional rights’ 566 in Van der Merwe 
(ed) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa. 
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intangible, and ancestral content as regards copyright law. A genuine sui generis 
instrument for traditional knowledge ought to be concise, considered, and clear in 
its understanding of these central terms. Students should be taught to grapple with 
questions such as why South Africa is not a signatory to the Swakopmund Protocol, 
how the Protocol differs from the IPLAA, and whether the Protocol can be used to 
achieve certain of the goals of the IPLAA.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS 
6.1  Introduction 
Copyright owners have exclusive rights over their works guaranteeing them the right 
to exploit these in the ways listed in sections 6–11B of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
Copyright owners can themselves exploit these rights or can authorise others to do 
so. They may also prevent others from engaging in the conduct prohibited by the 
Act.  However, the owner’s rights are not absolute and are subject to various 
legislative limitations. These exceptions and limitations represent statutorily 
sanctioned copyright infringements. Limitations present a synthesis between the 
two conflicting interests: the copyright owner’s inherent monopoly; and the public’s 
claim to access to cultural commodities. The primary objective of copyright law is to 
balance these contending interests through a variety of limitations and exceptions. 
The statutory exceptions in sections 12–19B of the Act are the most important, but 
are supplemented by certain inherent limitations to copyright – eg, duration. 
This chapter addresses fair-dealing exceptions, limitations on moral rights, and the 
limited duration of copyright, and contrasts these with the social, economic, political, 
and historical realities of the coloniser and the colonised. The approach is 
conceptual rather than black letter in that it focuses on copyright limitations on an 
abstract, theoretical level rather than on their doctrinal application, which is only 
invoked for illustrative purposes.424  
6.2  Exceptions 
6.2.1  Fair dealing 
This chapter considers the sections on copyright in Dean and Dyer,425 and Van der 
Merwe’s426 works on intellectual property law. Van der Merwe provides a broad 
                                                             
424  The subject of exceptions on its own, is worthy of a stand-alone study and some work has 
been done by various local and international scholars. For further reading see Shay R 
Entitlements under the Fair Dealing Exceptions to Copyright LLM dissertation Stellenbosch 
University, South Africa 2012. See further, Schonwetter T, De Beer J, Kawooya D & Prabhala 
A ‘Copyright and Education: Lessons on African Copyright and Access to Knowledge’ (2010) 
African Journal of Information and Communication and Andanda P ‘Copyright law and online 
journalism: A South African perspective on fair use and reasonable media practice’ (2016) 
6/4 Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property.  
425  Dean O & Dyer A Introduction to Intellectual Property Law.  
426  Van der Merwe A.Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa. (2 ed). 
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overview of exceptions and limitations, largely referencing the Copyright Act 98 of 
1978 and listing the three exceptions provided under fair dealing.427 He explains that 
what must be established is whether the work in question receives fair treatment in 
light of the stated purposes.428  
Dean and Dyer follow the same pattern and frame the exceptions as they appear in 
the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, save that – unlike Van der Merwe – they list the types 
of work and how these are specifically affected by the fair-dealing limitation.429 
The first edition of Cornish’s work defines fair dealing by dividing it into three 
grounds. He claims that the use of any work is covered by the fair dealing exception 
if: (1) it is for purposes of research and/or private study; (2) involves specific literary, 
dramatic, and musical works used for reporting current events; and (3) is for 
purposes of criticism or review.430 The three grounds, as set out by Cornish, accord 
with South African law as reflected in the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. Cornish opines 
that such use is termed ‘fair dealing’ as, among other things, the courts are left to 
judge the fairness in light of the circumstances. As an example, he cites as a 
condition for fairness, that the source should be sufficiently acknowledged.431  
Cornish's understanding of fair dealing was based on the 1911 UK Copyright Act432  
which introduced fair dealing under the heading, ‘Exemption of Innocent Infringer 
from Liability to Pay Damages, etc’.433 The Act referred specifically to an ‘innocent 
infringer’ as a person who was deemed ‘innocent’ if he or she infringed the copyright- 
protected work without being aware of infringement. For exemption under this 
exception, therefore, the infringer must have been ignorant and that ignorance must 
qualify as reasonable.  
                                                             
427  Ibid 289-310 for research, private study, personal or private use, criticism, review, and 
reporting of current events., 
428  Pistorius T ‘Exceptions and Limitations’ in Van der Merwe ibid 290-291. 
429  Dean O & Dyer A Introduction to Intellectual Property Law 45. Note that unlike Van der 
Merwe, this textbook relies heavily on Dean’s handbook   
430  Cornish WR Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights 364. 
431  Ibid 363. 
432  For full text, see World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) online archives. 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/il/il013en.pdf  
433  Article 8,  Copyright Act of 1911 (UK) 5/16: ‘Where proceedings are taken in respect of the 
infringement of the copyright in any work and the defendant in his defence alleges that he 
was not aware of the existence of the copyright in the work, the plaintiff shall not be entitled 
to a remedy other than an injection or interdict in respect of the infringement if the defendant 
proves that at the date of infringement he was not aware and had no reasonable ground for 
suspecting that copyright subsisted in the work.’ 
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Cornish’s latest edition no longer uses the ‘three-ground definition’. He merely lists 
specified fair dealing purposes: research or private study; reporting current events; 
criticism or review, parody, pastiche and caricature, quotation and illustration for 
instruction.434 
In Moneyweb v Media 24, the court held that fair dealing for purpose of reporting on 
current events – qualifying  section 12(1)(c)(i) of the Act – will only be established if 
three distinct elements are proved: (1) the dealing must be for a specified purpose; 
(2) the dealing must be fair; (3) the source, including the name of the author, must 
be mentioned.435 This definition follows the same logic as Cornish’s three-ground 
definition and shows that there has been little movement since his first edition in 
1981. The reliance on English case law, although a consequence of the history of 
copyright law, has the effect of entrenching coloniality in the curriculum.436 
The court stated that the list of factors which contribute to the determination of 
fairness437 in the context of section 12(1)(c)(i) is not exhaustive. This opens up the 
possibility of arguing for more factors to be considered in determining the fairness 
aspect of fair dealing.438  
Decolonisation of the copyright law curriculum invites students to think critically 
about circumstances that are uniquely African. The court’s admission that the list of 
factors for determining fairness is not exhaustive, not only open the door to critical 
                                                             
434  Cornish WR, Llewelyn D & Aplin T Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and 
Allied Rights (9 ed) 494-502. 
435  Shay R ‘Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd v Media 24 Ltd & Another’ (2017) 5/1 South African Intellectual 
 Property Law Journal 167.  
436  Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd v Media 24 Ltd & Another [2016] 3 ALL SA 193 (GJ), 2016 (4) SA 591 
para 103. The court held: ‘As before, there does not appear to be any South African decision 
on this point. Both sides referred me to decisions and writings from several foreign 
jurisdictions on the meaning of the phrase "fair dealing”. I understand that foreign authorities 
are referred to for guidance only. I also accept that I must be cautious in considering foreign 
law because each jurisdiction has its own particular history and, in many cases, is bound or 
influenced by domestic statutory precepts. I therefore intend, for historical reasons, to focus 
on English authority.’ 
437  Shay R ‘Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd v Media 24 Ltd & Another [2016] 3 ALL SA 193 (GJ); 2016 (4) 
SA 591’ (2017) 5/1 South African Intellectual Property Law Journal 167. The court held in 
para 113: ‘In my view, the factors relevant to a consideration of fairness within the meaning 
of section 12(1)(c)(i) include: the nature of the medium in which the works have been 
published; whether the original work has already been published; the time lapse between 
the publication of the two works; the amount (quality and quantity) of the work that has been 
taken; and the extent of the acknowledgement given to the original work. One factor may be 
more or less important than another, given the context in which publication occurs. The list 
of factors is not exhaustive.’ 
438  Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd v Media 24 Ltd & Another [2016] 3 ALL SA 193 (GJ), 2016 (4) SA 591 
para 113. 
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thinking about Afrocentric exceptions, but also problematises Africa’s reliance on 
English case law in the absence of local authority.  
Bently and Sherman439 offer a broad overview of copyright exceptions in the UK 
which, given South Africa’s reliance on English-law traditions, is crucial to this 
dissertation. The authors posit that the restricted fair-dealing approach can be 
contrasted with the approach in the US,440 which recognises a general defence of 
fair use which provides that if the court is satisfied that the use is fair, there is no 
infringement.441  
The decolonisation of copyright law necessitates contrasting fair dealing with fair 
use as this indicates to students not only that there are alternatives, but also that 
the open-ended nature of the US courts’ conception of fair use allows for a robust 
engagement with its normative content.442 Fair use has a wider scope than fair 
dealing in that it does not restrict potential exemption to pre-defined acts.443  
Contrasting the two concepts propels the discussion towards a purposive reading 
of the fair-dealing exceptions. The curriculum ought to make express reference to 
the different socio-economic conditions of the coloniser and the colonised, 
respectively, and move towards raising awareness of the need for these two groups 
to enjoy context-specific protections and exceptions. In this vein, Andanda contrasts 
fair use and fair dealing by studying the findings of the court in the Moneyweb case 
and the US case, Associated Press v Meltwater US Holdings Inc 931 F Supp 2d 
537, 543 (SDNY 2013). She argues that in the news industry one aspect that needs 
to be noted is the different types of news aggregators.  
                                                             
439  Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law (5 ed). 
440  US Copyright Act of 1976, s 107.  
441  Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law 224. 
442  Section 107 of the  US Copyright Act of 1976. See online archives https://www. 
copyright.gov/title17/title17.pdf. (Accessed on 06/11/2017) 
443  Ibid. ‘In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the 
factors to be considered shall include— (1) The purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2) The 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) The effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.’ 
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Andanda’s central thesis is that both fair use and fair dealing require 
reasonableness from the user which must be determined in its own context.444 
Kelbrick argues in similar vein that,  
Intellectual property is currently viewed as means – either the only one or the 
best available – to deal with many new problems. In developing countries, 
intellectual property protection has been identified as a possible solution to the 
appropriation of traditional knowledge [and indigenous culture] and other 
indigenous property. Developed countries view intellectual property protection 
as means to prevent counterfeiting and to control markets.445  
Kelbrick’s intervention proposes that all intellectual property laws should be taught 
in relation to the context, socio-economic reality, and locality of the jurisdiction to 
which they apply. This emphasises the different needs of different jurisdictions and 
how appropriate the protection is in responding to these needs.  
It is the contention of this chapter that South Africa’s current experience 
necessitates that copyright exceptions be given a wider interpretation.  
The textbooks considered in this study limit their student instruction to fair dealing 
alone, and very seldom expand on fair use. This entrenches a colonial mindset in 
the sense that it does not acknowledge that the fair dealing exception ought to be 
responsive to local social, economic, cultural, and political needs. The dissertation 
does not suggest that contrasting fair dealing with fair use automatically decolonises 
the curriculum, it rather posits that the inclusion of fair use will realise the decolonial 
demand for a pluriversal epistemic community in the curriculum.  
On a conceptual level, fair use is neither an African idea nor is it an embodiment of 
the epistemic traditions of the global South. This renders it vulnerable to the same 
colonial characteristics that define fair dealing; this is one of the factors that needs 
to be taken into account when teaching students about fair use, notwithstanding its 
greater emphasis on flexibility and a context-specific fairness threshold.  
The two textbooks, in the main, draw on fair dealing from English law and the its 
pedagogy as set out by English thinkers such as Cornish. A decolonised LLB 
curriculum which teaches critical thinking skills, argues against this reasoning, and 
                                                             
444  Andanda P ‘Copyright law and online journalism: a South African perspective on fair use and 
reasonable media practice’ 412. 
445  Kelbrick R ‘The need for different perspectives’ (2008) 39/8 International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 883. 
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emphasises the need for both fair dealing and fair use to be included in the 
curriculum. This becomes imperative in light of the Copyright Amendment Bill B13-
B 2017, which extensively amends existing legislation by introducing fair use to local 
jurisprudence.446 
6.2.2  Limitations on moral rights 
Moral rights protect owners’ non-pecuniary interests.447 Moral rights co-exist with 
the economic rights in copyright and inhere in the author even after transfer of the 
economic interests.448 The curtailment of moral rights falls under copyright 
limitations because copyright includes moral rights.  
The Copyright Act 98 of 1978 does not address the duration of moral rights which 
invites debate on how long they subsist. Dean and Karjiker argue that moral rights 
subsist for the life of the author.449  This conservative argument stems from the 
common-law tradition that links moral rights and authorship and, therefore, first 
ownership of a copyright.450 Their argument is that moral rights are akin to common-
law personality rights, and so cease to exist with the cessation of an individual’s 
personality. Tong agrees with Dean and Karjiker’s sentiment that moral rights are 
akin to personality rights, but argues further:  
Note that in South Africa they are statutory rights and not personality rights. It is 
possible that the effect of an author’s protection of his or her personality rights, 
                                                             
446  See generally amendments bringing about fair use, Copyright Amendment Bill [B 13B—
2017], insertion of s s 12A, 12B, 12C and 12D in Act 98 of 1978. 
447  Tong L ‘The Effect of Employee-Authors’ Moral Rights on Employer-Owned Copyright: 
Surviving Article 6bis of the Berne Convention’ (2014) 26/2 SA Mercantile Law Journal 213. 
See further Chapter 4 on Moral Rights and Ginsberg J ‘Moral Rights in a Common-Law 
System’ 274 in Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law.  
448  See s 20(1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978: ‘Notwithstanding the transfer of the copyright in 
a literary, musical or artistic work, in a cinematograph film or in a computer program, the 
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work, subject to the provisions of this 
Act, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work where such 
action is or would be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author: Provided that an 
author who authorises the use of his work in a cinematograph film or a television broadcast 
or an author of a computer program or a work associated with a computer program may not 
prevent or object to modifications that are absolutely necessary on technical grounds or for 
the purpose of commercial exploitation of the work.’ See further, on moral rights generally 
Chapter 4. 
449  Dean O Handbook of South African Copyright Law 113-114 (Online version) 
https://juta.co.za/products/3760-handbook-of-south-african-copyright-law/ (date of use: 
16/09/2017) 
450  Tong L ‘The Effect of Employee-Authors’ Moral Rights on Employer-Owned Copyright: 
Surviving Article 6bis of the Berne Convention’ 215 states: ‘The value of first ownership of 
copyright lies in the control over the economic exploitation of the work that it affords the 
owner. He or she may, for example, license the work and earn royalties, sell or assign the 
rights in exchange for payment, or decide to hold the rights defensively.’ 
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for example, the right not to be defamed, may coincide with the exercise of moral 
rights – in this case, the integrity right.451  
Tong distinguishes the legal nature of moral rights from personality rights, also 
showing areas of convergence between the two. Dean concedes that there are 
jurisdictions where the transfer of moral rights on the death of the author is 
recognised, yet persists in his original argument452 on the basis that the majority of 
countries agree that moral rights are inalienable.453 The view that moral rights cease 
to exist on the death of the author flows into the debate on the transferability of moral 
rights. Dean’s insistence that moral rights are personal and that authors may not 
transfer their moral rights to a person of their choosing, could well be an unjustified 
limitation for an author.454  
Dean’s analogy is inimical to the communal ethic among Africans, specifically values 
such as sharing and choice.455 The flaw in his argument is that it assumes that moral 
rights can only be granted to individuals. This dissertation argues that individual 
notions of authorship fit ill with certain traditional cultural expressions as the 
personality evident in these works is immeasurable in practical terms, and certainly 
not individuated.456 If an author ought to be recognised for his or her work, in his or 
her absence the moral rights to the work should fall to any person of his or her 
choosing to protect his or her paternity posthumously. In both African culture and 
pre-colonial Africa, the belief was in customary succession and inheritance of wealth 
that comes with the death of an elder in the family. Given that moral rights have an 
intrinsic value the owner of a moral right should be permitted to transfer the right to 
his or her descendants in line with African succession practices. These pre-colonial 
                                                             
451  Ibid 217 n 18.  
452  Dean O Handbook of South African Copyright Law (Online version) 1-113. 
453  Tong L ‘The Effect of Employee-Authors’ Moral Rights on Employer-Owned Copyright: 
Surviving Article 6bis of the Berne Convention’ 221. 
454  Pistorius T ‘The transfer of copyright and licensing’ in Van der Merwe A Law of Intellectual 
Property in South Africa 254. 
455  Gudeman S ‘Sketches, Qualms, and other thoughts on Intellectual Property Rights’102-103 
in Steven B Brush & Doreen Stabinsky (eds) Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People 
and Intellectual Property Rights: ‘The expression “intellectual property rights” makes it 
appear as if the property and rights are products of individual minds. This is part of a Western 
epistemology that separates mind from body, subject from object, observer from observed, 
and accords priority, control, and power to the first half of the duality.’   
456  See Chapter 4, as with the Ndebele artwork, the isiXhosa initiation school blanket and the 
Sesotho Seanamarena, are examples of some of the works whose authors cannot be 
defined by the current individualistic narrative applied by Dean. 
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African norms validate the view that communal authorship457 warrants a type of a 
moral right that can be transferred for perpetual enforcement after the owners’ 
passing.458  
Dean argues that because the paternity right is the right to be identified as the author 
of the work, that right can only attach to in the author. However, he neglects to 
reconcile the technical view of the law with the situation that when the author dies 
heirs have personal and communal interests in legally enforcing the paternity 
right.459  
Visser differs from Dean. He is of the view that that because moral rights are derived 
from copyright it follows that their duration is rationally linked to the duration of the 
copyright, given that a different term for moral rights is not specified in the Act.460 
Moral rights are accessory in nature because no moral right can arise where a 
copyright does not exist.461  
A third argument is advanced by Copeling who asserts that ‘[m]oral rights subsist 
for the duration of the copyright because this is in line with article 6bis of the Berne 
                                                             
457  The communal nature of pre-colonial African communities does not mean that all works 
derived from African communities are always property of the community. See Visser C 
‘Some thoughts on making Intellectual Property Work for Traditional Knowledge’ 658 who 
states: ‘While many indigenous and local communities generate and transmit knowledge 
from generation to generation collectively, there are situations in which individual members 
of these communities can distinguish themselves and be recognised as informal creators or 
inventors distinct from their communities.’ 
458  Gudeman S ‘Sketches, Qualms, and other thoughts on Intellectual Property Rights’ 102-103: 
‘In contrast to this modernist construction [of Western epistemology], in a community 
economy innovations are cultural properties in the sense that they are the product and 
property of a group.’  
459  Pistorius T ‘The nature and scope of copyright’ in Van der Merwe A Law of Intellectual 
Property in South Africa 251. 
460  Visser C, Pretorius JT and others Gibson: South African Mercantile and Company Law (8 
ed) 732.  
461  Ibid. 
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Convention’.462 His reasoning is that article 6bis should be the final arbiter on the 
debate.463 Geyer holds the same opinion as Copeling, arguing that she, 
find[s] this perspective, recorded so close to the promulgation of the 1978 
Copyright Act, very insightful. It is also in line with how article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention had developed over the years. It therefore appears that the moral 
rights in a work subsist for the full copyright term.464  
Tong clarifies that, ‘[t]he formulation of article 6bis is a compromise of sorts that 
reflects the difference in importance placed on moral rights by countries of the civil-
law tradition and those that have been influenced by Anglo-American common-law 
approach’.465 It is against this background that the reliance on article 6bis to advance 
Copeling’s textual argument is problematic.466 This dissertation rejects this textual 
approach to article 6bis in that such reasoning does not take into account that the 
article should be interpreted in light of its political history and aims.467  
As shown in Chapter 3, in prominent African cultures a person never dies but rather 
becomes an ancestor, thus continuing to live after his or her physical death. The 
                                                             
462  Copeling AJC Copyright Law in South Africa 67. Article 6bis: ‘(1) Independently of the 
author’s economic rights, and even  after  the  transfer  of  the  said rights, the author shall 
have the right to claim authorship  of  the  work  and  to  object  to  any distortion, mutilation  
or  other  modification of,  or  other  derogatory  action  in  relation  to, the  said  work,  which  
would  be  prejudicial  to his honor or reputation. 
(2)  The   rights   granted   to   the   author   in accordance with the preceding paragraph 
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall  
be exercisable   by   the   persons   or   institutions authorised  by  the  legislation  of  the  
country where  protection  is  claimed.  However, those countries whose legislation, at the 
moment of their ratification of or accession to  this  Act, does  not provide  for  the  protection  
after  the death of the author of all the rights set out in the  preceding  paragraph  may  
provide  that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.’ 
463  Although this is not expressed outrightly by Copeling, his use of art 6bis of the Berne 
Convention almost seems to suggest that he intended for it to be the unfettered authority in 
settling the debate. If this is truly the case, then Copeling commits a gross error, not only in 
decolonial terms, but also about the fact of the function, object, and scope of operation of 
the Berne Convention. The provisions of the Convention are wide and only act as guidance 
for its member states or signatories. The express operation of the Convention becomes that 
those who adhere to it must go back to their respective countries and democratically adopt 
laws that are in line with Convention. There is no logical precedent where the Convention 
has been used as the final authority on the interpretation of any local legislation especially 
in light of s 20’s silence on the duration of moral rights.  
464  Geyer S ‘Copyright in traditional works: Unravelling the intellectual property laws amendment 
Act of 2013’ 56. 
465  Tong L ‘The Effect of Employee-Authors’ Moral Rights on Employer-Owned Copyright: 
Surviving Article 6bis of the Berne Convention’ 218.  
466  There are further arguments in the debate on the duration of moral rights. See Copeling AJC 
Copyright Law in South Africa. Here the argument seems to be a centralist position which 
tends to mediate between the positions held by Dean and Visser. Copeling contends that 
moral rights endure for the full term of the copyright in accordance with art 6bis of the Berne 
Convention. 
467  Tong L ‘The Effect of Employee-Authors’ Moral Rights on Employer-Owned Copyright: 
Surviving Article 6bis of the Berne Convention’ 218.  
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expansive conception of the author as inclusive of the living, the dead, and the yet-
to-be-born propounded in Chapter 3, demands recognition of moral rights beyond 
individual lifespans. Extending moral rights to be transferable and exist beyond the 
life of the author, decolonises this epistemic anomaly. Using an African lens to 
assert the unending and transferable nature of moral rights, redefines the concept 
to transcend its current individualistic bounds.468  
6.3  Comparative analysis of copyright duration 
6.3.1  Introduction 
The duration of copyright differs depending on the type of work involved. Domestic 
legislation draws from the international obligation contained in article 12 of the 
TRIPS Agreement and section 7 of the Berne Convention, which stipulate the 
standard of 50 years for the duration of copyright.  
Copyright is of limited duration, and when its term expires, the work is no longer 
protected and falls into the public domain which allows the public to use the work 
freely.469  Notwithstanding the uniformity of international obligations, duration differs 
between jurisdictions.470 Unlike most copyright doctrines, duration is already 
differentiated in terms of the type of work and in most instances perpetuates the 
coloniser-colonised and developed-developing dichotomy. This is exemplified in the 
US’s lawmakers extending the duration of copyright at the behest of industry 
lobbyists – most prominently perhaps Disney’s demands for extended protection of 
its cartoon character Mickey Mouse: 
Until the 1970s, copyright terms only lasted for 56 years. But Congress 
retroactively extended the term of older works to 75 years in 1976. Then on 
October 27, 1998—just weeks before works from 1923 were scheduled to fall 
into the public domain—President Bill Clinton signed legislation retroactively 
                                                             
468  The transferability of moral rights must not be reliant on the inevitable death of the author, 
but ought to have regard to the fact that an author should be able to assert his or her rights 
in light of the African belief system of Modimo and Badimo. The isiZulu adage follows, 
‘Umuntu, ngumuntu ngabantu’ which means that a person is a person in relation to other 
people. Others have translated it loosely to mean, ‘I am, and therefore you are’. Dean’s 
conception of personhood begins and ends with the individual, which tends to be unfortunate 
and misleading, especially for purposes of recognition, attribution, and non-distortion in the 
African situation. 
469  Pistorius T ‘The duration of copyright’ 231 in Van der Merwe A (ed) Law of Intellectual 
Property in South Africa.  
470  See art 12 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
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extending the term of older works to 95 years, locking up works published in 
1923 or later for another 20 years.471 
As a result, before the 1970s copyright subsisted for 56 years, was extended to 75 
years in 1976, and in 1998 was extended further to 95 years. During this period, 
major film studios joined forces with the estates of famous authors and musicians 
to push for a copyright extension. This historical context is not conveyed to students 
in the copyright law curriculum.472  
A decolonised curriculum construes this history as reflecting the ideological 
dominance of a specific worldview. It argues that a Transmodernity-centred 
worldview of copyright duration should rather be adopted.473 Under such an 
approach students are encouraged to study uniquely African examples of all works 
– including works of indigenous knowledge. Such works are the products of 
traditional cultural expression and should, as regards questions of copyright duration 
– the dominant narrative in capitalist demands – be approached via Afrocentric 
reasoning. A decolonised pedagogy should question and interrogate the reasoning 
supporting an imported epistemology.474   
Mulder argues that ‘[t]he second way in which colonization damages the 
advancement of knowledge is the creation of a kind of “cram and vomit” ethos with 
                                                             
471  Timothy B ‘Why Mickey Mouse’s 1998 copyright extension probably won’t happen again’ 
ARS Technica online Magazine https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/01/hollywood-
says-its-not-planning-another-copyright-extension-push/ (date of use: 21/12/2018). The 
owners of Mickey Mouse have had the tendency to persuade American law makers to 
legislate in favour of a copyright law that extends copyright duration for works of the same 
type as Mickey Mouse. The copyright for the first Mickey Mouse film, Steamboat Willie, is 
scheduled to expire in 2024, though Disney would still hold a trademark for the Mickey Mouse 
brand. 
472  Ibid. On Mickey Mouse and capitalist lobbying, see generally, Collins S ‘” Property talk” and 
the revival of Blackstonian copyright’ (2006) 9/4 M/C Journal, See further, Lessig L ‘The 
Creative Commons’ (2004) 65/1 Montana Law Review. See also, Depoorter B ‘The Several 
Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property Law’ (2004) 9/4 
Virginia Journal of Law & Technology. 
473  On Transmodernity see Chapter 2. See further, Grosfoguel R ‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial 
Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and 
Global Coloniality’ 12. 
474  Duration has always been a subject of great debate and as with the Walt Disney and Mickey 
Mouse case, the centrality of the debate has always been directed at the interests of private 
property holders and of the public at large. See Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property 
Law 177. They state: ‘Similar debates have always been shaped by the particular 
circumstances under discussion, they are similar in that they have attempted to mediate 
between the private interests of owners and the interests of the public in ensuring access to 
creative works – that is, they have attempted to coordinate and balance the various interests 
that coexist in copyright law.’  
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the emphasis on exams and an absence of independent thinking and innovation.’475 
The cram-and-vomit method is colonial and prejudices the advancement of 
knowledge in all disciplines by focusing on the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’. 
Decolonising the LLB curriculum requires that students be encouraged to debate 
and question the law, not merely consume it as is, only to regurgitate it in their 
summative assessments as evidence of learning.476  
6.3.2  Literary, musical, and artistic works 
Copyright in literary, musical, and artistic works (excluding photographs) subsists 
for the lifetime of the author and for a further 50 years his or her death.477 
The situation in the UK differs slightly from that in South Africa in that in the UK 
copyright subsists for 70 after the death of the author.478 Bently and Sherman, Dean 
and Dyer, Cornish, and Van der Merwe are all silent on why this duration differs in 
various jurisdictions and from one work to another. This silence opens up an avenue 
for students to debate and contrast the different approaches, especially as South 
Africa is a former British colony and one would expect the duration to be uniform. 
The economic difference between developed and developing countries is that the 
former are producers whereas the latter are users, which justifies a differentiated 
model of protection.   
6.3.3  Duration of traditional works 
A careful reading of the IPLAA shows that for traditional works copyright subsists in 
perpetuity. This is because the Act equates traditional works and indigenous 
works.479 This is in contrast to derivative indigenous works which are protected for 
                                                             
475  Mulder L ‘Frantz Fanon, Internalized Oppression and the Decolonization of Education’ 18 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308773706_Frantz_Fanon_Internalized_Oppress
ion_and_the_Decolonization_of_Education. (date of use: 11/06/2018) 
476  Ibid 19. 
477   Section 3(2)(a) of Copyright Act 98 of 1978. This follows on from the guidance given by art 
12 of the TRIPS Agreement. See Van der Merwe A Law of Intellectual Property in South 
Africa 231:  ‘But if, before the death the author, a literary, musical, or artistic work or an 
adaptation of it has not been published, performed in public, broadcast or offered for sale to 
the public in the form of records copyright continues to subsist for a period of fifty years from 
the year in which the first of these acts was done.’ 
478  Section 12(2) of the Copyright Design and Patents Act (CDPA). See further, Bently L & 
Sherman B Intellectual Property Law 180: ‘Subject to exceptions (listed below), copyright in 
a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work expires 70 years from the year in which the author 
dies.’ 
479  Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 28 of 2013, s 28B(3)(b). 
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50 years from the end of the year in which the work was first communicated to the 
public, or the death of the author, whichever occurs first.480  
Van der Merwe textbook uses the terms ‘traditional works’ and ‘indigenous works’ 
interchangeably.481 Dean and Dyer posit that it is important to distinguish between 
the two types of traditional works, namely derivative indigenous works and 
indigenous works because different terms of protection apply in each.482 Bently and 
Sherman, as well as Cornish are silent on the duration of traditional works. The 
IPLAA is crucial because it provides a radical shift from the normative copyright law 
framework by providing perpetual protection for traditional works. This radical 
departure is in line with the proposal made in this chapter regarding the duration of 
moral rights. It is thus conceivable to suggest that the aspect of duration in traditional 
works as provided by section 28F (1)(b) of the IPLAA accords with the ethos of the 
decolonial demand where the duration of protection of indigenous works is 
concerned.  
6.3.4  Duration of works of joint authorship 
Copyright in works of joint authorship subsists for a period of 50 years from the end 
of the year of the death of the last surviving author.483 Dean and Dyer, Cornish, and 
Bently and Sherman are silent on the duration of works of joint authorship. Van der 
Merwe textbook discusses the Copyright Amendment Bill’s proposed introduction of 
the duration of the resale of rights pertaining to artistic works of joint authorship.484 
This resale right which subsists in a co-authored work endures 50 years after the 
year in which the last of the authors dies.485 The teaching relating to duration of 
works of joint authorship does not take into account the definition of an indigenous 
community in section 3(f) of the IPLAA which may present overlaps between a 
community and joint authors, especially where the identity of some of the authors is 
                                                             
480  Ibid s 28B(3)(a). 
481  Pistorius T ‘The duration of copyright’ in Van der Merwe A Law of Intellectual Property in 
South Africa 232 n 7: ‘The traditional work is an indigenous work.’ There is a debate about 
the correctness of this interchangeable use of these two terms. For further discussion, see 
Geyer S ‘Copyright in traditional works: unravelling the intellectual property laws amendment 
Act of 2013’ 47.  
482  Dean O & Dyer A Introduction to Intellectual Property Law 72. 
483  Section 3(4) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978.  
484  Pistorius T ‘The duration of copyright’ 233 in Van der Merwe A Law of Intellectual Property 
in South Africa. 
485  Clause 5 of the Copyright Bill which proposes cl 7C(2)(b)(i) and (ii), if the identity of the artist 
is known or if the identity of one or more, but not all of the artists are known, until the end of 
the period of 50 years after the death of the last known author. 
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not known. This dissertation has proposed in the preceding chapters that an African 
indigenous community means more the definition in the IPLAA, it follows that the 
logic applied to traditional works should be applied to works of joint authorship if it 
is established that these constitute works of indigenous knowledge. 
6.4  Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine copyright law limitations and exceptions using an 
African lens. Although there are various exceptions, the chapter limited its inquiry to 
fair dealing and fair use, pointing out that exceptions are an instrument to curtail the 
copyright owners’ exclusive rights to their work. Following from fair dealing, the 
chapter considered the limitations on moral rights and their transferability (or lack 
thereof) in light of Africanised communal modes of living. The duration of copyright 
in each work lapses depending on the type of work involved. This chapter contrasts 
the various durations to establish why each work is given its specific copyright 
duration. It also specifically considered the African context and the types of works 
unique to Africa. It is contended that the copyright regime determines duration in 
line with the demands of global capital, big business, and general capitalist desires.  
To this end, it becomes clear that, as with fair dealing, copyright duration follows 
British colonial patterns, and is hardly ever informed by the contextual realities of 
African peoples. If anything, the chapter illustrates that the legislature has largely 
been influenced by capitalist desires rather than the needs of the community when 
determining copyright duration. The chapter is guided by Kelbrick’s approach of 
differentiation, and appreciates Africa’s distinct cultural situation, its economic and 
social needs, as well as its history of colonial influence, and uses this as a 
background to study the various examples of the duration of a copyright.  
Having noted that the coloniser is conscious of itself as a Being and is at pains to 
ensure that this consciousness includes the deliberate dismembering of the Black 
Body, the coloniser gives itself reason to engage in the act of dispensing with the 
knowledge systems of local communities. It is contended that in contrasting fair 
dealing with fair use and applying the purposive approach hinted at in Moneyweb,486 
                                                             
486  The court noted that the Copyright Act must be capable of being interpreted in a manner that 
is consistent with the Constitution. Shay argues that the fair dealing exception must be 
interpreted holistically in light of the guarantee of the freedom of expression as espoused by 
our Constitution in a purposive manner. See Shay R ‘Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd vs Media 24 Ltd 
& Another [2016] 3 ALL SA 193 (GJ); 2016 (4) SA 591’ South African Intellectual Propertly 
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a student of copyright law will be in a position to assert his or her Being. The student 
is not seen as an empty vessel but rather as an entity with sufficient mental faculties 
not only to consume knowledge, but also generate it. The dense yet limited wording 
of section 20 of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 affords an opportunity to bring the 
debate to the transferability and duration of moral rights to students and allows them 
to articulate and/or assert their own views, beliefs, personalities, and localised logic 
in the discussion. Questioning and interrogation are means that can be called upon 
to assert and involve students in the content of the curriculum, as an active way of 
decolonising copyright pedagogy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Law Journal, 168. See further Shay R ‘Exclusive rights in the news and the application of fair 
dealing’ (2014) 26/3 SA Mercantile Law Journal 604. His assertions regarding the Moneyweb 
case are in line with his earlier opinion that, ‘[t]he liberal application of the fair dealing 
provisions and argues that this is the best-suited approach in the South African instance, as 
well as in foreign jurisdictions, if it followed in purposive fashion.’ He alludes to our courts’ 
current inclination to liberal application of fair-dealing provisions and proposes that the 
solution is to move towards a purposive application and/or conception.  
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Chapter 7 
 Conclusion 
7.1  Introduction 
This dissertation set out to study the calls for South African higher education to be 
decolonised using Africanisation as a lens through which to assess the copyright 
law curriculum and test the academic theories that underpin decoloniality as part of 
the copyright curriculum.  Copyright law topics were identified and their place in the 
pedagogical scheme in South African law faculties was analysed.  
Applying an African lens to copyright law demands constant reference to historical 
analysis of the development of copyright law. This is important as no study of 
decolonisation can be credible without in-depth historical background. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni paraphrases Ngugi wa Thiongo, to explain that colonialism was not merely 
an episode; rather, it is a continuing exertion of power and societal reconstitution of 
the production of knowledge and subjectivity.487 This pervasive nature of coloniality 
has necessitated this dissertation to go beyond the law and academic legal sources, 
and to have recourse to literature from sociology, political science, philosophy, and 
other humanities adequately to unravel the concepts of coloniality, decolonisation, 
and others. 
7.2  Transformation of legal education 
Drawing from the drawn-out discussions on the LLB curriculum since the dawn of 
democracy, Chapter 1 cogently evaluated the various proposals emerging from the 
discourse. These proposals vary between transformative legal education,488 critical 
legal studies,489 decolonisation, and general transformative pedagogy. A careful 
reading of existing theorising shows that although the academy has grappled 
extensively with transformative constitutionalism,490 this has not extended to the 
                                                             
487  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S ‘Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order’ 27. 
488  Quinot G ‘Transformative Legal Education’ (2012) 431. 
489  Modiri J ‘The Crises in legal education’ 8-9. 
490  See generally Mureinik E ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ 31-48. 
Other scholars, such as Klare, argue that a transformed legal pedagogy means that there 
should not be discord between legal culture and the Constitution’s demand for social change. 
See generally, Klare K ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 146-188. 
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decolonisation of the LLB. This is notable in the wording of the CHE report,491 which 
sets out the envisaged application of the concept of transformative constitutionalism 
in the LLB curriculum in detail, but merely mandates the SALDA to take the 
discussion on decolonisation forward.492 It appears that decolonisation is something 
of an after-thought in the report, inserted only to tick a box. This should come as no 
surprise precisely because the legal academy tends to steer clear of concepts that 
are not born of traditional legal theorising, legislation, and/or the courts.493 This type 
of disciplinary decadence494 lies at the heart of calls for the curriculum to be 
decolonised; a proposal for disciplines (such as the law) to break free of their current 
conservative strictures where law remains strictly law, science remains strictly 
science, and Africanisation remains strictly irrelevant.  
To date the SALDA has released a book on the decolonisation of the LLB curriculum 
pursuant to its mandate in the CHE report.495 The work states that it is foundational 
and presents SALDA’s early thinking on the question of decolonisation and 
Africanisation.496 The six chapters that make up the book provide unique 
conceptualisations of decolonisation and how it can be applied in LLB pedagogy. 
However, all these conceptualisations make the same error: either they liken 
transformative constitutionalism to decolonisation; or they assert that the two 
concepts are synonymous.497  
                                                             
491  Council on Higher Education The State of the provision of the Bachelor of Laws (LLB) 
qualification in South Africa 18. 
492  Ibid 54. 
493  The report does not engage the concept of decoloniality, only mentioning it towards the end 
when making its final recommendations. The recommendation itself does not provide 
practical plans and decisive definitional clarity on what decolonisation entails, or how it 
should be engaged in the LLB curriculum. It instead shifts this task to the hands of the 
SALDA. 
494  See generally, Gordon L ‘Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonisation of Knowledge’ 81-
92. 
495  Tshivase E, Mpedi L & Reddi M (eds) Decolonisation and Africanisation of Legal Education 
in South Africa.  
496  Ibid 1. 
497  See generally, De Villiers D ‘Residuary Sections, Stare Decisis, Customary Law and the 
Development of Common Law – How do these concepts affect decolonisation?’ 76 in 
Tshivase E, Mpedi L & Reddi M ibid:  ‘The question on the decolonisation of the law cannot 
be separated from the decolonisation of legal education and the latter cannot be divorced 
from transformative constitutionalism.’ See also, Tshivase E ‘Principles and Ideas for the 
Decolonisation and Africanisation of Legal Education in South Africa’ 6 in Tshivase E, Mpedi 
L & Reddi M (eds) ibid who states: ‘The preamble of the Constitution is of particular 
relevance. Its framing supports the call for decolonisation and Africanisation in general.’ 
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This dissertation has sought to take the decolonisation dialogue on legal education 
forward, clarify some of the questions surrounding decolonisation, and show its 
practical application in the LLB curriculum in general, and in the copyright law 
curriculum specifically. To this end, the dissertation has addressed two student 
textbooks on intellectual property law and adopted them as a matrix within which to 
re-examine selected copyright law concepts at undergraduate level.  
7.3  Decolonial articulations in copyright law 
Chapter 2 argued that both the copyright curriculum and the Copyright Act are 
essentially Eurocentric. It contends that Africanising the copyright curriculum will not 
necessarily automatically mean the curriculum will have been decolonised. The 
chapter approached conceptual Africanisation as an endeavour to analyse the 
curriculum though the context-specific lens of the Black Body and in the context of 
the unique experiences and epistemologies of Africa.498 Chapter 2 framed 
Africanisation499 though the decolonial project by explaining the difference between 
colonialism and coloniality, asserting that coloniality marks the continued patterns 
of the subjugation of the colonised through the enactment of global racial hierarchy 
and the hegemonic Eurocentric epistemologies in the present-day world system.500  
This chapter revealed that decolonisation speaks to the complete experience of the 
Black Body in an anti-black world, and casts this as a starting point for any dialogue 
on decolonising the curriculum. For example, on the question of coloniality of Being, 
                                                             
498  Lembede A. ‘Congress Youth League Manifesto’ 90-91 in Edgar R & Ka Msumza L (eds) 
Freedom in Our Lifetime. The author sets out two different worldviews of Africans and 
Westerners respectively. He argues that the West views the world as a gigantic machine, in 
which individuals are tiny private actors, personal power, successes and fame are the 
measure of values presenting an ideal that each person should live for. He further argues 
that, on the other hand, the African views the world as a composite whole, within which 
individuals are in a constant struggle to arrive at a harmonious collective community. This 
contrast in worldviews is crucial because it validates the urge to use an African lens to study 
copyright law and its pegagocial framework. See generally, Biko S ‘Black Consciousness 
and the quest for a True Humanity’ in Steve Biko I write what I like – Selected Writings. Biko 
argues that white racism and the colonial order has robbed the world of the Black Body’s 
contribution to the development of global culture and community. He follows on from 
Lembede’s assertions, positing that Africa can contribute to the world by teaching it the true 
value of humanity and humility.  
499  On conceptual Africanisation see generally, Zitzke E ‘A decolonial critique of private law and 
human rights’ 492-516. 
500  Grosfoguel R ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’ 205. 
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the chapter applied Maldonado-Torres’s formulation in which Descartes’s 
philosophy was inverted to explain the essence of decolonisation: 
The ‘I think, therefore I am’ presupposes two unacknowledged dimensions. 
Beneath the ‘I think’ we can read ‘others do not think’, and behind the ‘I am’ it is 
possible to locate the philosophical justification for the idea that ‘others are not’ 
or do not have being.501 
As long as 150 years before Descartes’s ontological formulation, European thinking 
can be located in the maxim ego conquistus – I conquer, therefore I am.502 This 
reading suggests that Europe had assumed a God-like status, placing itself at the 
foundation of knowledge, acting as an imperial being at the centre of the world; a 
world it had already conquered.503 The coloniser assumed that the Black Body are 
not thinkers, not Beings, and therefore asking questions about their theories of 
knowledge was pointless.504 
Having studied the two other manifestations of coloniality (power and knowledge) in 
Chapter 2, this dissertation finds that the question of the coloniality of Being is 
central to efforts to decolonise the curriculum and higher education in general. 
Colonial atrocities were all justified by the deliberate normalisation of the non-Being 
of the Black Body.505 The assertion that Being is central to the decolonial project in 
higher education tends to be contrary to the dominant narrative in the area of 
curriculum development where the focus is, as a rule, on the coloniality of power 
and knowledge. 
It is trite that universities are centres of knowledge – institutions of colonial power. 
Any inquiry regarding the curriculum should therefore strongly emphasise Being as 
the point of departure in the students’ engagement with the world around them, the 
university structure, and the content of the curriculum. The chronology of application 
                                                             
501  Maldonado-Torres N On the Coloniality of Being 252. 
502  Grosfoguel R Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: 
Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality 6. 
503  Ibid. 
504  Fanon F Black Skin, White Masks 73 where the author states, ‘[t]he white man imposes 
discrimination on me, makes me a colonised slave, robs me of all worth, all individuality, tells 
me that I am a parasite on the world and that I must bring myself as quickly as possible into 
step with the white world.’ See further, Biko S. ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a 
True Humanity’ 96. He argues that the epistemic concerns of the Black Body are 
encapsulated in a black culture that implies a freedom for Black Bodies to innovate without 
recourse to Western hegemonic values.  
505  Fanon F Black Skin, White Masks 143 where the author makes specific reference to the non-
Being of the Bantu people of South Africa. 
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does not negate the importance of grappling with knowledge and power, but insists 
that the decolonial project begins with re-humanising the dismembered Black Being 
prior to addressing questions of power and knowledge, which naturally follow after 
the re-membering of the dismembered.506 
The chapter further found that Africa is saddled with irrelevant knowledge that 
serves to disempower rather than empower, and alienate rather than re-member 
individuals and communities, thus laying a firm basis for decolonisation of the 
copyright law curriculum.507 
The chapter concluded by briefly analysing the history of the development of 
copyright law globally, and pointing out some of the colonial legacies dominating the 
copyright law curriculum.  
7.4  Decolonised intellectual property law justificatory theories 
Justificatory theories are not generally seen as a starting point in the LLB curriculum. 
None of the textbooks studied in this dissertation make mention of these theories. 
This is in the main due to their theoretical and ideological nature.508 The theories 
are a subject of academic writings by various scholars.509 Chapter 3 contends that 
justificatory theories are the basic building blocks upon which the system of 
intellectual property law stands, thus insisting that it should be inserted in the 
copyright law curriculum at undergraduate level.  
Chapter 3 considered the colonial nature of current theorisation on the justificatory 
discussion using the incentive theory and the labour theory. Under the former, the 
chapter proposed the African philosophy of Mohlomism as an alternative in critically 
analysing the concept of incentive in intellectual property.510 Mohlomism not only 
                                                             
506  On the process of re-membering the dismembered Black Body, see Chapter 2 generally.  
507  Ndlovu-Gatsheni S Decoloniality in Africa: A Continuing Search for a New World Order 33. 
508  See generally, Sunder M From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global 
Justice. See also, Drahos P A Philosophy of Intellectual Property. 
509  Du Bois M ‘Justificatory Theories for Intellectual Property Viewed through the Constitutional 
Prism’ 1-37. See further, Craig C Copyright, Communication and Culture: Towards a 
Relational Theory of Copyright Law Edward Elgar Publishing. 
510  Sesanti S ‘Africanizing the Philosophy curriculum through teaching African culture modules: 
An African Renaissance act’ 434. For further history of Morena Mohlomi and his philosophy, 
see Max Du Preez’s Chancellor’s address at a University of Free State, under the theme, 
‘The Socrates of Africa and his Student: A Model of Pre-Colonial African Leadership’ 
http://www.ufh.ac.za/files/max_dupreez.pdf  (date of use: 27/05/2018). See also the video 
and audio on YouTube online portal https://youtu.be/WNxxLOaAzTQ (date of use: 
24/12/2018) 
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decolonises the curriculum by its inclusion, but also offers an alternative to the 
extant Eurocentric understanding of incentivisation.511 The dissertation intervenes 
in the decolonial project by introducing the philosophy of Mohlomism which is 
important in that it allows for the practical application of Transmodernity in the 
decolonisation project and in the copyright law curriculum; inserting into the 
incentive theory, the African values of truthfulness, justice, peace, and the pursuit 
of sane humanism.512 
As regards the labour theory, Chapter 3 argued that Eurocentric paradigms 
emphasise the individual while neglecting Africa’s strong emphasis on communal 
living. It thus introduced the African idea of ancestors as authors,513 and argued that 
the labour theory’s assumption that intellectual property is born of the labour and 
skill of an individual is archaic and unworkable when explaining authorship in the 
context of some artistic products reflecting traditional cultural expressions and 
African indigenous knowledge systems.514 
7.5  Indigenous knowledge, Ubuntu and moral rights 
Chapter 4 starts by defining copyright as a concept and showing the basic taxonomy 
it follows outside of legislative provisions. This is crucial as to decolonise the 
copyright curriculum it is important first to understand its essence. To achieve this, 
the chapter relies on Pistorius’s five characteristics of copyright.515 It then argues 
that these five characteristics are in fact a representation of a system of copyright 
still steeped in colonial epistemological patterns which deliberately neglect the 
context of Africa’s epistemologies. This reality was exemplified by the negative 
                                                             
511  Mahao N ‘The King Moshoeshoe I Memorial Lecture’ 6-8. 
512  Sesanti S ‘Africanizing the Philosophy curriculum through teaching African culture modules: 
An African Renaissance act’ 434. 
513  The belief in ancestors and other forms of spirituality is at the heart of African and its people 
since time immemorial, an African lens through which all concepts are looked at is 
incomplete when it is bereft of a deepened understanding of ancestors. See Lembede A 
‘Freedom in Our Lifetime’ 19: ‘Africans had to rely on their inner resources to overcome 
inequitites and that spiritual beliefs were a necessary component of economic and political 
advancement.’ 
514  Craig C ‘Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A warning against a Lockean 
Approach to Copyright Law’ (2002) 28/1 Queen’s Law Journal 12-13. See also, Mostert F 
The Development of the Natural-Law Principle as One of the Principles underlying the 
Recognition of Intellectual Property: A Historical Survey from Roman law to Modern-Day Law 
495. ‘The doctrine of intellectual property is predicated on the principle that the creator of a 
work of intellect has an absolute and exclusive right to it, just as property as a tangible thing 
would grant unfettered dominion to the owner.’ 
515  Pistorius T ‘Introduction’ 179 in Van der Merwe A Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa.  
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characteristic of copyright. Thus was countered in Chapter 4 by proposing that 
copyright shift from its negative orientation and assume a positive stance which will 
allow it to become proactive and open rather than merely an instrument for the 
prohibition of predetermined acts in relation to a work. The chapter found that a shift 
from a negative to a positive characterisation of copyright, allows it to respond 
decisively to those instances in which cultural appropriation overlaps into copyright 
law. Cultural appropriation is an anomaly that society is yet to eradicate. It features 
in copyright when works that enjoy copyright protection amount to the undue taking 
of a people’s culture for perverted commercial gain; this is one practical enactment 
of the coloniality of knowledge. The chapter found that a positive copyright law is 
enabled to mediate incidents of cultural appropriation thus achieving decolonisation.  
The chapter also studied the concept of moral rights as currently provided for by 
section 20 of the Copyright Act as well as it is taught in Bently and Sherman.516 
Broadly, it showed how moral rights could be taught using the African philosophy of 
Ubuntu, it recommends that the aspects of recognition and respect should be read 
through the prism of Ubuntu. This would not only make the concept context-specific, 
but inserting Ubuntu into the curriculum achieves decolonisation by way of reversing 
epistemicide, wherein concepts such as Ubuntu are deliberately dispensed away 
with.  
The inclusion of Ubuntu in the pedagogy of moral rights does not come without 
necessary criticism in that the chapter argues that existing theorisation on Ubuntu 
is laden with ideological, political, and intellectual inaccuracies. To this end, the 
chapter recommends a decolonial approach towards Ubuntu. On a practical level, 
the chapter proposes that moral rights should be taught on the basis of the pillars of 
Ubuntu: recognition and respect. This recommendation ties in, and is validated by, 
the intervention that coloniality of Being is the primary inquiry in the project to 
decolonise higher education as Ubuntu speaks to the very ontological and epistemic 
traditions of the Black Body.  
The chapter concludes by turning to three indigenous knowledge case studies to 
show the complexity of colonial copyright’s attempt to regulate expressions that fall 
outside of its traditional strictures. These cases studies are crucial in understanding 
                                                             
516  Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law (4 ed) 272. 
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three things about copyright law and the Black Body: (1) there is a relationship 
between the individual author and the community, and simply because an 
expression is authored by the community does not negate the skill, labour, and effort 
of the individual; (2) that recognition as espoused by existing moral rights theory 
should not be limited to the personality of the author but to the work itself as an act 
of re-membering the Being of the Thingified Black Body; and (3) copyright has a role 
to play in stemming cultural appropriation. 
7.6  Requirements for copyright 
Chapter 5 examined the requirements for the copyright focusing on originality and 
the material embodiment requirements. The chapter opens with an important 
disclaimer which says that although the courts have found that once an expression 
does not meet the material embodiment threshold, it is not a work and thus falls 
outside of the realm of copyright.517 A decolonial inquiry construes some products 
of traditional cultural expressions as worthy of copyright protection and applies a 
decolonial critique to material embodiment as a basis. This critique showed that 
traditional cultural expressions may reflect Africa’s diverse history which includes a 
rich oral culture thus excluding much of its cultural products on the basis of the 
current strictures governing copyright law – eg, the material embodiment threshold.  
Following on from Chapter 4, the threshold was found to be purveyor of cultural 
imperialism in terms of which international corporations record sacred African 
cultural expressions (such as the songs sung in the isiZulu annual Umkhosi 
womhlanga) for commercial purposes without due regard of their sacred nature.518 
Chapter 5 critically analysed the originality requirement, asserting that the concept 
is not defined by legislation and that courts rely on the skill and labour threshold. It 
found that decoloniality would seek copyright to shift from understanding these 
definitions through the colonial and Eurocentric lens which individualises an author’s 
skill and labour. The chapter picked up the theorisation of the African belief in 
ancestors in Chapters 3 and 4 and argued decisively that an author’s skill and labour 
ought to include communal authors that include the dead, alive, and the yet-to-be-
                                                             
517  See generally, Waylite Diary CC v National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA 645 (A) 653F-G.  
518  On cultural imperialism and the commodification of culture, see generally, Whitt L Science, 
Colonialism and Indigenous People: The Cultural Politics of Law and Knowledge. 
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born. This is a new concept which will contribute greatly to an Africanised copyright 
law curriculum.519 
The chapter concludes by looking to the IPLAA, the Swakopmund Protocol, and the 
Indigenous Knowledge Act as potential alternatives for finding definitional clarity on 
questions that relate to copyright law and the intangible, sacred, and communal 
nature of some products of traditional cultural expression. In relation to the IPLAA, 
the chapter recommends that the meaning of an indigenous community should be 
read not only in light of the provisions of the IKS Act, but also instruments such as 
the Swakopmund Protocol to find greater definitional clarity on the ever evolving 
sphere of indigenous knowledge systems and the indigenous community. As 
regards the Swakopmund Protocol, the chapter commended the Protocol’s wider 
definition of indigenous community, intangible works, and products of sacred cultural 
expression, and notes with regret that South Africa is not yet a signatory to the 
Protocol. This contextual and purposive reading of the meaning of an indigenous 
traditional community comports with the decolonial imperative of ensuring that the 
marginalised epistemologies are re-centred within the knowledge production space 
despite their not conforming to Eurocentric copyright law strictures. 
7.7  Copyright limitations and exceptions 
In Chapter 6, Kelbrick’s observation that there is a need to differentiate how 
intellectual property law is taught in developed countries and developing countries, 
is supported.520 Kelbrick’s assertion on differentiation is a departure from the framing 
of intellectual property law protections as espoused by the TRIPS Agreement,521 
which requires that all countries, whether developing or developed, should provide 
the same minimum level of protection for intellectual property rights.522  
There is no better topic to illustrate Kelbrick's assertions than copyright limitations 
and exceptions. Chapter 6 found that, drawing from Kelbrick’s insights, a 
decolonised copyright curriculum will require an engaged study of the varying socio-
                                                             
519  On the African meaning of persons as the alive, dead, and yet-to-be-born see generally, 
Taylor D ‘Defining Ubuntu for Business ethics – Deontological approach’ (2014) 33/3 South 
African Journal of Philosophy. 
520  Kelbrick R ‘The need for different perspectives’ 39.  
521  This is an agreement establishing the World Trade organization (WTO) which reflects the 
outcome of the Uruguay round of the GATT negotiations that lasted from 1986 through 1994. 
522  Visser C ‘Some thoughts on making Intellectual Property Work for Traditional Knowledge’ 
657.  
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economic, social, political, economic, and cultural situations in developing countries 
and contrast these with those in the developed countries. With the appreciation of 
the varying conditions and situations, the dissertation recommends that the 
curriculum should present copyright limitations and exceptions in the context of the 
needs of a specific country.  This represents a radical shift in the current teaching 
methods which seek to paint a picture of intellectual property rights as following the 
same set of patterns the world over. 
Bently and Sherman523 posit that,  
the restricted approach [to fair dealing] adopted in the United Kingdom should 
be contrasted with the United States of America’s copyright law,524 which has a 
general defence of fair use such that if the court is satisfied that the use is fair, 
then there will be no infringement.525  
The court noted that the Copyright Act must be capable of being interpreted in a 
manner that is consistent with the Constitution.526 The dissertation recommends that 
a decolonial copyright law curriculum needs to take heed of the argument made by 
Shay, where he insists that in light of the guarantee of the freedom of expression as 
espoused by our Constitution, the fair dealing exception must be interpreted 
holistically and in  a purposive manner.527 Fair dealing, and all other copyright 
exceptions and limitations are already an expression of the contradictions inherent 
in the interests of the individual and of the community. 
7.8 Recommendations 
Having laboured into an enquiry of the content of copyright law as taught in South 
African law faculties, with a specific aim to decolonise this specific aspect of the 
copyright law curriculum, this dissertation makes various concrete 
recommendations for copyright law teachers.  
As regards the transformation of higher education broadly, and the LLB curriculum 
specifically, the dissertation recommends that implementers of transformation 
                                                             
523  Bently L & Sherman B Intellectual Property Law 224. 
524  US Copyright Act of 1976, s 107.  
525  Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland, News Group Newspapers Ltd, News International Ltd, 
Murrell CA 10 Feb 2000 EMLR 363 para 21. 
526  Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd v Media 24 Ltd & Another [2016] 3 ALL SA 193 (GJ), 2016 (4) SA 591 
para 124.  
527  Shay R ‘Moneyweb (Pty) Ltd v Media 24 Ltd & Another [2016] 3 ALL SA 193 (GJ), 2016 (4) 
SA 591’ South African Intellectual Property Law Journal 168.  
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should break free from formalist and positivist perceptions, and instead appreciate 
that the law is a discipline that is not divorced from broader society and it should be 
studied in conjunction with, and with the context of, non-legal subjects such as 
philosophy, politics, sociology, sciences, theology and others. It further 
recommends that law teachers should desist from any approach that centres or 
deifies the Constitution of the republic. The dissertation makes this recommendation 
in light of theorisation that locates the deification of the Constitution in apartheid and 
related colonial schools of thought. The dissertation appreciates the Constitution as 
forming part of the varying contestations about the true meaning of the legacy of 
South Africa’s democratic project.  
As regards decolonisation of the curriculum, the dissertation recommends that law 
teachers should begin by distinguishing between colonialism and coloniality when 
teaching students about the depth, and reach of colonialism in the curriculum. It 
further recommends that students should be made aware of the three localities of 
coloniality, and that the scholarly work about the coloniality of Being serves as a 
good example to make students understand the subtle nature of the operations of 
the global colonial system that continues to exist even after the demise of legislated 
colonialism. 
The dissertation revealed that students experience colonial education as alienating 
as they are unable to identify with the content that is taught. To remedy this, it is 
recommended that decoloniality should be understood to mean, inter alia, that the 
curriculum ought to be structured in a way that students are given an opportunity to 
immerse themselves in the curriculum; to be encouraged to think, reason, and write 
critically, guided by their lived experiences.528 Decolonisation allows the student a 
voice to critique, reason, and insert him/herself in the curriculum. The student is thus 
empowered to question a Eurocentric copyright law, and to add to the discourse of 
reforming the law. 
As regards the justificatory theories, the dissertation recommends that the African 
philosophy of Mohlomism should be used to teach the incentive to innovate theory, 
and that a deepened study of African modes of communal living should be used to 
                                                             
528  The research deliberately uses the word ‘guided’ because the image of guiding is different 
from that of dictating. The current Eurocentric curriculum in its format dictates to the student 
what is right and what is wrong. A truly decolonial curriculum allows the student to be and it 
uses existing literature to guide rather than to restrict, dictate, or confine the student.  
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teach the labour theory. These two theories are posited as alternatives to 
Eurocentric intellectual property law justificatory theories. 
As regards the nature of copyright, the dissertation recommends that the current 
five characteristics of copyright as used to define copyright by student textbooks 
should be studied through a decolonial lens. It understands that decoloniality will 
achieve to, for example, transform the ‘negative’ nature of copyright law from one 
that merely prohibits people from certain actions to become instructive, proactive 
and helpful in mediating competing societal interests that sometimes emerge 
through instances of cultural appropriation.  
The dissertation further recommends that moral rights in a decolonised copyright 
curriculum should be taught using three pillars, these are respect, recognition and 
Ubuntu. It specifically recommends that the philosophy of Ubuntu should be rescued 
from the current neo-colonial habits with which it is currently canvassed in the 
academy and the courts. 
As regards the requirements of originality and material embodiment, the dissertation 
recommends that law teachers should make students attentive of the colonial nature 
of originality, as it draws its being from individualistic labour theory, which assumes 
that an author is always an individual, or a group of individuals (either as co-authors 
or communal authors). Law teachers should also create an environment of 
pluriversal529 epistemic reasoning in discussions about the material embodiment 
requirement, showing students that this requirement assumes that expressions only 
fit the ambit of intellectual property only when it is materially embodied which makes 
most traditional cultural expressions to fall out of copyright protection. This 
Eurocentric conception of the material embodiment requirement makes traditional 
cultural expressions to be vulnerable to colonial and commercial exploitation. 
As regards copyright limitations and exceptions, the dissertation recommends that 
the curriculum should embrace a context-sensitive approach in teaching students 
                                                             
529  Santos B de S Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide 172, the author 
stresses that a crucial part of the decolonial dialogue is appreciating the epistemic need for 
a pluriverse in place of a universe, he argues that ‘[t]here is no single, univocal way of not 
existing. The logics and processes through which metonymic reason produces the 
nonexistence of what does not fit its totality and linear time are various. Nonexistence is 
produced whenever a certain entity is disqualified and rendered invisible, unintelligible, or 
irreversibly discardable. What unites the different logics of the production of nonexistence is 
that they are all manifestations of the same rational monoculture.’ 
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about the various statutory limitations. It recommends that a decolonial copyright 
curriculum should explicitly differentiate between the global South and the global 
North, and use this differentiation to teach students to be critical of the uniformity of 
global intellectual property regime which is driven by capitalist expansionist 
aspirations. 
7.9  Concluding remarks 
This dissertation poses a two-fold question to invite decolonial dialogue in the 
copyright law curriculum: (1) What is the starting point in seeking to decolonise 
higher education? and (2) What does the practical project of decolonisation entail 
as regards the curriculum and copyright law pedagogy? The various chapters have 
responded decisively by critically examining extant Eurocentric theories which 
underpin the current copyright regime. It has assessed existing legislation and 
juxtaposed it with the content of the curriculum as presented in South African law 
faculties.  
The dissertation observes that the starting point in seeking to decolonise higher 
education is a deepened theoretical, abstract, philosophical, and intellectual 
understanding of the entrenchment of the colonial order post the official colonial 
period. This steers clear of disciplinary decadence, instead preferring to grapple with 
the prevailing conditions holistically. In other words, a copyright law curriculum is 
not studied in isolation or exclusively, but rather in light of its position in the global 
coloniality project. The dissertation thus insists that no logical decolonial enquiry can 
be undertaken before there has been a proper analysis of the three manifestations 
of coloniality – Being, power, and knowledge. Furthermore, where the curriculum 
and higher education in general are concerned, the systematic operation of the 
coloniality of Being must be the first target, with the coloniality of power and 
knowledge following naturally. 
On a practical level, decolonisation of the copyright law curriculum recognises the 
missing voices (epistemology) of the Black Body, Africans, the subaltern, and the 
global South.  This is exposed by various copyright law concepts that contradict the 
basic values of the proverbial ‘Other’. Even where contradictions are not apparent, 
the copyright narrative, on a conceptual level, remains obscenely skewed as it 
reflects only the epistemic traditions of, mostly white males from Europe. The 
118 
 
immediate task is to engage in deliberate research which will disinter and resuscitate 
the silenced epistemologies of the Black Body and re-member them in the family of 
existing knowledge(s).  
Decolonisation studies the role of the different actors in the curriculum. At the centre 
of this study is how colonial education has created fixed classroom roles in which 
the teacher is omniscient and the student is the perpetual infant who must be spoon-
fed (if not suckled) by the teacher.530 The decolonial project demands a radical break  
with this type of didactic to a pedagogical framework that embraces both the teacher 
and the student as bearers of knowledge and in which assessment methods are 
structured to reflect this reality.  
The intended outcome of epistemic decolonisation and conceptual Africanisation 
that is the African lens, is to achieve a pluriversal epistemic tradition in an academy 
which embraces different ways of knowing, doing, and thinking, and which 
appreciates that superior logic is divorced from the colour of the skin and the 
geographic, political, and historical positioning of the source. Such an approach 
succeeds in re-humanising the dismembered Black Body whose knowledge(s) 
continue to be regarded as sub-knowledge, at best, or just plain voodoo, at worst.  
The copyright law curriculum offers the academy a rare opportunity to practically 
test in practice, the application of the proposals and recommendations brought to 
the fore by the decolonial discourse. This dissertation sets a firm basis upon which 
further work can be undertaken to achieving a truly decolonised higher education 
and copyright law curriculum.  
 
 
 
                                                             
530  Biko S ‘Black Souls in White Skins’ in Steve Biko I write what I like – Selected Writings 24. 
The author makes the point that the racist status quo in colonial territories in South Africa is 
that the education system follows a pattern of superior-inferior white-black stratification in 
which the white person is the perpetual teacher and the Black Body is a perpetual student. 
The author further bemoans white arrogance, suggesting that white people should desist 
from the false thinking that they should always lead in innovation, research, and knowledge 
production, but rather be attentive of alternative epistemologies. This is a point that is 
strongly made by Lembede A ‘Freedom in Our Lifetime’ 91 where he argues that the effect 
of colonial education is that it reduces the (black) student to a perpetual minor, thus negating 
his or her Being and ability to produce knowledge. 
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